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Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments.... Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made avail-
able to all on equal terms.
-Chief Justice Earl Warren)
I. INTRODUCTION: TITLE IX
On February 26, 1992, the United States Supreme Court, in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools,2 announced that "[i]n sum, we conclude
that a damages remedy is available for an action brought to enforce Title
IX.' '3 This decision has ushered in the post-modern era of Title IX activity.
June 23, 1997 will mark the silver anniversary of the passage of Title IX.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
2. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
3. Id. at 76.
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This article examines the representative issues and battles being fought in
the educational forum concerning sex discrimination in academics and
athletics. The years 1994 and 1995 represented a mixed bag for Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX"). The year 1996 resulted in
an avalanche of major decisions in this area, which will also be explored.4
The Title IX statute states that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 5 This article focuses on Title IX as it
pertains to interscholastic and intercollegiate athletic programs and activi-
ties. Due to the influx of decisions concerning Title IX generally, all of the
Title IX decisions rendered since 1994 will be probed. There were no
changes to the Title IX statute itself, though Congress enacted a truth-in-
advertising type of statute, entitled the "Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics
Act,"6 and the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR") implemented regulations.
The new Act concerns compiling and making available financial information
relating to intercollegiate athletic departments which receive federal funds,
either directly or indirectly, through their universities.
The Title IX regulations were enacted in 1975.8 To date, no changes
have been made. The 1979 Health Education & Welfare ("HEW") Policy
Interpretation addressing intercollegiate athletics also remains unchanged.9
The United States Department of Education, through the OCR, is the main
entity responsible for enforcement and compliance with Title IX. During
April 1990, the OCR unveiled a new Title IX Athletics Investigators Manual.
No changes were made to the Manual despite the meetings that were held
during this period to review it. The OCR's actual budget for fiscal year 1995
4. See Education Amendments of 1972 §§ 901-909, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
6. See Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382 (Oct. 20, 1994),
which contained the Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics Act. See also Jim Naughton &
Rachanee Srisavasdr, Data on Funds for Men's & Women's Sports Became Available as New
Law Takes Effect, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 25, 1996, at A45.
7. 34 C.F.R. § 668 (1996).
8. 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (1996).
9. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979). The OCR is excepted from having to comply with refer-
ences to the Women's Equity Action League v. Harris case contained therein due to the
decision in Women's Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 44
Fed. Reg. at 71,418.
1997]
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totaled the incredulous amount of $58,236,000.10 Congressional hearings
were held on Title IX during May 1995. As a result, during September
1995, the OCR delivered a draft policy clarification entitled "Clarification of
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three Part Test." During
January 1996, the OCR issued the official "Clarification of Intercollegiate
Athletics Policy Guidance." The states directed few bills to the issue of
gender equity in academic athletic programs and activities.1
The major issues raised in this time period are: 1) should the "effective
accommodation" test be used in analyzing whether a school is satisfying the
interests and abilities of students of each sex when separate athletic pro-
grams and activities are provided; 2) whether a Title IX cause of action
exists for an employee of an educational institution based on sex discrimina-
tion, as opposed to merely a Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII")'2
cause of action; 3) assuming arguendo that Title X does allow a private
cause of action for athletic department employees of educational institutions,
then what protection does Title IX provide where the coach of the women's
athletic team is paid less than the coach of the men's team, coaching the
same sport, primarily due to the sex of the athletes involved; 4) what
standard applies to analyze a Title IX sexual harassment action; and does the
standard differ based on whether the sexual harassment concerns a student
versus an educational employee, or when the offending party is another
student (peer sexual harassment), or another individual; 5) procedurally,
10. Clinton's Fiscal 1997 Budget Plans for Higher Education & Science, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Mar. 29, 1996, at A43. The estimated OCR budget for fiscal year 1996 was
$53,951,000, and the amount requested for fiscal year 1997 was an even $60 million. Id.
11. For example, on January 5, 1995, a bill was introduced in Missouri prohibiting
"colleges and universities from discriminating on the basis of gender in athletics programs."
State Legislation Relating to College Athletics, NCAA NEws, Jan. 25, 1995, at 5. On January
30, 1995, a bill was introduced in New York, S. 1352, which would provide that educational
institutions must provide each student with equal opportunity in athletics programs without
regard to each student's sex or familial status. State Legislation Relating to College Athletics,
NCAA NEws, Feb. 22, 1995, at 14. In Tennessee, a bill was introduced, S. 694, which would
require the payment of "equal base salaries to athletic directors and coaches with equal
experience limits this requirement to sports in which both men's and women's teams compete
at the intercollegiate level." Id. An Illinois bill, S. 269, would allow tuition waivers to female
student athletes at public universities in the state. State Legislation Relating to College
Athletics, NCAA NEws, May 31, 1995, at 5. Representative Kahn of Minnesota introduced a
state bill which would amend "the Human Rights Act to permit the restriction of membership
on an athletics team (program or event) to participants of one sex whose overall athletics
opportunities previously have been limited." State Legislation Relating to College Athletics,
NCAA NEWS, Dec. 2, 1996, at 19.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (1994).
[Vol. 21:545
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which statute of limitations should be used for a Title IX cause of action,
and; 6) does Title IX foreclose a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
vice versa.13 Is Title IX really an enigma?
The overwhelming number of cases commenced, subject to court
decisions, or settled concerned female employees of athletic departments-
coaches, athletic directors, or trainers-were predicated on claims of sexual
discrimination or retaliation pursuant to three possible federal statutes: Title
IX, Title VII, or the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("Equal Pay Act").' 4 There
continues to be an absence of a uniform judicial standard concerning these
cases from a Title IX perspective.' 5 There was a lot of activity concerning
female collegiate students seeking to enforce gender equity. A handful of
cases were brought by male collegiate students, all seeking to forestall
internment of their varsity sports teams. The courts turned back all their
attempts. The first co-ed gender equity claims relating to athletics were
commenced during the time period. Surprisingly, there was scant legal
action instituted concerning interscholastic athletic programs, which contin-
ues the trend of 1992-93. Interestingly, the courts rendered the first of a
handful of decisions concerning educational programs and activities afforded
female prisoners in this country, which underscored their second-class status
in this institution.
Collectively, the decisions rendered during 1994-95, with a few
exceptions, have a meandering quality about them. Conversely, the deci-
sions handed down during 1996 were being delivered at a staccato pace, with
the effect of a volcanic eruption. 16 Part Two reviews decisions involving
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988).
15. There continues to be no judicial decision interpreting "equal opportunity" as it per-
tains to coaches, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(5)-(6), or the following regulations concerning
employment: 34 C.F.R. § 106.7 (Effect of employment opportunities), 34 C.F.R. § 106.51
(Employment), 34 C.F.R. § 106.52 (Employment criteria), 34 C.F.R. § 106.54
(Compensation), 34 C.F.R. § 106.55 (Job classification and structure). See Diane Heckman,
The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in Intercollegiate Athletics During 1992-93: Defining
the "Equal Opportunity" Standard, 1994 DEr. C.L. REv. 953, 998-1016 (1994).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (single-sex military
schools) (discussed infra p. 555); Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th
Cir. 1996) (discussed infra p. 623); Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir.
1996) (discussed infra p. 551); Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 1395 (5th Cir.
1996) (Title IX sexual abuse) (discussed infra p. 640); Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ.,
76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996) (Title IX sexual harassment) (discussed infra p. 625); Davis v.
Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996) (Title IX peer sexual harass-
ment) (discussed infra p. 641); Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 357 (1996) (Title IX employment); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir.
1997] 549
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procedural aspects of Title IX. Part Three examines cases dealing with
education generally, including separate programs for men and women at
public military schools and at prisons (federal and state). Part Four switches
to athletic departments, programs, and activities, and monitors decisions
involving student athletes and prospective student athletes on the interscho-
lastic and intercollegiate level. Part Five showcases decisions concerning
athletic department employees or former employees-brought pursuant to
Title IX, but frequently pursuing other federal statutes-in four areas:
hiring; equal pay and benefits or comparable pay; termination claims
predicated on sex discrimination; and retaliation claims. Part Six focuses on
educational employment termination or retaliation generally. Part Seven
details the implosion of Title IX case law pertaining to sexual harassment of
students or educational employees. This area is subdivided into six catego-
ries depending on the status of the individual who allegedly engaged in the
harassing actions and the status of the individual allegedly harassed, and
includes: coach/student athlete; teacher/student; supervisor/student;
other/student; student/student (peer sexual harassment); and educational
employment sexual harassment. Part Eight monitors the congressional and
federal regulatory action of the United States Department of Education and
the OCR.
IX. PROCEDURALLY
In Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College,17 the Eighth Circuit
utilized the Minnesota six-year statute of limitations utilized for personal
injury actions for a Title IX claim, eschewing a one-year statute of limita-
tions pertinent to the state civil rights actions (Minnesota Human Rights
1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussed infra p. 565;
Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Kan. 1996) (Title IX contact sport participation)
(discussed infra p. 564); Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La.
1996) (Title IX equal opportunity for female collegiate student athletes) (discussed infra
p. 580); Bartges v. University of N.C. at Charlotte, 908 F. Supp. 1312 (W.D.N.C. 1995)
(discussed infra p. 608); and Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 900
F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 99 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussed infra p. 631).
See also Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
165 (1996) (declining review of the Fifth Circuit's decision).
17. 72 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 1995). See Nelson v. University of Me. Sys., 914 F. Supp. 643,
648 (D. Me. 1996) (applying Maine's six-year personal injury statute of limitations, rather
than the civil rights statute of limitations) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)). See
also Nelson v. University of Me. System, 923 F. Supp. 275 (D. Me. 1996).
[Vol. 21:545
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Act).18 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit, in Lillard v. Shelby County Board of
Education,19 applied the Tennessee personal injury statute of limitations,
rejecting the 180-day period used for filing Title VI administrative com-
plaints. Moreover, during 1994, the district court in Linville v. Hawaii"
concluded that the statute of limitations for filing a Title IX claim is separate
and distinct from the statute of limitations imposed for Title VII claims, even
if the underlying facts triggering both claims are the same.
In Topol v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania,2' the plaintiff was
allowed to add a claim of retaliation under Title IX. The district court in
Mann v. University of Cincinnati22 held that the Title IX scheme is compre-
hensive enough to subsume 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims based on other consti-
tutional guarantees, while the Sixth Circuit resolutely came to the opposite
conclusion during 1996 in Lillard.23 During 1994, the district court in Stern
v. Milford Board of Education4 resolved that an elementary student could
pursue a Title IX claim for sexual harassment against the school board due to
peer sexual harassment, even though a state claim had been filed. The
Seventh Circuit, in Waid v. Merrill Area Public Schools,2s determined that a
state claim did not prevent a female employee from pursuing a Title IX claim
against the school district.
There is a growing judicial consensus that the parents of a student are
not proper party plaintiffs in Title IX actions. 26 However, whether individ-
18. This would contradict the federal district court's position in Deli v. University of
Minn., 863 F. Supp. 958, 962 (D. Minn. 1994), which applied a mere one-year statute of
limitations utilized for civil rights actions.
19. 76 F.3d 716, 729 (6th Cir. 1996). See also Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882
F.2d 74, 77-78 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying the Pennsylvania personal injury statute of limita-
tions).
20. 874 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Haw. 1994).
21. 160 F.R.D. 474 (E.D. Pa. 1995). See also Murray v. New York Univ. College of
Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995) (claim of retaliation under Title IX by female dental
student implicitly recognized) (discussed infra p. 638).
22. 864 F. Supp. 44, 48 (S.D. Ohio 1994). See also Nelson v. University of Me. Sys.,
914 F. Supp. 643, 648 n.2 (D. Me. 1996); Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 59-60 (D.
Conn. 1995).
23. Lillard, 76 F.3d at 729. See also Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Schs., 890 F. Supp.
1452, 1461 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
24. 870 F. Supp. 30 (D. Conn. 1994).
25. 91 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e can see that Congress closed the avenue
created by § 1983 to all plaintiffs who could follow the way created by Title IX.").
26. See, e.g., Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1207-08
(N.D. Iowa 1996) (claims by parents lack merit); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F.
Supp. 1006, 1020 (WD. Mo. 1995); Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1123 (D. Utah
19971
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ual coaches and teachers are proper party defendants, pursuant to Title IX,
has resulted in opposite conclusions.27 Nonetheless, it would behoove the
plaintiffs' practitioner to continue to include such individuals in the lawsuits
since other causes of action alleged may necessitate such inclusion.
HI. EDUCATION
A. Generally
In Clemes v. Del Norte Country Unified School District,28 the district
court found that a former teacher, a white male, supervising an Independent
Studies Program, which had an enrollment of Native Americans, the major-
ity of which were females, had standing under Title IX to pursue a claim of
retaliation, allegedly attributed to his actions in seeking to protect the rights
of the aforementioned.29
1994); R.L.R. v. Prague Pub. Sch. Dist. 1-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526, 1530 (W.D. Okla. 1993);
Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576-77 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
27. See Plotzke v. Boston College, No. 94-12329-EFH (D. Mass. 1995) (allowing indi-
vidually named defendants to remain as parties to the lawsuit); Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F.
Supp. 53, 56 (D. Conn. 1995). But see Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Schs., 91 F.3d 857, 862
(7th Cir. 1996) ("The creation of this incentive indicates that Congress intended to place the
burden of compliance with civil rights laws on educational institutions themselves, not on the
individual officials associated with those institutions."); Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864
F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162,
166 (N.D.N.Y 1996); Pailett v. Palma, 914 F. Supp. 1018, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Tenured
professor charged with sexual harassment named as a defendant "is not a proper party either as
an employer or a teaching institution. The federal claims against him are dismissed on the
court's own motion."); Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 140, 143
(W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, No. 95-50811, 1997 WL 66087 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 1997) (discussed
infra pp. 620, 632); Leija v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 947, 953 (W.D. Tex.
1995), rev'd, Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996); Garza v.
Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 (S.D. Tex. 1994) ('The Title IX claim
must be dismissed against individual defendants because Title IX claims may not be asserted
against individuals."); Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 145-46 (W.D. Tex. 1994);
Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867, 876 (M.D. Ga. 1993); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist.,
830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576-77 (N.D. Cal. 1993). See Slaughter v. Waubonsee Community
College, No. 94 C 2525, 1994 WL 663596, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1994) (referred to in Doe
v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 1395, 1400 n.9 (5th Cir. 1996)). See also Nelson v.
Temple Univ., 920 F. Supp. 633, 638 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (cause of action was not established
against a defendant who was the administrator of student organizations and activities at the
University).
28. 843 F. Supp. 583 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
29. Id at 590.
[Vol. 21:545
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A male nursing student challenged his expulsion from the nursing
program in Andriakos v. University of Southern Indiana,30 claiming sex
discrimination in violation of Title IX. The Seventh Circuit upheld the
lower court's determination that the expulsion was based on his failure to
satisfy safe and professional nursing skills.31
A New York state trial court in Starishevsky v. Hofstra University32
determined that recipients of federal funds are required to adopt and publish
grievance procedures, which is in accordance with the directive of the
specific Title X regulations. 33 In another case, a male student at Vassar
College received two messages on tape which contained abusive language
and threats of physical violence directed at him due to his homosexuality. A
male student was charged with having violated the college's sexual harass-
ment policy. He brought suit in Fraad-Wolff v. Vassar College, 4 alleging
that the school violated a New York state law in not following prescribed
procedures in the investigation and adjudication of this matter. On July 12,
1996, the district court disposed of the lawsuit by granting summary judg-
ment to the college stating that "nothing in the student handbook or in the
Panel's rules required defendant to declare plaintiff innocent if the Panel
was unable to reach a decision. 35
The female plaintiff in Ivan v. Kent State University36 was enrolled in a
joint masters/doctorate program at the University, which required her to
complete a master's thesis within two years and maintain a 3.3 grade point
minimum. Subsequently, the plaintiff requested permission to skip a fall
semester (during which time she gave birth to her child) and forego employ-
ment as a graduate assistant for that semester and the following semester.
When she returned for the Spring semester, she received an "IP" (in prog-
ress) grade for her clinical practicum class. She claimed discrimination in
30. 867 F. Supp. 804 (S.D. Ind. 1992), af'd, 19 F.3d 21 (7th Cir. 1994).
31. Andriakos v. University of S. Ind., 19 F.3d 21 (7th Cir. 1994).
32. 612 N.Y.S.2d 794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). See also 34 C.F.R. § 106.9.
33. Starishevsky, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
34. 932 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
35. Id. at 93.
36. 863 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ohio 1994), aff'd mem., 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996). See
EI-Attar v. Mississippi State Univ., 68 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 817
(1996). In EI-Attar, the Title IX claim was dismissed concerning University's denial to a
doctoral program by the female plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed the denial was based solely on
her GMAT score, which disparately impacted on women and individuals who speak English
as a second language. The court rejected this argument as the University's admission policy
did not focus solely on the GMAT scores.
1997]
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receiving that grade based on her gender and her pregnancy condition. 37 On
September 14, 1995, the federal district court granted the University's
motion for summary judgment on both the Title VII and Title IX claims.
The district court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard
used in Title VII cases to the Title IX argument, finding that the defendant's
articulated legitimate reasons for the IP grade were not rebuffed by the
plaintiff as being pretextual.3 s The court focused solely on the employment
aspect. Parenthetically, the First Circuit, in Cohen v. Brown University,
39
left open the question of whether the burden-shifting standard should be
used in Title IX employment cases.
A female dental student failed to complete ten of her twenty-eight
courses and was notified by the college that she was required to repeat her
second year in Murray v. New York University College of Dentistry.4 She
alleged Title IX sexual discrimination based on a hostile environment
created by the actions of one of the patients involved in the school's dental
clinic4' and retaliation in having to repeat the aforementioned school year,
after she had allegedly complained about the harassment.
On June 16, 1995, the Second Circuit stated:
We have noted that in order to make out a Title IX claim based on
an educational institution's allegedly discriminatory motivation in
taking disciplinary action against a student, the complaint must set
forth a "particularized allegation relating to a causal connection
between the flawed outcome and gender bias" and must point to
"particular circumstances" supporting an inference of gender bias,
such as "statements by members of the disciplinary tribunal, state-
ments by pertinent university officials, or patterns of decision-
making that also tend to show the influence of gender." No lesser
showing is necessary when the educational institution's challenged
37. Ivan, 863 F. Supp. at 584.
38. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). McDonnell Douglas
provides that after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, including being
a member of the protected class, the burden shifts to the employer to advance some legitimate
reason for the adverse action. Id. at 802. Then if the employer has advanced a non-
discriminatory reason for the action, the plaintiff must establish that such reason was
pretextual. Id. at 804. See also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
39. 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussed infra p. 565).
40. 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussed infra p. 638).
41. Id (discussing the hostile environment claim).
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action is not disciplinary but is rather an enforcement of its facially
neutral academic standards.
42
On March 22, 1996, the district court, in Hall v. Lee College,43 deter-
mined there was no Title IX violation where a female student was suspended
from a private college for allegedly engaging in premarital sex in contradic-
tion of a school policy. The court determined that the plaintiff failed to
advance any evidence that the policy would not have been equally applied to
male students and thus there was no intentional discrimination on the basis
of sex.
B. Public Military Schools
The right of females to attend all-male public military schools was
examined in Faulkner v. Jones44 and United States v. Virginia.45 Title IX
excludes these schools from coverage. 6 On July 22, 1994, the district court
in Faulkner ruled that The Citadel, a public all-male military college, had to
admit Shannon Faulkner into the Corps of Cadets.47 Three weeks later, the
42. It. at 251 (citation omitted).
43. 932 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
44. 858 F. Supp. 552 (D.S.C. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995). See also Faulk-
ner v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 1993) (entitling female student to attend state-appointed
all-male military school pending resolution of her equal protection claim).
45. 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994) (applying the intermediate scrutiny test, the dis-
trict court refused to require Virginia Military Academy ("VMI") to admit women), affd, 44
F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). However, it had to provide a
comparable program at an all-female state college. The female program was not required to be
a mirror-image of VMI or to adopt the same or similar methodology used at VMI. See also
United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated and remanded, 976
F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). The district court entered
judgment for the defendant, Commonwealth of Virginia, and directed the University to
undertake one of the following actions: 1) admit women to VMI; 2) establish a parallel
institution or programs; or 3) abandon state support. Id
46. Section 901(a)(5) of the Education Amendments directs that "in regard to admissions
this section shall not apply to any public institution of undergraduate higher education which
is an institution that traditionally and continually from its establishment has had a policy of
admitting only students of one sex." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5). Another subdivision, section
901(a)(4), provides that "this section shall not apply to an educational institution whose
primary purpose is the training of individuals for the military services of the United States, or
the merchant marine." See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4). However, the federal military service
academies have admitted women since 1976.
47. Faulkner v. Jones, 858 F. Supp 552, 569 (D.S.C. 1994), aff'd, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 352 (1995).
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Fourth Circuit granted the school's stay pending the appeal. 48  During
August 1995, Faulkner entered The Citadel, in Charleston, South Carolina,
becoming the first female cadet.49 Faulkner withdrew within the first week
indicating that to stay would only risk her health. On October 16, 1995, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that her action was moot and denied
Nancy Mellete' s motion to intervene or add a party.50
In United States v. Virginia,51 a female student challenged Virginia
Military Institute's ("VMr') decision refusing her admittance to the all male
military school. In this case predicated on violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Circuit affirmed and
remanded the case, holding that Virginia could maintain single gender
college programs as long as comparable programs were offered to both men
and women. 2 A strong dissent was registered as to the two component
arrangement and whether the particular separate-but-equal arrangement
proposed by the Commonwealth and adopted by the district court could
survive intermediate equal protection scrutiny.53 The United States Supreme
Court agreed to hear this appeal.54
On June 26, 1996, the Court, in a 7-1 decision,5 5 held that such an all-
male military college education violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause.56 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, writing for the majority,
stated that "[w]omen seeking and fit for a VMI-quality education cannot be
offered anything less ....,5 The Court framed the issue as "[niot whether
'women-or men-should be forced to attend VMI;' rather, the question is
whether the state can constitutionally deny to women who have the will and
capacity, the training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely af-
fords."5 8 The Court explained:
48. Faulkner, 51 F.3d at 450.
49. See Susan Faludi, The Naked Citadel, NEw YORKER, Sept. 5, 1994, at 64 (describing
Faulkner's legal odyssey to attend The Citadel).
50. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. at 352.
51. 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995).
52. Id at 1242.
53. Id at 1250 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
54. United States v. Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
55. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). Justice Clarence Thomas did not
participate, as he has a son enrolled at the Virginia Military Institute. Id. at 2287.
56. Id. at 2269.
57. Id at 2287.
58. Id. at 2280. One commentary noted:
Because the Constitution does not regulate private conduct, the VMI ruling does
not apply to private women's colleges, as the 26 private women's colleges who
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Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must
demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for that ac-
tion .... Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of oppor-
tunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must deter-
mine whether the proffered justification is "exceedingly persua-
sive." The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely
on the State.... The justification must be genuine, not hypothe-
sized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must
not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females.59
The Court further cautioned that
such classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create
or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.
Measuring the record in this case against the review standard just
described, we conclude that Virginia has shown no "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for excluding all women from the citizen-
soldier training afforded by VMI.6
In reviewing the "parallel" program for women offered at VMI, while
excluding all females from VMI's programs and activities, the Court
commented, "[h]owever 'liberally' this plan serves the state's sons, it makes
no provision whatever for her daughters. That is not equal protection."
6
'
Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion, predicated on his disa-
greement with utilizing the "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard,
but agreeing with the result of the majority.62 Justice Antonin Scalia
authored a dissent in which he commented that "[t]oday the court shuts
down an institution that has served the people of the Commonwealth of
Virginia with pride and distinction for over a century and a half. I do not
filed a Supreme Court brief against VMI's position understood.... Rather than
sounding the death knell for single-sex education, the VMI decision stands for
the proposition that individual merit must prevail over stereotyped notions of
women's talents and interests.
Marcia D. Greenberger & Deborah L. Brake, Point of View, The VMI Decision: Shattering
Sexual Stereotypes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 5, 1996, at A52.
59. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274-75.
60. Id. at 2276 (citations omitted).
61. M at 2279.
62. Id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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think any of us, women included, will be better off for its destruction."
63
The decision will affect The Citadel. 64 VMI did not vote to admit women
until September 21, 1996, and thus, the first class with women would not be
until 1997.65 The Citadel ushered in four female cadets during August 1996.
C. Prison Education
Jeldness v. Pearce66 represents the first in a series of decisions brought
by female prisoners challenging educational programs. Female inmates in
Oregon state prisons asserted that differing educational programs and
procedures provided to them violated Title IX.67 Unlike men, women
prisoners were searched in order to travel between prisons and often arrived
late for classes. There was no apprenticeship program at women's medium
security prisons, and women could not participate in the mechanical trade
apprenticeship programs. Male prisoners were entitled to merit pay for
participating in vocational training courses, unlike the female prisoners.
The Ninth Circuit held that Title IX does not provide an exemption for
educational programs provided at state prisons, which are recipients of
federal funds.68 Further, the appellate court disregarded the Equal Protection
63. Id. at 2291 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See James S. Kunen, One Angry Man: Even on a
Conservative Court, Antonin Scalia Manages to Seem Embattled, TIME, July 8, 1996, at 48-
49; David J. Garrow, The Rehnquist Reins, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 6, 1996, at 68-69.
64. See Associated Press, Judge Calls Recess in Citadel Case, NEWSDAY, Aug. 13, 1996,
at A13 (reporting that attorneys for the United States Department of Justice, on behalf of the
three women who plan to attend The Citadel during the 1996-97 academic year, and the
school's counsel, were working out details to accommodate the females' attendance at the
formerly all-male military college). See also Douglas Lederman, Judge Orders Virginia to
Report on Progress in Enrolling Women at VMI, CHRON. HIGHER EDuC., Dec. 13, 1996, at
A34 (relating that the Fourth Circuit "ordered Virginia to 'formulate, adopt, and implement a
plan' for enrolling female students."). Fourteen of the 355 applications for the next academic
year are from women.
65. See Mike Allen, Defiant V.M.I to Admit Women But Will Not Ease Rules for Them,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1996, at 1, 36. VMI and The Citadel expended approximately $10
million and $7 million, respectively, in legal costs. Id. at 36.
66. 30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Archer v. Reno, 877 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Ky.
1995); Women's Prisoners of D.C. Dep't of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp.
634 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part and modified in part, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995).
67. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1222.
68. Id. at 1225. Title IX defines "educational institution" as "any public or private pre-
school, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of vocational, professional, or
higher education .... 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(c).
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Clause "parity" level in favor of the Title IX "equality" standard.69  The
court stated that "Title IX and its regulations do not require gender-
integrated classes in prisons." 70 Furthermore,
[s]trict one-for-one identity of classes may not be required by the
regulations. But there must be reasonable opportunities for similar
studies at the women's prison and women must have an equal op-
portunity to participate in educational programs.... And facilities
such as labs, classrooms, and workshops must be comparable to
each other.
71
The court stressed, "[a]nd the inmates must be aware of the opportunity for
participation in various programs before their interests can be assessed.,72
The most important aspect of the Ninth Circuit's opinion was its statement
that "the absence of discriminatory motive does not transform a policy which
discriminates on its face into a neutral policy with only a discriminatory
effect .... This constitutes disparate treatment, not merely disparate im-
pact .... Such disparate treatment is clearly forbidden by Title IX and its
regulations."
73
In Women Prisoners of District of Columbia Department of Corrections
v. District of Columbia,74 the women prisoners were allegedly subjected to
sexual assaults by the prison guards. The male prisoners attended full-time
adult basic education ("ABE") and General Education Development
("GED") classes, while the women had one teacher, who taught one three-
hour ABE class and one three-hour GED class. The female residents also
did not receive comparable recreational (exercise) facilities. On December
69. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1226. "Research has disclosed no opinion holding that Title IX
is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause." id. at 1228.
70. IU.
71. Id. at 1229. The "regulations provide that institutions may administer scholarships
provided by foreign institutions or wills that are restricted by sex, as long as they make
'available reasonable opportunities for similar studies for members of the other sex."' Id. at
1228 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 86.31(c)). See also Glover v. Johnson, 931 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D.
Mich. 1996) (regarding educational opportunities available to female prisoners in Michigan;
the action asserted no Title IX cause of action).
72. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1228 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 1231 (citing 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.31, .51 (1993)).
74. 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part and modified in part, 899 F. Supp.
659 (D.D.C. 1995), rev'd in part, 93 F.3d 910 (D.D.C. 1996).
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13, 1994, the district court highlighted that "[tlhe denial of access to course
offerings on the basis of sex is forbidden. 75 Therefore, the
number of classes offered should at least be proportionate, not just
to the total number of inmates, but to the number of inmates desir-
ing to take educational programs. In addition, a desire to preserve
the state's limited resources can not be used to justify an allocation
of those resources which unfairly denies women equal access to
programs routinely available to men.
76
Query, whether the court's proportionate directive is the appropriate one,
rather than offering equivalent classes for the female prisoners? The court
also elaborated on the aspect of discriminatory intent and stated that
"[d]iscriminatory intent, however, is only an issue in cases involving facially
neutral policies.... When a classification is expressly defined in terms of
gender, an inquiry into intent is unnecessary. Defendant's policy of segre-
gating male and female prisoners is just such a gender-based policy. 77
On August 14, 1995, the district court found that Title IX reaches the
prison industries, recreation, work details, and work training.78 However, on
August 30, 1996, the District of Columbia Circuit had reservations over
certain of the district court's findings, specifically that "Title IX and equal
protection principles are not applicable here because the male and female
prisoners whom the district court compared were not similarly situated. 79
The majority noted that "[t]he threshold inquiry in evaluating an equal
protection claim is, therefore, 'to determine whether a person is similarly
75. Id at 674.
76. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The money excuse has been discounted by
the courts in the Title IX athletic equal opportunity cases. See, e.g., Favia v. Indiana Univ. of
Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 583 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Homer v. Kentucky
High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussed infra p. 585).
77. Women Prisoners, 877 F. Supp. at 675 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 659. See Klinger v. Nebraska Dep't of Correctional Svcs., 824 F. Supp. 1374
(D. Neb. 1993) (finding that the failure of the state of Nebraska to provide regularly scheduled
pre-release programs for female prisoners, where such programs were provided for the male
prisoners violated Title IX, as the pre-release programs were deemed educational), rev'd, 31
F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1177 (1995).
79. Women's Prisoners of the D.C. Dep't of Corrections v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d
910 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The appellants did not challenge the provisions that related to
educational (academic and vocational) programs. However, they objected to ones that
required "them to upgrade the work, recreational, and religious programs available to female
inmates, and that relate to law library hours, group events, and transportation to job inter-
views." Id. at 924.
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situated to those persons who allegedly received favorable treat-
ment.' ... We believe the same principle should apply in Title IX cases. 80
Thus, the court in comparing the population size of the prison, security level,
types of crimes, length of sentences, and special characteristics, rendered the
prisoners dissimilarly situated.81 The appellate court stated that
an inmate has no constitutional right to work and educational op-
portunities. But even though we do not address the scope of Title
IX in the prison context, we admit to grave problems with the
proposition that work details, prison industries, recreation, and re-
ligious services and counseling have anything in common with the
equality of educational opportunities with which Title IX is con-
cerned.82
Judge Rogers, who issued an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, took exception to the majority's determination on the equal protec-
tion analysis, stating that "[e]ven assuming the government may constitu-
tionally provide separate programs for the sexes, the programs must be
substantially equivalent."83  Thus, "[e]ven if the District may properly
segregate prisoners by sex, it does not follow that it may segregate them by
sex into unequal facilities. 8 4  This opinion recognized the heightened
scrutiny test mandated by the Court in Virginia.8 5  It argued that "[t]he
District may not treat men and women dissimilarly and then rely on the very
dissimilarity it has created to justify discrimination in the provision of
benefits., 8 6 While this equal protection analysis seems more persuasive than
the majority approach, the issue would then be a question of fact pursuant to
Title IX as to whether certain of the claimed inequities the women prisoners
allegedly suffered from came under "educational programs and activities."
80. Id. (quoting United States v. Whiton, 48 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1995).
81. Id. at 925. The court continued "[w]e do not suggest that these mechanical ratios are
a test of comparability; merely that, standing alone, the difference in the number of programs
provided by prisons having vastly different numbers of inmates can not be taken as evidence
that those in small institutions that offer fewer programs have been denied equal protection.
More than that is required." Id.
82. Women's Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 927.
83. Id. at 955 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Id. at 951.
85. Id
86. Id.
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In the third action, the Eastern District of Kentucky, in Archer v.
Reno,87 determined that there was no violation of Title IX where female
prisoners were prevented from completing educational courses to become
certified dental technicians. On January 5, 1996, the court ruled that Title
IX applies to educational programs or activities conducted by state or local
governments. "The statute is silent as to the United States and its agen-
cies.... [Thus] the Court concludes that Title IX is not applicable to the
national apprenticeship program offered to federal inmates through the
dental lab at [the Federal Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky]. 88
Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to state a Title IX claim of action.
IV. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ON BEHALF OF STUDENTS
The most significant aspect of the Title IX regulations that pertain to
athletic programs or activities is the requirement of equal opportunity for
members of both sexes. Specifically, it states that "[a] recipient which
operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural
athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both
sexes." 89  The regulations then go on to list ten specific, non-exclusive
program areas to be analyzed to determine whether equal opportunity has
been satisfied. The first program area, and the one which has been at the
core of the intercollegiate athletics litigation battles during the 1990s,
evaluates "[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both
sexes." 90 The 1979 Policy Interpretation provides that the effective accom-
modation of student interests and abilities will be assessed in any of the
following ways:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for
male and female students are provided in numbers substantially
proportionate to their respective enrollments; or (2) Where the
87. 877 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Ky. 1995).
88. Id. at 379. Title IX states that "[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the term 'program
or activity' and 'program' mean all of the operations of (1)(A) a department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or (B) the entity
of such State or local government that distributes such assistance and each such department or
agency (and each other State or local government entity) to which the assistance is extended,
in the case of assistance to a State or local government." 20 U.S.C. § 1687.
89. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (emphasis added).
90. Id. § 106.41(c)(1).
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members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history
and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstra-
bly responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the mem-
bers of that sex; or (3) Where the members of one sex are under-
represented among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution can-
not show a continuing practice or program expansion such as that
cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and
abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and effectively
accommodated by their present program.
91
A. Cross-Over Cases
The Title IX regulations permit qualified separate teams for members of
each sex "where the selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill
or the activity involved is a contact sport." 92 There were no cross-over cases
(cases brought by members of one sex seeking to participate on established
teams of the other sex, generally pursued on the interscholastic level by
female athletes seeking participation on established all-male teams) on either
91. HEW Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (1979) (emphasis added).
92. Section 106.41(b) provides:
(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this
section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each
sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity
involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a
team in a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no
such team for members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members
of that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be
allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact
sport. For purposes of this part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby,
ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of
which involves bodily contact.
See generally Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title JX,
9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPoRTs L. REv. 1, 47-56 (1992).
Michigan state law defines baseball as a "non-contact" sport for interscholastic athletic
activities. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 380.1289(3) (West 1988), which provides that
[f]emale pupils shall be permitted to participate in all noncontact interscholastic
athletic activities, including archery, badminton, baseball, bowling, fencing, golf,
gymnastics, riflery, shuffleboard, skiing, swimming, diving, table tennis, track
and field, and tennis. If a school has a girls' team in a noncontact interscholastic
athletic activity, a female shall be permitted to compete for a position on any
other team for that activity. This subsection shall not be construed to prevent or
interfere with the selection of competing teams solely on the basis of athletic
ability.
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the interscholastic or intercollegiate levels instituted or reviewed during
1994-95, except for the Supreme Court denying certiorari in Williams v.
School District of Bethlehem.93 Although not covered by Title IX, this
scenario would also apply to the Olympic and professional levels. However,
on February 2, 1996, the district court in Adams v. Baker94 ruled that a
school district policy which prohibited a female high school student from
competing on the boys wrestling team, designated a "contact" sport, would
violate her rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction. 95 The court
recognized that "wrestling is, not surprisingly, defined as a contact sport
' 96
under the Title IX scheme. The court nonetheless continued that "[a]lthough
Congress may specify remedies available for a violation of a federally
protected right, Congress can not thereby substantively limit constitutional
rights. 97  The court also disregarded the school district's argument that
participation by a female could lead to sexual harassment charges.98 The
court emphasized that wrestling was an athletic activity and not a sexual
activity. 99 The case was settled during the spring, whereby the plaintiff was
allowed to tryout for the wrestling team. The agreement is partially confi-
dential.' ° In light of the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Vir-
ginia,'0' a real concern emerges as to whether the ostensible demarcation of
93. 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing male student who wanted to participate on
the all-female interscholastic field hockey team where no team was provided for the boys).
94. 919 F. Supp. 1496, 1500 (D. Kan. 1996) ("Evidence was presented that there are over
800 girls competing in wrestling in the United States.").
95. See Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1123 (E.D.
Wis. 1978) (announcing that "[i]t is declared that the defendants' exclusion of the [female]
plaintiffs and the class they represent from participation in a varsity interscholastic athletic
program in a particular program where such a program is provided for male students violates
the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment."). But see Kelley v.
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938
(1995). See also discussion infra p. 589.
96. Adams, 919 F. Supp. at 1503.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1504.
99. Id.
100. Telephone Interview with Charles O'Hara, counsel for plaintiff (August 22, 1996).
Interestingly, in deciding whether to permit the female student to participate on the wrestling
team or disband the team, the three female members of the School Board voted to eliminate
the team, while the four male members of the board agreed to allow a co-ed wrestling team,
according to plaintiffs counsel. Id.
101. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (discussed supra p. 556).
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certain sports for men only, under the "contact sport" classification, would
withstand equal protection scrutiny.
B. Female Student Athletes
1. Intercollegiate Level
a. Cases Commenced Pre-1994 Seeking Reinstitution of Varsity
Teams
(i) Cohen v. Brown University: The Trial
On September 26, 1994, the federal trial commenced in Cohen v. Brown
University,1°2 in which the plaintiff was seeking a permanent injunction to
restore two women's teams to varsity status. The case was partially settled
on September 28, 1994, which ensured comparable treatment for men's and
women's varsity programs. 10 3 The agreement indicated:
The University maintains the right to distribute University funds as
it sees fit, provided that such distribution does not disproportion-
ately affect one gender in comparison to the other, provided fur-
ther, however that this... be construed to require comparison on a
team by team or overall gender basis of actual money expenditures.
Comparability shall be determined by the nature of the programs,
not the cost. It is understood and agreed that comparability does
not imply or mean that every team will be provided identical fund-
ing or any other item provided to any other team. Further, different
teams may receive different levels of support.
104
The issue of the effective accommodation of the interests and abilities of the
students at the Ivy League University, raised in 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1),
remained viable.
102. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (granting plain-
tiffs a preliminary injunction ordering the retention of the two women's varsity teams). See
Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: Testimony Before the House Subcomm. on
Postsecondary Education, Training and Life-Long Learning, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement
of Vartan Gregorian, Ph.D., President of Brown University).
103. Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 92-0197-P (D.R.I. 1995), Settlement Agreement and
Stipulation of dismissal in Regard to Equality of Treatment [hereinafter Agreement]. The
Agreement "settles claims in this matter concerning the relative support provided to men and
women student athletes and potential student athletes at Brown ... and shall remain in effect
for a period of three years from the date of its execution by the parties." Id. at 1, 3. See also
Oscar Dixon, Title IX Suit Settled in Part by Brown, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 1994, at C13.
104. Agreement, supra note 103, at 4-5.
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On March 29, 1995, the district court in Cohen'0 5 ruled the defendant
University violated Title IX in not accommodating the interests and abilities
of the female students. 1' 6 In a sixty-nine page decision, the court painstak-
ingly explicated the "effective accommodation" test under the directive of
the First Circuit's 1993 decision. 10 7 Again, the court stressed that "an
institution complies with the three prong test if it meets prong one of the
analysis and no other."'0 8
The trial judge specifically elaborated on the first prong which requires
"substantial proportionality" between the percentage of students and student
athletes.1°9 The court adopted a plain meaning approach, in that the number
of female and male athletes would be based on the number of participation
opportunities as manifested by the NCAA squad lists, which was a tangible
and easily identifiable number."0 The court noted that "[t]he Policy Inter-
pretation's three prong test does not mandate statistical balancing. In fact,
the test is designed to avoid an absolute requirement of numerical equal-
ity.""' The court ruled that "[a]n institution satisfies prong one provided
that the gender balance of its intercollegiate athletic program substantially
mirrors the gender balance of its student enrollment."'1
2
"First, prong one compliance is assessed by comparing the gender ratio
of the entire intercollegiate athletic program."' 13 The court highlighted that
when "significant numerical changes did occur in the intercollegiate athletic
105. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 101 F.3d 155 (Ist Cir. 1996). The decision cited Heckman, supra note 15. Id. at 188.
See Walter B. Connolly, Jr. & Jeffrey D. Adelman, A University's Defense to a Title IX
Gender Equity in Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never Intended Gender Equity Based on
Student Body Ratios, 71 U. DEr. MERCY L. REv. 845 (1994) (Mr. Connolly is one of the
attorneys for Brown University in this lawsuit.). See Walter B. Connolly, Jr. & Jeffrey D.
Adelman, How a University Can Best Comply with Title IX and Win a Lawsuit: Practical
Suggestions, (undated eight-page handout distributed at an April 1996 Title IX forum
sponsored by the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA")) (on file with the Nova
Law Review); Walter B. Connolly, Jr., "University In-House Audit of Employment Related
Issues to Determine Compliance with Title VII and Title IX and Other Related Issues"
(undated) (104 page handout distributed at an April 1996 Title IX forum sponsored by the
NCAA) (on file with the Nova Law Review).
106. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 211 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1)).
107. Id. at 194.
108. Id. at 200.
109. Id. at 201-02.
110. ld. at 202.
111. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 199
112. Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
113. Id at 202.
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program as a whole, these changes were within the control of the univer-
sity.' 1 4 For example, the University controls the recruiting of student
athletes." 5 During the 1993-94 academic year, the percentage of students
comprised 48.86% men and 51.4% women, with 61.87% male athletes and
38.13% female athletes." 6 This accounted for a 13% differential between
female students and female student athletes. The court also identified "that
the 'participation opportunities' offered by an institution are measured by
counting the actual participants on intercollegiate teams," rather than
counting teams' filled and unfilled athletic slots, as the defendant argued.
1
'
7
Thus, the 13% disparity did not satisfy the first prong of the effective
accommodation test.
The court examined the University's unique two-tiered system. The
University characterized its varsity athletic offerings as varsity intercolle-
giate teams ("university-funded" teams), on the one hand, and donor-funded
varsity teams (also known as "club varsities" or "intercollegiate club"
teams)." 8 The court determined that "university-funded" varsity teams were
not comparable to "donor-funded" varsity teams.119 "During the 1994/95
seasons Brown guaranteed the volleyball team university-funded varsity
status for the next five years."' 20 Furthermore, "[g]ymnastics is currently
supported as a university-funded team as required by court order. However,
in the absence of this order, Brown has acknowledged that it would demote
gymnastics to donor-funded status."
121
Second, the University did not satisfy the second prong of a continuing
practice of intercollegiate program for women, the underrepresented sex.
Rather, the court emphasized that "[s]ince the 1970s, the percentage of
women participating in Brown's varsity, athletic program has remained
remarkably steady."' 22 Finally, the court concluded Brown did not currently
fully and effectively accommodate the interests and abilities, specifically
with regard to "maintaining women's water polo at club status and by
demoting women's gymnastics where these teams have demonstrated the
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 192.
117. Id. at 202.
118. Id. at 189.
119. Id. at 212.
120. Id. at 192 n.17.
121. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 192 n.18.
122. IdM at211.
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interest and ability to operate as varsity teams."' 23 The court also rejected
Brown's argument "that it may accommodate less than all of the interested
and able women if, on a proportionate basis, it accommodates less than all of
the interested and able men."' 24
In conclusion, the court required Brown University to submit a compli-
ance action plan within 120 days, but stayed this directive pending an
appeal.12 During April 1995, the University filed an appeal. On May 4,
1995, Judge Pettine modified his March 29, 1995, judgment, truncating the
time for the University to submit its Title IX compliance plan from 120 to 60
days and the court eliminated the stay of the provision requiring the Univer-
sity to submit the plan pending the outcome of an appeal. 126
On August 17, 1995, the trial court rejected the University's proposed
compliance plan, filed on July 7, 1995, which concentrated on adding junior
varsity teams for female student athletes, rather than adding new women's
varsity teams and cutting men's sports, and crafted its own plan requiring the
University to upgrade the women's varsity teams. 127 The court, in terse
language responding to the University's proposed plan, stated:
The proposed plan artificially boosts women's varsity numbers by
adding junior varsity positions on four women's
teams.... Counting new women's junior varsity positions as
equivalent to men's full varsity positions flagrantly violates the
spirit and letter of Title IX; in no sense is an institution providing
equal opportunity if it affords varsity positions to men but junior
varsity positions to women.'2
123. Id at 212.
124. Id. at 208.
125. Id at 214.
126. Modified Order at 4, Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 92-197-P (D.R.I. May 4, 1995).
127. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992), aft'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993). On March 29,
1995, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that the University had discrimi-
nated in violation of Title IX. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), aff'd, 101 F.3d 155
(1st. Cir 1996).
128. Order at 6, Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 92-197-P (D.R.I. Aug. 16, 1995). The court
further stated that "[a]n institution does not provide equal opportunity if it caps its men's
teams after they are well-stocked with high-caliber recruits while requiring women's teams to
boost numbers by accepting walk-ons." Id. at 8.
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(ii) First Circuit Affirms that Brown University Violated Title IX
On November 21, 1996, the First Circuit, in a 2-1 decision comprising
forty-four pages, affirmed the district court's determination in Cohen v.
Brown University that the University violated Title IX in not effectively
accommodating the interests and abilities of its female student athletes. 29
The First Circuit found
no error in the district court's factual findings or in its interpreta-
tion and application of the law in determining that Brown violated
Title IX in the operation of its intercollegiate athletics program.
We therefore affirm in all respects the district court's analysis and
rulings on the issue of liability. We do, however, find error in the
district court's award of specific relief and therefore remand the
case to the district court for reconsideration of the remedy in light
of this opinion.
130
First, the appellate court summarized in detail the relevant determina-
tions of the district court, concluding that "[t]he district court did not find
that full and effective accommodation of the athletics interests and abilities
of Brown's female students would disadvantage Brown's male students."
131
Second, the First Circuit summarized the Title IX predicates and made the
first judicial reference to the OCR "Clarification Memorandum," issued on
January 16, 1996,132 "which does not change the existing standards for
compliance, but which does provide further information and guidelines for
assessing compliance under the three-part test.' ' 133 Third, Senior Circuit
Judge Bownes underscored that "[i]n Cohen II, a panel of this court squarely
rejected Brown's constitutional and statutory challenges to the Policy
Interpretation's three-part test, upholding the district court's interpretation of
the Title IX framework applicable to intercollegiate athletics ... ."134 Then,
in addressing the University's argument, which was in essence to begin to
129. 101 F.3d 155 (lst Cir. 1996).
130. Id. at 162.
131. Id. at 164.
132. UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CLARIFICATION OF
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICs POLICY GUIDANCE: THE THREE PART TEST (1996).
133. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 167. The court continued, explaining that "[t]he Clarification
Memorandum contains many examples illustrating how institutions may meet each prong of
the three-part test and explains how participation opportunities are to be counted under Title
IX." Id.
134. Ia
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decide ab initio the question of Title IX liability, the court pondered the
issue of the "law of the case doctrine"1 35 and concluded that "[t]he precedent
established by the prior panel is not clearly erroneous; it is the law of this
case and the law of this circuit. 1 36 Fourth, the court found that Title IX
complies with the Fifth Amendment. 37  An intervening Supreme Court
decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena'38 does not change the
disposition in Cohen.139 The First Circuit articulated that the intermediate
standard of scrutiny applies to gender-based classifications,"40 underscoring
that, "[a]s explained previously, Title IX ... is distinct from other anti-
discrimination regimes in that it is impossible to determine compliance or to
devise a remedy without counting and comparing opportunities with gender
explicitly in mind."''I Fifth, any excluded evidence was deemed harmless. 42
The University's three most charismatic and dispositive Title IX
substantive attacks were: 1) Title IX is an affirmative action or quota
statute; 43 2) Title IX should adopt the "relative interest" of the student
athletes to determine compliance; 144 and 3) the Title VII standard should
have been applied. 45
135. Id. at 168. "For the reasons that follow, we conclude that no exception to the law of
the case doctrine applies, here and, therefore, that Cohen II's rulings of law control the
disposition of this appeal." Id. at 169.
136. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 169.
137. Id. at 182.
138. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (remanding for a determination of whether a federal statute
which awarded minorities contracts of less than 5% of the total value of contracts per year
served a compelling government interest).
139. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 155.
140. Id. at 182. "Under intermediate scrutiny, the burden of demonstrating an exceed-
ingly persuasive justification for a government-imposed, gender-conscious classification is
met by showing that the classification serves important governmental objectives, and that the
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.... Applying
the test, it is clear that the district court's remedial order passes constitutional muster." Id. at
183-84. Amy Cohen, the named plaintiff in Cohen, expressed that "[t]here are little girls out
there who need women athletes to look up to. And if you take away their opportunity to have
women's sports, you take away their interest." Rachanee Srisavasdi, Athlete Who Sued Brown
is Happy With Outcome, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 6, 1996, at A61.
141. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 184.
142. Id. at 185.
143. Id. at 170.
144. Id. at 174.
145. Id. at 176.
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(iii) First Circuit Disposes of Quota-Affirmative Action Argument
Brown argued that the district court misconstrued and misapplied the
three-part effective accommodation test and that such prior determination
"effectively renders Title IX an 'affirmative action statute' that mandates
preferential treatment for women by imposing quotas in excess of women's
relative interests and abilities in athletics."'146 The court recognized:
Title IX is not an affirmative action statute; it is an anti-
discrimination statute, modeled explicitly after another anti-
discrimination statue, Title VI. No aspect of the Title IX regime at
issue in this case-inclusive of the statute, the relevant regulation,
and the pertinent agency documents-mandates gender-based pref-
erences or quotas, or specific timetables for implementing numeri-
cal goals. Like other anti-discrimination statutory schemes, the Ti-
tle IX regime permits affirmative action. In addition, Title IX, like
other anti-discrimination schemes, permits an inference that a sig-
nificant gender-based statistical disparity may indicate the exis-
tence of discrimination.
147
Furthermore, the three-part effective accommodation test applied was
proper. 48 The court stated that "[w]e reject Brown's kitchen-sink charac-
terization of the Policy Interpretation and its challenge to the substantial
deference accorded that document by the district court."'149 Thus, "[w]e hold
that the district court did not err in the degree of deference it accorded the
regulation and the relevant agency pronouncements."' 50 Furthermore, actual
athletic participation opportunities are the measure for determining the first
prong addressing substantial proportionality between the percentage of
students and student athletes of one sex.'
5
'
146. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 169.
147. Id. at 170-71 (emphasis added). Moreover, the majority stressed that "[flrom the
mere fact that a remedy flowing from a judicial determination of discrimination is gender-
conscious, it does not follow that the remedy constitutes 'affirmative action.' Nor does a
'reverse discrimination' claim arise every time an anti-discrimination statute is enforced." Id.
at 172.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 173.
151. Id. '"he district court's definition of athletics participation opportunities comports
with the agency's own definition." Id. at 173.
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(iv) Court Rejects Brown University's "Relative Interests" Argument
Perhaps the most novel approach, which, if adopted, would effectively
dismantle Title IX, was Brown University's argument that
an athletics program equally accommodates both genders and com-
plies with Title IX if it accommodates the relative interests and
abilities of its male and female students. This 'relative interests'
approach posits that an institution satisfies prong three of the three-
part test by meeting the interests and abilities of the underrepre-
sented gender only to the extent that it meets the interests and
abilities of the overrepresented gender.
152
The majority emphasized that
[w]e agree with the prior panel and the district court that Brown's
relative interests approach 'cannot withstand scrutiny on either le-
gal or policy grounds,' ... because it 'disadvantages women and
undermines the remedial purposes of Title IX by limiting required
program expansion for the underrepresented sex to the status quo
level of relative interests.'15 3
In pressing the University's quota argument, especially as to the third prong,
the court stated that "[i]n any event, the three-part test is, on its face, entirely
consistent with § 1681(b) because the test does not require preferential or
disparate treatment for either gender."15 4 Furthermore,
[o]nly where the plaintiff meets the burden of proof on these ele-
ments [the first and third prongs] and the institution fails to show
as an affirmative defense a history and continuing practice of pro-
gram expansion responsive to the interests and abilities of the un-
derrepresented gender will liability be established. Surely this is a
far cry from a one-step imposition of a gender-based quota. 155
The court summarized that "[i]n short, Brown treats the three-part test for
compliance as a one-part test for strict liability."'
56
152. Id. at 174.
153. ld. (citations omitted).
154. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 175.
155. Id.
156. Md
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The court recognized that "Brown also fails to recognize that Title IX's
remedial focus is, quite properly, not on the overrepresented gender, but on
the underrepresented gender; in this case, women.... It is women and not
men who have historically and who continue to be underrepresented in
sports, not only at Brown, but at universities nationwide."' 57
In discarding and dismantling the University's relative interest argu-
ment, the appellate court stated:
We view Brown's argument that women are less interested than
men in participating in intercollegiate athletics, as well as its con-
clusion that institutions should be required to accommodate the in-
terests and abilities of its female students only to the extent that it
accommodates the interests and abilities of its male students, with
great suspicion. To assert that Title IX permits institutions to pro-
vide fewer athletics participation opportunities for women than for
men, based upon the premise that women are less interested in
sports than are men, is (among other things) to ignore the fact that
Title IX was enacted in order to remedy discrimination that results
from stereotyped notions of women's interests and abilities. Inter-
est and ability rarely develop in a vacuum; they evolve as a func-
tion of opportunity and experience. 58
The court continued:
Thus, there exists the danger that, rather than providing a true
measure of women's interest in sports, statistical evidence pur-
porting to reflect women's interest instead provides only a measure
of the very discrimination that is and has been the basis for
women's lack of opportunity to participate in sports. Prong three
requires some kind of evidence of interest in athletics, and the Title
IX framework permits the use of statistical evidence in assessing
the level of interest in sports. Nevertheless, to allow a numbers-
based lack-of-interest defense to become the instrument of further
discrimination against the underrepresented gender would pervert
the remedial purpose of Title IX. We conclude that, even if it can
be empirically demonstrated that, 4t a particular time, women have
less interest in sports than do men, such evidence, standing alone,
cannot justify providing fewer athletics opportunities for women
than for men. Furthermore, such evidence is completely irrelevant
157. Ma
158. Id. at 178-79.
1997]
29
Heckman: On the Eve of Title IX's 25th Anniversary: Sex Discrimination in
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
where, as here, viable and successful women's varsity teams have
been demoted or eliminated.'59
The court stated that, "[f]inally, the tremendous growth in women's partici-
pation in sports since Title IX was enacted disproves Brown's argument that
women are less interested in sports for reasons unrelated to lack of opportu-
nity."' 6  The court observed further that, "[h]ad Congress intended to
entrench, rather than change, the status quo-with its historical emphasis on
men's participation opportunities to the detriment of women's opportuni-
ties-it need not have gone to all the trouble of enacting Title IX.,,
1 61
(v) The Lady or the Tiger: Should a Title VII Analysis Be Applied to a
Non-Employment Title IX Case?
Brown posited that the district court did not properly apply Title VII
standards to its analysis of whether Brown's intercollegiate athletics pro-
gram complies with Title IX. The court replied that
[i]t does not follow from the fact that § 1681(b) was patterned after
a Title VII provision that Title VII standards should be applied to a
Title IX analysis of whether an intercollegiate athletics program
equally accommodates both genders. While this court has ap-
proved the importation of Title VII standards into Title IX analysis,
we have explicitly limited the crossover to the employment con-
text.
162
The majority stated:
To the extent that Title IX allows institutions to maintain single-sex
teams and gender-segregated athletics programs, men and women
do not compete against each other for places on teams rosters. Ac-
cordingly .... the Title VII concept of the 'qualified pool' has no
place in a Title IX analysis of equal athletics opportunities for male
and female athletes because women are not 'qualified' to compete
for positions on men's teams, and vice-versa.
163
159. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 179-80.
160. Id. at 180.
161. Id. at 180-81.
162. Id. at 176.
163. Id. at 177.
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The court elaborated:
Brown's approach fails to recognize that, because gender-
segregated teams are the norm in intercollegiate athletics programs,
athletics differs from admissions and employment in analytically
material ways. In providing for gender-segregated teams, inter-
collegiate athletics programs necessarily allocate opportunities
separately for male and female students, and thus, any inquiry into
a claim of gender discrimination must compare the athletics par-
ticipation opportunities provided for men with those provided for
women. For this reason, and because recruitment of interested
athletes is at the discretion of the institution, there is a risk that the
institution will recruit only enough women to fill positions in a
program that already under represents women, and that the smaller
size of the women's program will have the effect of discouraging
women's participation.
In this unique context, Title IX operates to ensure that the gen-
der-segregated allocation of athletics opportunities does not disad-
vantage either gender. Rather than create a quota or preference,
this unavoidably gender-conscious comparison merely provides for
the allocation of athletics resources and participation opportunities
between the sexes in a non-discriminatory manner.... In contrast
to the employment and admissions contexts, in the athletics con-
text, gender is not an irrelevant characteristic.1
64
(vi) The Remedy
The only conflict uncovered by the First Circuit was that "the district
court erred in substituting its own specific relief in place of Brown's statuto-
rily permissible proposal to comply with Title IX by cutting men's teams
until substantial proportionality was achieved."'' 65  Brown's proposed
compliance plan called for elevating certain women's junior varsity teams.
The plan also proposed that "if the Court determines that this plan is not
sufficient to reach proportionality, phase two will be the elimination of one
or more men's teams."'166 The First Circuit agreed with the district court
"that Brown's proposed plan fell short of a good faith effort to meet the
164. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 177-78 (citations omitted).
165. Id at 185.
166. Id. at 186. Thus, the district court had ordered Brown to "elevate and maintain
women's gymnastics, women's water polo, women's skiing, and women's fencing to
university-funded varsity status." Id. at 187.
1997]
31
Heckman: On the Eve of Title IX's 25th Anniversary: Sex Discrimination in
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
requirements of Title IX .... ,1 67 However, "[i]t is clear, nevertheless, that
Brown's proposal to cut men's teams is a permissible means of effectuating
compliance with the statute.... Brown therefore should be afforded the
opportunity to submit another plan for compliance with Title IX.... In all
other respects the judgment of the district court is affirmed."'168
(vii) Dissenting Opinion
Chief Judge Torruella issued the dissenting opinion finding that the
Supreme Court's determinations in Adarand16 9 and the United States v.
Virginia 17 applied to Cohen.17 1 "What is important for our purpose is that
the Supreme Court appears to have elevated the test applicable to sex
discrimination cases to require an 'exceedingly persuasive justification.'
This is evident from the language of both the majority opinion and the
dissent in Virginia."'72  Herein, such a justification was absent in the
dissent's view.'
73
Second, this judge would eliminate "contact sports" from the analysis
of the effective accommodation test. 7 4 "Even assuming that membership
numbers in varsity sports is a reasonable proxy for participation opportuni-
ties-a view with which I do not concur--contact sports should be elimi-
nated from the calculus."'' 75 The Chief Judge rationalizes this position by
noting that the controlling regulation 76 allows schools to operate single-sex
teams in contact sports.
The Chief Judge's opinion is susceptible to rebuttal on several fronts.
First, this position is another version of the 1974 Tower Amendment, which
would have in effect eliminated revenue-producing sports from the analysis,
i.e., men's contact sports, such as football and basketball. Congress has
never adopted such proposals to remove any teams from a Title IX analy-
sis. 177 No discussion of the legislative history was included in this part of
the dissent. Second, the essence of Title IX is the "equal opportunity"
167. Id.
168. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 187-88.
169. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
170. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2287 (discussed supra p. 556).
171. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 191.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 192.
176. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
177. See Heckman, supra note 92, at 12-13.
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mandate. The dissent attempts to elevate the "separate teams" portion of the
regulation, which contains the contact sport language, to the superior or
primacy position, relegating the "equal opportunity" portion to a secondary
or subservient position. Such an attempt belies the Title IX vitality. Even
the district court in Gonyo v. Drake University, 178 when examining the other
regulation, which instructs specifically on athletics concerning the distribu-
tion of athletic scholarships, 179 found that it is the "equal opportunity"
directive which must take precedence. 80 Third, the contact sport dichotomy
sanctioned the status quo by permitting schools to continue to prevent
individual, talented females from participating in established all-male
contact sports. The Chief Judge, who was quick to cite Virginia, should
have gone a step further and, based on his reliance on this part of the
regulation, determined whether, in light of the "exceedingly persuasive
justification" standard articulated in Virginia,181 the contact sport distinction
could withstand constitutional scrutiny.
As to the three-part effective accommodation test, the dissent concludes
as to the third prong that "[e]ven a single person with a reasonable unmet
interest defeats compliance."' 82 First, such was not the case herein, and so
any such musings must be characterized as dicta. The reality is that during
the nearly twenty-five year tenure of Title IX, it is the prospective female
student athletes who have had to jump through the obstacle course to have
their participation opportunities created, not the males, who have had
established teams in place years before enactment of Title IX and thereafter
and thus were not required to offer justifications, petitions, and lawsuits.
The difference was that the men need only show up and they were suited up,
compared to the women who also showed up, accompanied by their attor-
neys with court orders or settlement agreements. One need only note the
struggle of female student athletes at Colgate University to have a club ice
hockey team elevated to varsity status, while male student athletes already
had a varsity ice hockey team.18 3 Third, regardless of the dissent's dismay
178. 879 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
179. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c).
180. See Diane Heckman, Case Summary: Gonyo v. Drake University, NOLPE NOTES,
June-July 1995, at 7-9.
181. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274-75.
182. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 196.
183. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 992 F.2d 17
(2d Cir. 1993). The case was re-instituted as a class action in Bryant v. Colgate Univ., No.
93-CV-1029, 1996 WL 328446 (N.D.N.Y. June 11, 1996) (settled in January 1997 subject to
the court's approval) (discussed infra p. 579).
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with the possibility that "one-woman" tennis, golf, and archery teams might
have to be established to fully and effectively accommodate the interests and
abilities of the underrepresented sex, clearly whether one person can
constitute an intercollegiate athletic team would be a question of fact and a
hypothetical clearly not before this court.
Fourth, the dissent apparently ignores the Policy Interpretation, which
does not automatically mandate the creation of such teams. A further
condition is required for establishment of both contact and non-contact
sports. For contact sports,
[e]ffective accommodation means that if an institution sponsors a
team for members of one sex in a contact sport, it must do so for
members of other sex under the following circumstances: (1) The
opportunities for members of the excluded sex have historically
been limited; and (2) There is sufficient interest and ability among
the members of the excluded sex to sustain a viable team and a rea-
sonable expectation of intercollegiate competition for that team. 184
Moreover, these same two conditions apply to "non-contact" sports with a
further requirement: "(3) Members of the excluded sex do not possess
sufficient skill to be selected for a single integrated teams, or to compete
actively on such a team if selected."'' 85 There was no mention of these
further impediments by the dissent. "All of the negative effects of a quota
remain, and the school can escape the quota under prong three only by
offering preferential treatment to the group that has demonstrated less
interests in athletics.' 86 Fifth, the dissent's statement belies the facts in this
case. Clearly, the female student athletes who originally brought this case
were not "less" interested in athletics. Rather, they were forced to go to
court to retain teams in sports in which they were very much interested in
participating.
Finally, the dissent intimates a possible First Amendment violation due
to the private status of this University, stating that the majority
"[i]nstead... established a legal rule that straight-jackets college athletics
programs by curtailing their freedom to choose the sports they offer."' 87 No
184. 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418 (1979).
185. Id.
186. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 196-97.
187. Id..
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mention is made of the Supreme Court decision in Grove City College v.
Bell,188 which upheld Title IX as companionable with the First Amendment.
The parties in Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania89 have
agreed to put the case on the inactive docket, while still abiding by the
pending preliminary injunction.' 90
b. Cases Commenced Pre-1994 Seeking Elevation of Club Teams
During August 1993, female students filed a class action lawsuit in
Bryant v. Colgate University'9' alleging sex discrimination in the intercolle-
giate athletics program. On January 21, 1994, the plaintiffs filed a motion
for summary judgment, and the defendants filed a cross motion for summary
judgment. Finally, during the spring of 1996, the judge issued his decision
denying both motions. 192 The trial was scheduled for August 1996. How-
ever, the trial was rescheduled to February 2, 1997, in order to allow the
parties to update discovery material. This case was commenced after a prior
lawsuit, Cook v. Colgate University,193 was brought by individually-named
female members of the club ice hockey team alleging Title IX violation and
seeking to upgrade their team to varsity intercollegiate status, where the men
had a varsity intercollegiate ice hockey team. 194 Colgate University has
since hired a full-time coach for the women's club ice hockey team and
permitted it to compete in a league comprised of varsity teams. On January
17, 1997, the parties settled the Bryant case, with the elevation of the
women's club team to varsity status (Division M1), effective for the 1997-98
academic year, subject to the court's approval. 195
c. Cases Commenced During 1994-96 Seeking Elevation of Club
Teams
There were no cases commenced during the three-year period from
1994 through 1996 seeking reinstitution of varsity teams. Rather, a slew of
federal class action lawsuits were commenced during 1994 and 1995 seeking
elevation of club teams to varsity status. During January 1994, members of
188. 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (discussing associational rights).
189. 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (denying University's request to modify an injunction
requiring the University to reinstate women's gymnastics and field hockey).
190. Letter from plaintiff's co-counsel to author (Oct. 4, 1996).
191. No. 93-CV-1029 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
192. Bryant, 1996 WL 328446, at *11.
193. 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
194. Id. at 739-40.
195. Telephone Interview with plaintiffs counsel (Jan. 17, 1997).
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the women's field hockey, softball, lacrosse, and crew club sports com-
menced a federal class action lawsuit in James v. Virginia Polytechnic
Institute & State University,196 seeking elevation of their teams to varsity
status. Thereafter, on April 17, 1995, the district court approved a settle-
ment which provided that by the end of the 1996-97 academic year the
percentage of female student athletes would be within three percentage
points of the percentage of female undergraduate students.
197
An interesting aspect was the provision that if the Supreme Court, the
Fourth Circuit, or Congress sets forth a certain percentage of female athletes
as the minimum required, then either party can petition the court to modify
the order. A women's lacrosse team would be added during the 1994-95
academic year, and women's varsity softball would be offered by 1995-96.
The women's athletic scholarships would be within five percentage points of
the percentage of undergraduate female students by 1997-98, continuing
through 2000-01. Comparable facilities for practice, training, and competi-
tive games for female student athletes will also be provided. A new softball
facility would be constructed for use during the spring 1996 season. The
plaintiffs' attorneys were accorded $50,000 in fees.
On March 31, 1994, members of the women's soccer team at Louisiana
State University ("LSU") commenced a federal class action lawsuit entitled
Pederson v. Louisiana State University'98 seeking elevation of a women's
club soccer team to varsity status. 199 Thereafter, a companion case was
commenced on January 3, 1995, by Cindy and Karla Pineda in Pineda v.
Louisiana State University2w in the Eastern District of Louisiana, requesting
declaratory and injunctive relief against the University and, in particular,
seeking a preliminary injunction adding fast pitch softball as a varsity sport.
On July 5, 1995, the district court denied the plaintiffs' request for a pre-
liminary injunction requiring: "(a) institution of intercollegiate varsity fast
196. No. 94-0031-R (W.D. Va. 1994).
197. Id. (Proposed Settlement Order, Apr. 7, 1995). See also Press Release from Virginia
Tech's Women's Intercollegiate Sports Expansion Plan (May 16, 1994) (distributed at a 1996
NCAA Title IX forum) (on file with the Nova Law Review).
198. 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996). Thereafter, on May 16, 1994, the plaintiffs filed
a motion for a preliminary injunction, and for class certification and a request for an expedited
hearing. Id. at 897. The court dismissed plaintiffs' motion on October 28, 1994. Id. at 898.
A stipulation was entered into by the parties in Pederson that the instatement of women's
varsity soccer team in the fall of 1994 made this request moot. Id. at 898 n.2. On September
19, 1994, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 897.
199. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 897.
200. Id. at 899. Defendants' motion to consolidate the Pineda and Pederson cases was
granted on March 30, 1995. Id.
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pitch softball in Fall 1995, (b) requesting LSU present a plan for compliance
with Title IX, and (c) freezing current expenditures and administrative
support for male varsity sports at Louisiana State University.
201
On October 10, 1995, the trial commenced in Pederson/Pineda v.
Louisiana State University. On January 12, 1996, the district court found
that the University had violated Title IX.2o2 However, the court emphasized
that Title IX distinguishes between "claims for unequal treatment of athletes
based on sex ['treatment claims'] and, on the other hand, claims for ineffec-
tive accommodation of demands of female and male athletes, i.e., equality of
opportunity to participate in athletics., 20 3 The court elaborated that "[a]ll
five plaintiffs asserted a claim for unequal treatment of female varsity
athletes, including unequal pay to coaches, lesser quality facilities, and other
related grievances. An unequal treatment claim presupposes that the
claimant was a varsity athlete who was treated unequally based upon her
sex.' 2°4 The court stressed the prevailing sentiment that the University is not
required to provide any athletic opportunity for its students, but if it elects to
do so, it "must provide equal athletic opportunity for both sexes and not
exclude either group from participation because of their sex.... Opportunity
is the possibility of participation, not the guarantee of participation. 2 °5
In reviewing the available Title IX precedents and case law, the court
stated critically that "[t]he Policy Interpretation has not been approved by
either the President or Congress, however, and is also susceptible, in part, to
an interpretation distinctly at odds with the statutory language." 206 In
examining the three-part effective accommodation test, the first prong would
require statistical proportionality between the percentage of students of each
sex and the percentage of student athletes; if satisfied, this would constitute
compliance with the effective accommodation test. Despite the fact that the
First,207 Third,208 Sixth,2 9 Seventh,210 and Tenth21 1 Circuits have respectively
201. Id. at 899. The court's more detailed ruling was contained in an October 28, 1994
ruling. Id
202. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 917.
203. Id. at 904.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 905.
206. Id. at 911-12. The court nonetheless continued that "[d]espite these drawbacks, the
Policy Interpretation definitely has a role to play in ascertaining the proper analysis of
compliance with Title IX." Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 912. Regardless, "[lt is the question of
how to evaluate equality of opportunity in levels of competition which provides a significant
sticking point in the Policy Interpretation's framework." Id.
207. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (discussed supra p. 565).
208. See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (1993) (discussed supra p. 579).
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condoned the tripartite test,2 12 this district court emphatically stated that as to
the first prong, "[t]his Court disagrees with either proposition and the
analysis leading to such a result, and denies most emphatically so to hold. 213
It stated that
[w]ithout some basis for such a pivotal assumption, this Court is
loathe to join others in creating the "safe harbor" or dispositive as-
sumption for which defendants and plaintiffs argue. Rather, it
seems much more logical that interest in participation and levels of
ability to participate as percentages of the male and female popula-
tions will vary from campus to campus and region to region and
will change with time. To assume, and thereby mandate, an unsup-
ported and static determination of interest and ability as the corner-
stone of the analysis can lead to unjust results. 214
Moreover,
Title IX does not mandate equal numbers of participants. Rather, it
prohibits exclusion based on sex and requires equal opportunity to
participate for both sexes. As appears in the Policy Interpretation,
inherent in this prohibition and mandate is knowledge of the desire
to participate, the ability to participate and the level of competi-
209. See Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994)
(discussed infra p. 586).
210. See Kelly v. Board of Dirs. of Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 938 (1995) (discussed infra p. 589).
211. See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993).
212. See Heckman, supra note 180, at 8.
213. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 913. The Title IX statute mandates:
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to require
any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the
members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving
the benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in comparison with
the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any community, State,
section, or other area: Provided, That this subsection shall not be construed to
prevent the consideration in any hearing or proceeding under this chapter of sta-
tistical evidence tending to show that such an imbalance exists with respect to the
participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such program or activity by the
members of one sex.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
214. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 913-14. Furthermore, "the jurisprudential emphasis on
numerical 'proportionality' is not found within the statute or the regulations; rather, it is
inferred from language in the Policy Interpretation and the statute which argues against such
an inference." Id. at 914.
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tion involved. Ceasing the inquiry at the point of numerical pro-
portionality does not comport with the mandate of the statute.
215
The district court found that
[n]o plan exists to institute a method to identify the interests and
abilities within the male and female student populations at LSU,
nor a plan to evaluate the athletic opportunities presented in light of
those identified interests and abilities, nor even a plan to effectively
and timely implement the decision it has already made to add inter-
collegiate varsity women's soccer and fast pitch softball.
21 6
Thus, the court directed that LSU "come into compliance immediately or
provide this Court with an adequate plan to do so with all due haste. 217 The
University filed a compliance action plan on February 1, 1996; however, as
of February 3, 1997, the court has yet to officially sanction such plan
through a court order.21 8
The court further concluded that the "plaintiffs failed to prove the
requisite element of intent necessary to justify monetary damages.,!2 19 This
was based on its finding that
[a]lthough the question is a very close one, this Court holds that the
violations are not intentional. Rather, they are a result of arrogant
ignorance, confusion regarding the practical requirements of the
law, and a remarkably outdated view of women and athletics which
created the byproduct of resistance to change.... LSU is saved
from the conclusion that it intended to discriminate in part by the
fact that the jurisprudence and regulations regarding Title IX have
been confused and unclear from the very beginning and [the ath-
letic director's] contradictory actionsY °
The court ruled the Pederson plaintiffs did not have standing.22' The
plaintiffs have filed an appeal concerning this issue. Howevei, due to an
215. Iaat 914.
216. Id. at 921-22.
217. Id. at 924.
218. Telephone Interview with Counsel for Plaintiffs (Feb. 4, 1997).
219. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 918.
220. Id. at 918-19.
221. Id. at 908. "Plaintiffs have not alleged any experience of the effect, impact or al-
leged injury resulting from any other alleged discriminatory practices Within LSU's existing
women's varsity athletics." Id. at 904.
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intervening Supreme Court decision concerning Eleventh Amendment
immunity,22 this state University filed a motion to dismiss with the district
court; the decision remains outstanding as of February 3, 1997.
During August 1994, female student athletes sought redress in Ulett v.
University of Bridgeport223 against the state University alleging discrimina-
tion in the athletic department and requested reinstatement of the women's
varsity gymnastics team. The complaint indicated that females comprised
54% of the students and 42% of the student athletes. 224 The men's volleyball
team was also eliminated. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive
relief. A consent decree was entered into among the parties on July 7, 1995,
with the University agreeing to retain the gymnastics team at least through
the 1997-98 academic year.2z
On May 8, 1995, a class action lawsuit commenced by members of the
women's club lacrosse and softball teams in Boucher v. Syracuse Univer-
222. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1118 (1996). Seminole Tribe
was a 5-4 decision proclaiming that "each State is a sovereign entity in our Federal system."
Id. at 1122. The Supreme Court held that "notwithstanding Congress' clear intent to abrogate
the States' sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Congress" the
power to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment Immunity. Id. at 1119. Thus, "[e]ven when
the Constitution vests Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the
Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against
unconsenting States." Id. at 1131. Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion, wrote: "[F]or the
first time since the founding of the Republic... Congress has no authority to subject a State
to the jurisdiction of a Federal court at the behest of an individual asserting a Federal right."
Id. at 1145 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also David J. Garrow, The Rehnquist Reins, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1996, § 6, at 71. The Eleventh Amendment states that "[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONsT. Amend. XI. But cf. Lipsett v. University of P.R.,
864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (requiring that in order to go forward with a Title IX claim
against this public University, part of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the plaintiff had to
establish that either the University waived its sovereign immunity or that Congress did so
when it enacted this federal statute). But see the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1994), which provides that "[a] State shall not be immune under the
Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a
violation of... [T]itle IX of the Education Amendments of 1972." See also Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Doe, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (No. 95-1694) (1996) (currently pending in the Supreme
Court). More recently, in a post-Seminole Tribe case, a federal district court determined that
"the University of Minnesota does not have state immunity from an employee's lawsuit under
the Americans with Disabilities Act." University of Minnesota Loses Bid for Legal Immunity,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUc., Dec. 13, 1996, at A35.
223. No. 3:94CV01460(PCD) (D. Conn. July 5, 1995) [hereinafter Consent Decree].
224. IM; Plaintiffs' Complaint at 4, 6.
225. Ulett, Consent Decree at 4.
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sity226 sought elevation of those teams to varsity status. The University has
announced plans to offer a women's varsity soccer team during the 1996-97
academic year and to offer varsity lacrosse in 1988. On June 12, 1996, the
district court granted partial summary judgment to the University, and
dismissed the causes of action alleging unequal financial assistance and
unequal benefits and opportunities for female varsity athletes.227 Some
controversy exists as to whether class certification should be provided for all
the plaintiffs' differing club sports that are seeking elevation. The plaintiffs
are awaiting the judge's determination on the plaintiffs' claim for class
action status. The defendant filed another motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiffs were awaiting rebuttal motion papers due on January 21, 1997.
d. Other Cases Commenced During 1994-96
On July 7, 1995, a lawsuit initiated by a softball player, a student
assistant softball coach, and a graduate assistant volleyball coach sought
proportionate facilities and funding at Northeast Louisiana University in
Hale v. Northeast Louisiana University.228 A federal district court in Harker
v. Utica College of Syracuse University2 9 found no violation of Title IX
when members of women's athletic teams had to share locker rooms,
whereas members of the men's teams did not.230
2. Interscholastic Level
On December 22, 1994, the Sixth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision in Homer v.
Kentucky High School Athletic Association,231 affirmed in part the lower
court's granting of summary judgment that no Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause claim of discrimination existed where the defendants, the
Kentucky High School Athletic Association ("KHSAA") and the Kentucky
State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education ("KSBESE"), sanc-
tioned fewer sports for females than the boys and refused to sanction girls'
interscholastic fast pitch softball, despite offering baseball for the boys.
226. No. 95-CV-620, 1996 WL 328444 (N.D.N.Y. June 12, 1996).
227. Id at *4.
228. See Will Kowalski, Athletes, Coaches Turn to Lawsuits to Spur Changes, USA
TODAY, Nov. 8, 1995, at 4C.
229. 885 F. Supp. 378 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
230. Id. at 392.
231. No. C-92-0295-L(J) (W.D. Ky. Jan 11, 1993) (applying a program-wide analysis to
determine whether a violation of Title IX had occurred where the state athletic association did
not sanction fastpitch softball for females), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 43 F.3d 265 (6th
Cir. 1994).
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However, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case as to the
district court's grant of summary judgment on the plaintiffs' Title IX
claim.232 The court found that both the defendants were recipients of federal
funds.z 3  For example, the KHSAA "receive[s] a portion of its revenues
from dues paid by member schools. 234 The court recognized that while the
Title IX "regulations do not impose an independent requirement that an
institution always sponsor separate teams for each sport it sanctions ... the
regulations do require that institutions provide gender-blind equality of
athletic opportunity to its students. 235 The Sixth Circuit also adopted the
three-part effective accommodation test.236 Again, limited finances will not
be countenanced as an excuse for not complying with Title IX, as the court
stated "[t]hus, a recipient may not simply plead limited resources to excuse
the fact that there are fewer opportunities for girls than for boys. 237  A
dissent was filed by Judge Alice M. Batchelder, based on her opinion that
the plaintiffs failed to present a prima facie case.238 Thereafter, on March
10, 1995, the Sixth Circuit denied the petitions by the defendants for a
rehearing en banc.
239
232. Id. at 276.
233. Id. at 272.
234. Id. at 270.
235. Id. at 273.
236. Homer, 43 F.3d at 273.
237. Id. at 275.
238. Id. at 276. On July 15, 1994, the Kentucky Assembly approved the following
amendment to the relevant state statute to include the following:
(a) The state board or its designated agency shall assure through promulgation of
administrative regulations that if a secondary school sponsors or intends to spon-
sor an athletic activity or sport that is similar to a sport for which National Col-
legiate Athletic Association members offer an athletic scholarship, the school
shall sponsor the athletic activity or sport for which a scholarship is offered. The
administrative regulations shall specify which athletic activities are similar to
sports for which National Collegiate Athletic Association members offer scholar-
ships.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 156.070(2)(a) (1996).
Thereafter, the KHSAA "passed a similar by-law, making an exception for schools in
which the underrepresented gender votes otherwise." Erin Cook, Title IX Report Card,
Implementation of Fast Pitch Softball Offers New Scholarship Opportunities for Kentucky's
Female Athletes, WOMEN'S SPORTS EXPERIENCE, Oct. 1995, at 13 (newsletter of the Women's
Sports Foundation).
239. Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994). A
meeting between the parties' attorneys was scheduled for August 1, 1995, "in which a plan
was to be devised to remedy the existing Title IX violations that surfaced during the trial."
Cook, supra note 238, at 13.
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On April 5, 1995, four lawsuits, including Thomsen v. Fremont Public
School District # 1,240 were simultaneously filed on behalf of female students
in a federal district court in Nebraska against school districts in Fremont,
North Platte, Minden, and Holdrege, alleging unequal opportunities and
unequal benefits and treatment. The lawsuits seek compensatory damages in
unspecified monetary amounts, injunctive and declaratory relief based on
violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Title IX, and the Nebraska "Equal
Opportunity in Education Act" statute. 241
C. Male Student Athletes
All the "equal opportunity" cases brought on behalf of males concerned
male collegiate students. The three-year time period also showcased the first
co-ed cases brought by collegiate students. As Donna Lopiano, the Execu-
tive Director of the Women's Sports Foundation underscored, "[c]utting the
level of men's participation needs to be a last choice. 242
On June 3, 1994, the State University of New York at Albany an-
nounced plans to drop men's wrestling, men's tennis, and men's and
women's swimming, and add women's field hockey and women's golf. In
an anomalous situation, the first of its kind, both male and female student
athletes commenced an article 78 lawsuit in state court in In the Matter of
240. No. 4CV95-3124 (D. Neb. 1995) [hereinafter Complaint] (on file with the Nova
Law Review). The Complaint alleges that "Thomsen desires to participate in softball at the
varsity interscholastic level (funded by Fremont, as opposed to the privately-funded club sport
level), but Defendants refuse to provide such an opportunity." Id. at 6. See Liberty v.
Holdrege Pub. Sch. Dist. # 44, No. 4:95CV3127 (D. Neb. 1995) (complaint on file with the
Nova Law Review). See also Fritson v. Minden Pub. Sch., No. 4:95CV3129 (D. Neb. 1995);
Praster v. North Platte Sch. Dist., No. 4:95CV3128 .(D. Neb. 1995). All four cases were
settled with the parties agreeing to the establishment of female interscholastic softball teams at
the respective school districts. Telephone Interview with Plaintiffs' Counsel, supra note 218
(Feb. 26, 1997).
241. Complaint at 19, Thomsen (No. 4CV95-3124). The Nebraska statute provides:
The Legislature finds and declares that it shall be an unfair or discriminatory
practice for any educational institution to discriminate on the basis of sex in any
program or activity. Such discriminatory practices shall include but not be lim-
ited to the following practices: ... (2) denial of comparable opportunity in intra-
mural and interscholastic programs.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-3003 (1990) ("Equal Opportunity Act").
242. Donna Lopiano, Title IX: It's Time to Live Up to the Letter of the Law, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 6, 1996, at B7. See also Heckman, supra note 15, at 997 (recommending
scrutiny of men's athletic budgets and over-all team sizes).
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Kane v. State University of New York at Albany243 challenging the Univer-
sity's actions as not being in conformity with procedural requirements. On
August 19, 1994, the state supreme court trial judge issued a temporary
restraining order on behalf of the plaintiffs, precluding the University's
planned actions. 244 Thereafter, on August 26, 1994, a stipulation and order
was entered into reinstating the aforementioned teams for the 1994-95
academic year, requiring that prompt notice of any future decisions to
terminate programs be given and that "all defendants in programs shall be in
compliance with federal law and made in accordance with appropriate
university procedure. 245
During May 1995, litigation commenced in a New York state court in
Lichten v. State University of New York at Albany246 challenging contempt of
the court's August 19, 1994 order in Kane. Subsequently during August
1995, the state trial court ruled that although there were some discrepancies
in the decision making process to eliminate three men's teams and a
women's team (swimming), where other women's teams were established,
they did not result in an arbitrary or capricious decision or in violation of
Title IX.2 47 The court found that the proposed actions would bring the state
University into closer compliance with Title IX.248 The decision was upheld
on appeal.249
Members of the men's swimming team at the University of California at
Los Angeles ("UCLA") sought a preliminary injunction to reinstate their
team at the University. On May 17, 1994, a California state court in Kurth v.
University of California Regents250 declined to issue a preliminary injunc-
tion.
The court found that a university is permitted to eliminate propor-
tional overrepresentation of male student-athletes to achieve the
goal of proportional equality. The plaintiffs have appealed the de-
243. No. 4834-94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994). See also Lichten v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Al-
bany, 646 N.Y.S.2d 402 (N.Y.A.D. 1996) (asserting failure to comply with the court order in
Kane and seeking restitution of the same sports slated for extinction as in Kane).
244. No. 4834-94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 19, 1994).
245. Id.
246. 646 N.Y.S.2d 402 (N.Y.A.D. 3d Dept. 1996). The percentage of female student
athletes has risen from 35% to 47%. Karla Haworth, Court Upholds Cutting 4 SUNY-Albany
Teams, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 9, 1996, at A32.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. No. SC-029577 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Los Angeles, May 17, 1994).
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cision. UCLA had previously announced that it was also cutting
women's gymnastics, but reinstated the sport after female student-
athletes threatened to challenge such action as a violation to Title
Ix.25
1
Members of the men's varsity swimming team sought the reinstatement
of their team in Kelley v. Board of Trustees of University of ilinois,2- where
the women's swimming team was not also scheduled for elimination. On
September 1, 1994, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's granting
of the defendant's motion for summary judgment.25 3 The appellate court
supports the principle that "an institution may violate Title IX solely by
failing to accommodate effectively the interests and abilities of student
athletes of both sexes"254 and endorsed the three-part effective accommoda-
tion test set forth in the HEW 1979 Policy Interpretation. 25" The court noted
that "[m]en's swimming was selected for termination because, among other
things, the program was historically weak, swimming is not a widely offered
athletic activity in high schools, and it does not have a large spectator
following."
256
The Seventh Circuit held that
[t]he university could, however, eliminate the men's swimming
program without violating Title IX since even after eliminating the
program, men's participation in athletics would continue to be
more than substantially proportionate to their presence in the Uni-
versity's student body. And as the case law makes clear, if the per-
centage of student-athletes of a particular sex is substantially pro-
portionate to the percentage of students of that sex in the general
student population, the athletic interests of that sex are presumed to
have been accommodated.5 7
The appellate court also found that the Title IX regulation, 34 C.F.R. §
106.41, "is not manifestly contrary to the objectives of Title IX" and,
251. ACHIEVING GENDER EQUITY: A BAsIc GUIDE TO TITLE IX FOR COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES BY THE NCAA 34 (1995).
252. 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 1993), aff'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 938 (1995).
253. 35 F.3d 265, 273 (7th Cir. 1994).
254. Id. at 268.
255. Id.
256. IM. at 269.
257. Id. at 270.
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therefore, "this Court must accord it deference. '258 Furthermore, the court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the regulation imposes a gender-based
quota system?2 9 Also, "[r]equiring parallel teams is a rigid approach that
denies schools the flexibility to respond to the differing athletic interests of
men and women. ' 2 °
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the school's
decision to eliminate men's swimming while retaining women's swimming
would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.261
The Seventh Circuit instead found that Congress has broad powers under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to remedy past discrimina-
tion.262
Title IX's stated objective is not to ensure that the athletic opportu-
nities available to women increase. Rather its avowed purpose is to
prohibit educational institutions from discriminating on the basis of
sex. And the remedial scheme established by Title IX and the ap-
plicable regulation and policy interpretation are clearly substan-
tially related to this end.263
On January 23, 1995, the Supreme Court denied the request to hear the
plaintiffs' appeal. 2 4
In the second case evaluating whether a University violated Title IX
when it dropped a men's sport, the district court in Gonyo v. Drake Univer-
sity265 denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction seeking the
retention of the men's varsity wrestling team at this private University
during October 1994.266 On March 10, 1995, the district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Title IX, the Fifth Amend-
ment "equal protection clause," and the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.267 The court had previously denied
258. Kelly, 35 F.3d at 270-71.
259. Id. at 271.
260. Il
261. Id. at 272.
262. Id.
263. Kelly, 35 F.3d at 272.
264. 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995).
265. 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
266. Id. at 990.
267. Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
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the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to refrain from eliminating
268the men's varsity wrestling team at the end of the 1992-93 academic year.
The governing regulation 269 directs substantial proportionality between
the percentage of athletes and athletic scholarships. 270 The plaintiffs argued
that the University was not in compliance with this regulation, identified as
the "scholarship test."271 The plaintiffs argued that a violation of either
section 106.37 or section 106.41 should constitute a violation of Title IX. 2
The court disagreed, stating:
[The 'safe harbor' of proportional participation extends beyond
the question of compliance under section 106.41. As I read Title
IX and the implementing regulations, the paramount goal of Title
IX is equal opportunity to participate.... Scholarships may be a
significant aspect of this opportunity, and an important tool in cre-
ating opportunity, but they remain only a part of the larger picture,
logically subordinate to the overarching goal.273
During February 1995, male wrestlers instituted a suit in a New York
state court in Cooper v. Peterson274 after St. Lawrence University announced
the decision to drop wrestling after the 1994-95 seasons. The case was
predicated primarily on alleged breach of contract. 5 No Title IX claim was
made. New York has no state statute comparable to Title IX as it pertains to
intercollegiate athletics. The defendant thereafter filed a motion to dismiss,
which the state trial court judge granted during April 1995.276 "In dismissing
the claim for sex discrimination, the court noted that the wrestlers had failed
to present sufficient information demonstrating that they had been excluded
on the basis of gender or subjected to discrimination in the athletics pro-
gram. 277 No appeal was taken.
268. Gonyo, 837 F. Supp. at 996.
269. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c).
270. Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1004.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1005.
273. Id.
274. 626 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
275. Id..
276. Id at 435.
277. Governmental Affairs Report, NCAA NEws, Aug. 30, 1995, at 5.
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Members of the men's soccer and wrestling teams at Illinois State
University commenced a lawsuit during September 1995 seeking reinstitu-
tion of their teams. 278
V. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETIC EMPLOYMENT
As indicated, the bulk of cases revolved around the "equal opportunity"
cases on behalf of female athletic employees or coaches of female teams, all
on the post-secondary level.279 Title VII states in pertinent part that
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(1)
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin .... 280
Title VII, which prohibits sex discrimination in certain employment situa-
tions, requires satisfaction of either claim: a disparate treatment claim where
the individual alleges intentional discrimination by the employer, or a
disparate impact claim where a facially neutral or nondiscriminatory practice
has a disproportionate negative impact on the hiring, firing, or terms and
conditions of that employment for members of one sex over the other.81
The crux of the Equal Pay Act is that equal pay must be accorded to
employees of the opposite sex "for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are per-
formed under similar working conditions ..... 282 The Ninth Circuit, in Hein
278. Kowalski, supra note 228.
279. See Heckman, supra note 15, at 998-1018, for exploration of the three federal stat-
utes (Title IX, Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act) routinely used in educational employment
cases and for additional background and discussion of the case law issued concerning the
athletic employment cases commenced prior to 1994.
280. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). See also Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(Supp. V. 1993).
281. See EEOC v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters. Inc., 60 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1995), rev'd,
117 S. Ct. 660 (1997) (addressing the issue of the number of employees working, as Title VII
only covers employers that have "fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.")
282. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1988). See Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151 (5th Cir.
1993) (female English literature professor at Rice University failed to establish a claim of
discrimination pursuant to the Equal Pay Act or Title IX). See also Houck v. Virginia
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 10 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing female professor who
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination pursuant to the Equal Pay Act).
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v. Oregon College of Education,23 determined that the Equal Pay Act
focuses on jobs that require equal skills and not to employees that possess
equal skills. The Eleventh Circuit, in Brock v. Georgia Southwestern
College 4 stated that "[i]t is important to bear in mind that the prima facie
case is made out by comparing the jobs held by the female and male employ-
ees and showing that these jobs are substantially equal, not by comparing the
skills and qualifications of the individual employees holding those jobs." 5
While the Title VII and Equal Pay Act statutes have been thoroughly
vetted by the courts, Title IX, which pertains only to employment at educa-
tional institutions which are recipients of federal funds, has yet to be fully
fleshed out. A patchwork of case law is developing, borrowing on the other
two federal employment related statutes, but still not explicitly focusing on
the Title IX regulations that address employment 6 or the requirement
within 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)5-6 that where schools provide separate teams
for members of each sex, that those students must have equality in coaching.
Inexplicably, there has not been one court decision, to date, involving
sex discrimination by a coach or athletic director at an educational institution
which discusses any of the specific Title IX regulations governing employ-
ment, not even in dicta, or a footnote. Query: Where University A hires a
nationally renown successful male basketball coach for the men's intercolle-
giate basketball team with a salary to reflect that distinction, however, the
women's intercollegiate basketball team is coached by a female former
player, whose salary is appreciably less than that of the men's team-has the
school triggered Title IX sexual discrimination in employment and has the
school provided equal coaching to both the men's and women's team, and
the attendant student athletes, as required by Title IX regulations? Second:
Does paying a coach of a men's team a greater amount than the coach of the
women's team for the same sport, on the same divisional level, trigger a
violation of Title IX, as opposed to the Equal Pay Act? For example, the
NCAA has three divisions: Division I (most prestigious); Division II; and
283. 718 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1983) (concerning litigation by a female assistant professor in
the physical education department whose coaching duties approximated one-third of her
responsibilities and teaching duties comprised two-thirds, as compared to the men's varsity
basketball coach whose coaching duties approximated one-fourth and teaching duties three-
fourths).
284. 765 F.2d 1026 (lth Cir. 1985).
285. Id. at 1032 (emphasis added).
286. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 106.7 (Effect of employment opportunities); § 106.51
(Employment); § 106.52 (Employment criteria); § 106.54 (Compensation); § 106.55 (Job
classification and structure).
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Division III (non-athletic scholarship). Third: Should courts place merit
when the men's male coach has greater accomplishments than the women's
female coach, considering the following two factors?
First, ostensibly, women have been and continue to be almost exclu-
sively absent from coaching men's teams on the collegiate, and thereafter,
the Olympic, and professional levels.28 7 During the 1995-96 season, on the
collegiate level, there was not one woman coaching Division I men's
football, baseball, or hockey. A lone female, Kerri-Ann McTiernan, was
coaching a men's intercollegiate (non-Division I) basketball team at
Kingsborough Community College, in New York, and Dot Murphy is an
assistant football coach at Hinds Community College, a non-NCAA institu-
tion in Mississippi. No women coached any of the United States men
competing in the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta.288 While affirmative
efforts have been voiced about bringing more black (male) coaches into the
professional ranks, there has not been even any rhetoric about commencing
the inclusion of women into this segment of the job market, despite the
passage of almost twenty-five years since Title IX's enactment, or the
expanse of time after Title VIl's enactment. No real progress has been
made, no trickle up effect has occurred due to the generation of females who
have played interscholastic and intercollegiate sports. 9 Consider the
287. For example, in 1996, there was not one woman coaching in the National Football
League ("NFL"), the National Basketball Association ("NBA"), Major League Baseball
("MLB"), or the National Hockey League ("NHL"). Moreover, there has never been a female
referee in either MLB, the NFL, NHL, or Major League Soccer. Julie Sommer, Gender is
Deciding Factor for International Referees: Highly Qualified Referee Denied Opportunity,
WOMEN'S SPORTS EXPERIENCE, Dec. 1996, at 11-12.
288. Moreover, parity still has not been reached in the number of athletic events available
for men and women. For example, for the first time women competed in softball at the 1996
Summer Olympics, but presently it has not received status as a permanent sport to be included
for female athletes at future Olympics. Females comprised 34% of all athletes at the Summer
Olympics. Women's basketball was not added as an Olympic sport until 1976, and a women's
marathon was not included until the 1984 Summer Olympics. Moreover, only ten out of 113
members of the influential International Olympic Committee are women. There is only one
woman on the IOC Executive Board, Anita DeFrantz. See Christopher Clarey, Perspective:
Swifter, Higher, Stronger... Gender, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1996, § 8, at 9. Within the next
10 years, each of the 197 participating countries will be required to have women comprise at
least 10% of their decision-makers, which the IOC will be required to do so by the year 2000.
Jody Smith, International Olympic Committee Increases the Role of Women, WOMEN'S
SPORTS EXPERIENCE, Feb. 1996, at 13. The New York Times devoted an entire issue of its
Sunday magazine to women's participation in the Olympics. N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, June 23,
1996, § 6 (24th anniversary of Title IX).
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second factor: Since there are few outlets for women to coach professional
female athletes 290 a class comparison of a male coach with a female coach
impacts to the detriment of a female coach-and so could be used in perpe-
tuity to relegate the female coach to a lesser salary than her male counter-
part. So when the judges compare the backgrounds of a George Raveling to
a Marianne Stanley, or a Butch Beard to a Sanya Tyler, it is not surprising
that the men are coming out on top. However, even if the courts allow this
approach for an Equal Pay Act analysis (despite the aforementioned appel-
late decisions that instruct that the focus should be on the job skills, rather
than individual skills), there has yet to be a direct answer as to whether this
approach can be utilized when examining a Title IX cause of action. The
essence of this commentary was first raised in 1994. Three years later, there
has been no advancement in the Title IX panorama.
The 1995 Women's Basketball Coaches Association ("WBCA") survey
found inequities between coaches of NCAA men's versus women's basket-
ball teams in the percentages of radio and television shows, amenities (such
as country club memberships, automobiles and amenities), bonuses for team
performance, and program support (such as secretarial assistance, promotion
and sport information staff time)-all not surprisingly favoring coaches of
the men's NCAA Division I basketball teams compared to coaches of the
women's basketball teams.291
A. Hiring
There were no cases initiated concerning hiring policies of women
coaching men's teams, which continues the dearth of case law in this area
289. This coincides with the complete blackout of any women athletes employed by the
men's teams in the NFL (there has never been a female NFL player), NBA (likewise, there has
never been a female NBA player), MLB (the Colorado Silver Bullets, a women's baseball
team had played against minor league baseball players, but the women are not part of the
Major League Baseball Players' Association), or the NHL (during the early 1990s, a Canadian
female player, Manon Rheaume, briefly played on a minor league team).
290. For example, since Title IX's enactment, there have been sporadic professional
women's basketball leagues; however, 1996-97 will feature two women's basketball leagues,
including the American Basketball League, which commenced operation during the Fall 1996,
and the National Basketball Association sponsored one, the Women's National Basketball
Association, which will commence operation during the summer of 1997. See Kate McCor-
mick, Spotlight: Women's Sports on the Professional Track-Part I, WoMEN's SPORTS
EXPERIENCE, Oct. 1996, at 19-21. While the women's baseball team, the Colorado Silver
Bullets has been playing for the last couple of years, the Women's Professional Fastpitch
League will debut during June 1997. 1& at 19.
291. WBCA 1995 Division I Salary Survey (1995) (on file with the Nova Law Review).
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since Title IX's inception.292 The results of the ongoing longitudinal study
done by Professors Acosta and Carpenter concerning NCAA colleges and
universities revealed further disturbing news with their latest update. As of
1996, only 47.7% of the coaches of women's teams are women, a decline
from the 1994 figure of 49.4%.293 Furthermore, only 18.5% of all women's
programs are headed by a woman, also a decrease from the 1994 figure of
21%; and only 11.9% of colleges and universities with a full-time sports
information director had a woman at the helm.294 In Division I in 1996, the
research indicated that men comprised a startling 91.2% of the athletic
directors of women's programs.295 In 1996, only a few Division I schools
296had any women in athletic administration positions. Merely five of theNCAA's Division I-A athletic directors are women.297
B. Equal Pay
The Title IX regulation governing compensation states:
A recipient shall not make or enforce any policy or practice which,
on the basis of sex:
(a) Makes distinctions in rates of pay or other compensation;
(b) Results in payment of wages to employees of one sex at a rate
less than that paid to employees of the opposite sex for equal work
on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
292. See Grebin v. Sioux Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 18 (8th Cir. 1985) (teaching
position for which a female applied was filled by a man, who could also coach football). In
this Title VII case, the Eighth Circuit determined the school district had a legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff, as the male applicant was better qualified. Id. at
21. See also Sennewald v. University of Minn., 847 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1988) (discussing
another Title VII case concerning a female assistant softball coach who was not promoted to a
full-time position).
293. R. Vivian Acosta & Linda Jean Carpenter, Women in Intercollegiate Sport: A Lon-
gitudinal Study-Nineteen Year Update 1977-96, at 1 (unpublished manuscript on file with the
Nova Law Review) [hereinafter Acosta & Carpenter]. Cf Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Black
Women, Gender Equity and the Function at the Junction, 6 MARQ. SPoRTs L.J. 239 (1991)
(examining, inter alia, the low number of African-American women coaching).
294. Acosta & Carpenter, supra note 293, at 11.
295. Id
296. Id. at 12.
297. The women athletic directors are Andrea Seger of Ball State University, Deborah
Yow of University of Maryland, Cary Groth of Northern Illinois University, Sandy Barbour of
Tulane University, and Barbara Hedges of University of Washington. Arena, NEWSDAY, Sept.
14, 1996, at A28.
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responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions.2
98
There has yet to be a court decision in the area of athletics employment at an
educational institution which addresses this specific regulation.299
There were only two cases exploring the equal pay considerations for
coaches, who were still in their positions while the litigation ensued. The
jury trial in Tyler v. Howard University was conducted in a District of
Columbia Superior Court during 1993.300 The jury rendered a verdict of
$2.39 million for Sanya Tyler, the women's basketball coach at Howard
University. On June 29, 1993, the judge reduced the verdict, based on
duplicate recovery for the same injuries under alternate legal theories, to
$1.06 million against the University, and retained the original $54,000
verdict against the individual defendant.
301
On September 15, 1995, the trial judge finally issued an order and
memorandum opinion responding to the July 1993 post-trial motions filed by
the defendants.30 2 The four causes of action asserted were: 1) Equal Pay
Act; 2) sex discrimination pursuant to Title IX and a District of Columbia
statute; 3) retaliation; and 4) defamation. The court granted the defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the Equal Pay Act
based on the plaintiff not being selected as the Athletics Director in 1991
and a claim of retaliation.
Tyler had been the full-time Associate Athletic Director since 1986, and
part-time women's basketball coach since 1980, for an aggregate salary of
$62,000. On July 1, 1990, a full-time men's basketball coach was hired at an
annual salary of $78,500, plus access to a leased car, with a four-year
contract with an option for an additional year.30 3 Tyler was paid $44,436.3°4
298. 34 C.F.R. § 106.54 (emphasis added). Note that the regulation does not include the
language, on the basis of sex of the individual, to track the Title VII verbiage.
299. See Heckman, supra note 15, at 1014-15.
300. See Tyler v. Howard Univ., No. 91-CAl1239 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 1995)
(Memorandum Opinion) [hereinafter Mem. Op.]; Pitts v. Oklahoma, No. 93-1941-A (W.D.
Okla. 1993) (discussed in Heckman, supra note 15, at 1010).
301. Id. The court awarded $600,000 for lost wages pursuant to Title IX and the District
of Columbia Human Rights Act; $138,000 damages pursuant to the Equal Pay Act; $72,00 for
emotional distress under the sex discrimination claim; $250,000 damages for emotional
distress under the retaliation claim; and $54,000 for the defamation claim. Il
302. The court stated that resolution of the post-trial motions was intentionally delayed
awaiting the development of appellate judicial precedent under the Equal Pay Act and Title
IX. Mem. Op., supra note 300, at 2 n.1.
303. Id. at 9.
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Tyler applied for the top position, which went to another candidate outside
the University.
The court noted that the issue concerning the Equal Pay Act was
whether this federal statute was violated due to the difference in salary and
conditions paid to the men's and women's basketball coaches.305  The
University argued that although the head full-time basketball coaches have
the same job title and the same general job description, this did not entitle
them to the same or identical salary.306  Rather, the jobs must be
"substantially equal., 30 7 The court cited an appellate opinion which stated
that "[s]kill includes consideration of such factors as experience, training,
education and ability.... Responsibility involves the degree of accountabil-
ity required in the performance of the job; the controlling factor is not job
title but job content-'the actual duties that the respective employees are
called upon to perform."' 30 8 The court found the Ninth Circuit decision in
Stanley v. University of Southern California309 was persuasive on the equal
pay issues.
Howard University's men's basketball coach was a former NBA player
and coach, who authored a book and did television color commentary, and
according to the University, the school "was forced to compete with market
forces," in obtaining his services.310 Clearly, he had more playing experi-
ence and a higher level of coaching experience than the plaintiff. However,
considering the limited or nonexistent professional basketball opportunities
for women in this country, certain men will always come in with an advan-
tage (as result of historical discrimination against women in athletic and
employment situations, which necessitated federal statutes such as Title IX,
Title VII, and the Equal Pay Act).
The court also relied on the fact that the men's basketball team
304. Id
305. Id. See also Debra E. Blum, Pay Equity for Coaches: Some Colleges Give Substan-
tial Raises to Mentors of Women's Teams, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 6, 1994, at A53
(designating specific universities which are awarding coaches of their women's teams with
considerable raises to more closely align their salaries with those of the men's coaches, such
as women's basketball coaches at The Florida State University, Texas A & M University,
University of Florida, and University of Kansas).
306. Mem. Op., supra note 300, at 2 n.1.
307. Id
308. Id. at 11.
309. 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994).
310. Mem. Op., supra note 300, at 15-16.
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also served to generate income from the viewing public and spec-
tators, the media, and from other sources to a far greater degree
than did the women's basketball team. This revenue-generating
function and responsibility placed far greater pressure on Coach
Beard to win than was the degree of pressure placed on Ms. Tyler
with reference to the women's basketball team. Thus, for this rea-
son, their jobs were not substantially equal 311
The court noted that
[a] question may be raised as to whether societal factors, such as
far greater spectator interest in men's basketball than women's
basketball, and greater media and television interest and coverage
of men's sports, as external factors, should be allowed to justify a
disparity or differential in the pay of men and women coaches for
the same athletic activities.
312
The court responded that
[t]his Court is constrained to follow the existing judicial precedent
and leave it to the appellate courts to grapple with the issue of such
market forces, as spectator interest and television and media cover-
age, justifying paying women less compensation than their male
counterparts for basically the same function, except for the impact
of these market forces over which universities and colleges claim
they have no control.313
The defendant's motion was denied as to the sex discrimination claims
of being undercompensated as women's basketball coach, involving the pay
and working conditions, pursuant to Title IX and a District of Columbia
statute. As to the retaliation claim, the court expounded:
While there was some dispute and misunderstandings as to office
space assignment, available funds because of budget restraints, and
other minor related issues, this Court concludes that the evidence
concerning these matters did not rise to the level of establishing the
311. Id.
312. Id
313. IL at 18.
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required nexus so that a reasonable jury could find that this activity
was retaliation for complaining of sex discrimination. 314
Additionally, the motion was denied as to the defamation action alleged
against an individual defendant, who allegedly in a single publication to a
professional colleague of the plaintiff, intimated that the plaintiff was a
lesbian. In conclusion, the court granted the defendant's motion for a new
trial or remititur, only as to damages on the two sex discrimination claims of
the District of Columbia statute and Title IX, or accepting a reduction to
$250,000; and on the defamation claim a reduction from $54,000 to $10,000.
Thereafter, the parties settled the case during November 1995.
C. Termination
1. Cases Commenced Pre-1994
On January 6, 1994, the Ninth Circuit in Stanley v. University of
Southern California315 affirmed the district court's denial of the plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction seeking restoration of the plaintiffs
position as the women's basketball coach at the University pendente lite.
Marianne Stanley had commenced her lawsuit in 1993 seeking $8 million in
compensatory and punitive damages on a number of legal theories, includ-
ing: Title IX, the Equal Pay Act,316 the California Constitution, breach of
contract, and wrongful discharge.
The appellate court found the men's basketball coach had
"substantially" different responsibilities in raising revenue (the men's
basketball program generated 90% revenues compared to the women's
basketball program which generated 10%) and public relations responsibili-
ties on behalf of the University that could command a greater salary than
314. IL at 5.
315. 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994) (granting the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment). An appeal has been taken to the Ninth Circuit. Prior to this decision, there was only
one other decision concerning athletic employment pursuant to Title IX, O'Connor v. Peru
State College, 781 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1986), which did not reach the merits of the case, but
focused on the threshold issue of whether the athletic department was a recipient of federal
funds to ensure Title IX protection.
316. See Mike Candal, Equal Coaching for Unequal Pay, NEWSDAY, Apr. 2, 1995,
(Sports section), at 18 (concerning the difference in salary paid to the men's and women's
basketball coaches at the University of Connecticut). The male head coach of the women's
team guided his team to the 1994-95 NCAA Women's Basketball championship. See also Ira
Berkow, Auriemma Helps Pave the Way at UConn, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1995, § 8, at 2.
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provided to the women's basketball coach pursuant to the Equal Pay Act.
The Ninth Circuit found that "[e]mployers may reward professional experi-
ence.., without violating the EPA. 3 17 Furthermore, "[r]evenue generation
is an important factor that may be considered in justifying greater pay. We
are also of the view that the relative amount of revenue generated should be
considered in determining whether responsibilities and working conditions
are substantially equal.'
Interestingly, the only reference to Title IX was contained in a footnote,
where the Ninth Circuit stated, "Coach Stanley has not contended either in
the district court or before this court that this evidence [concerning the
revenue-generating ability of the men's versus women's basketball pro-
grams] would support an inference that USC violated Title IX."319 Further-
more, the mere fact that the University ultimately offered only a one-year
contract did not establish retaliation 320 where the men's basketball coach had
a multi-year contract, and Stanley's expired contract was a multi-year
contract. In both the Ninth Circuit decision and the following district court
decision, Title IX is essentially left out of the equation in determining
whether sex discrimination existed.
On March 10, 1995, the district court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment in its entirety, primarily on the determination that the
duties and responsibilities of the men's basketball coach were greater than
those required of the women's basketball coach, with the former position
requiring greater pressure to win, raise revenue, and satisfy greater public
relations requirements. 321 The district court found that
317. Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1322 (citing Soto v. Adams Elevator Equip. Co., 941 F.2d 543,
548 n.7 (7th Cir. 1991)).
318. Id. at 1323. See Naughton & Srisavasdr, supra note 6, at A45, referring to a recent
NCAA report that revealed that "more than 60 percent of Division I men's basketball
programs and Division I-A football programs lose money. The average deficits are $226,000
and $1.02 million respectively." Id. See also Jim Naughton, A Book on the Economics of
College Sports Says Few Programs are Financially Successful, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct.
11, 1996, at A57.
319. Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1323 n.3 (citations omitted). Cf. Heckman, supra note 15, at
1007-08.
320. 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (adopting by incorporation 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e)) (prohibiting
retaliation).
321. Stanley v. University of S. Cal., No. CV93-4708 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1995)
[hereinafter Slip. Op.]. See Jane Gottesman, An Odyssey of Championships and Hardships,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995, § 8, at 11 (concerning Coach Stanley). Cheryl Miller, who was
hired as Stanley's replacement, submitted her resignation during September 1995 to pursue
television opportunities and more recently has become involved with the Women's National
Basketball Association. Stanley was hired during April 1996 as the head women's basketball
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Stanley still is unable to show the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact on the issue of whether the men's and women's bas-
ketball coaching positions are substantially equal and require equal
pay under the law. It is clear they are not. Both the men's and
women's head coaches recruit student athletes, coach basketball,
provide academic guidance to team members, and supervise their
coaching staffs. The men's coach, however, is under considerable
pressure to generate revenue for the university by attracting paying
spectators and producing a winning team.
32 2
The court noted that "[t]his pressure is created by the media, public, and the
school's administration and donors. 32 3
The court grouped the sex discrimination claims pursuant to the Equal
Pay Act, Title IX, and the California statute 3 24 in one discussion. A review
indicated that as with the prior appellate court decision, the focus was on an
explicit analysis of the Equal Pay Act. "To state a claim under this section,
the plaintiff's job must require substantially the same skill, effort, and
responsibility as the higher compensated job held by a member of the
opposite sex." 325 The only direct mentions of Title IX were in the next to
last paragraph of the subsection, where as an aside the district court stated
that "[s]imilarly, Title IX of the [Education Amendments] of 1972 prohibits
an educational program that receives federal financial assistance from
denying benefits to, or subjecting to discrimination, any person on the basis
of sex," 326 and "[the athletic director's] power as athletic director to hire and
fire athletic coaches does not make him an employer for purposes of individ-
ual liability under... Title IX,, 327 Once again, there was no discussion of
any of the Title IX regulations. First, there was absolutely no mention of the
Title IX regulations governing employment. Second, there was no recogni-
tion of the Title IX regulation establishing "equal opportunity" which
coach at University of California at Berkeley, after serving as temporary head coach at
Stanford University. Stanley will be paid a base salary comparable to that of the men's
basketball coach. Cf University of California, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics at
the University of California: A Report of the Gender Equity Committee of the Department of
Intercollegiate Athletics & Recreational Sports, Dec. 1, 1993 (on file with the Nova Law
Review).
322. Slip Op. at 14, Stanley, (No. CV93-4708).
323. Id. at 15.
324. Fair Employment & Housing Act, CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 12940-12950 (West Supp.
1993).
325. Slip Op. at 12-13, Stanley (No. CV93-4708).
326. Id. at 13.
327. Id. at 19.
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explicitly mandates equal opportunity in coaching for male and female
athletes when a school elects to provide separate teams for their male and
female student athletes. The court underscores that the women's basketball
coach was
not required to make any specific number of public appearances to
promote the women's basketball team .... The University did not
impose public relations responsibilities on her while she was head
coach .... In contrast, [the men's basketball coach's] required
participation in at least twelve outside speaking engagements per
year, that he be accessible to the media for interviews, and that he
participate in community activities. He was required to participate
in fund-raising activities benefiting the athletic department in gen-
eral and the men's basketball program in particular. 3
28
The court fails to recognize that generally it is the recipient of federal funds,
the academic institution, which is clearly controlling the issue of public
relations responsibilities, by explicitly imposing it as a requirement within a
contract of the men's basketball coach and not the contract of the women's
basketball coach, and then is permitted to use the absence thereof to penalize
the women's basketball coach when it comes to remuneration. As previ-
ously identified, surely a women's coach would not be against such minimal
additional public relations duties, with a possible additional compensation of
$60,000 per annum. The logic certainly seems flawed. Moreover, query
whether it triggers a direct attack as to whether the recipient of federal funds
was providing "equal opportunity" for its female student athletes, where the
school, adopting the court's rationale, was apparently not required to
promote this program with the same vigor.
Additionally, the court places significant stock in the revenue-
generating responsibilities of the men's coach. "Revenue generation is an
important factor in determining whether responsibilities and working
conditions are substantially equal and whether greater compensation is
justified., 329  Not surprisingly, the men's basketball program raised
$4,621,020.90 versus only $59,918.50 by the women's basketball program.
The court neglects to provide the dates when the men's and women's
basketball teams came into existence at the University. The court does
compare the spectators for the appropriate periods for the men's and
women's basketball teams. Not surprisingly, the statistics favored the men;
328. Id. at 16.
329. Id. (citations omitted).
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however, the men's team averaged merely 4103 spectators for the time
period in question, hardly. an overwhelming number for a major college
basketball program. 330  Of course, the argument can be made, that if the
judiciary is going to do a side-by-side comparison, then by necessity the
University must provide an "equal opportunity" for both programs, and so
the court would be required to insure that that standard was satisfied, before
the comparison can be made. This determination, resting as it does on the
Ninth Circuit decision, obscures the Title IX picture. As previously identi-
fied, revenue-generation is absent from the "equal opportunity" discussion.
Furthermore, the "[c]ourt addresses the retaliation claim as if it arises under
Title VII. 330 ' Again, what about retaliation pursuant to Title IX?
Instead, the court reiterated that "[t]he [c]ourt finds no discrimination
arising from USC's contract offers to Stanley. It thus was not required to
pay her a salary equal to that paid to the men's head coach. 332 The appel-
lee's brief recounted the Ninth Circuit's observation that "the uncontradicted
evidence shows that Coach Raveling's responsibilities, as head coach of the
men's basketball team, differed substantially from the duties imposed upon
Coach Stanley. 3 33 Coach Raveling has since retired. It is not known what
compensation arrangement exists with the current men's basketball coach.
Oral argument before the Ninth Circuit occurred on October 7, 1996. 334
330. The Appellee's Brief, in discussing one of plaintiffs experts' arguments, notes that
"[w]hat Frey appears to be saying, although he cites no source for his statement, is that,
compared with other men's programs, USC's men's program did not have relatively high
attendance; conversely, compared with other women's programs, the USC women's program
did have relatively high attendance." Stanley v. University of S. Cal., No. 95-55466,
Appellee's Brief, Aug. 25, 1995, at 21 n.17.
331. Slip Op. at 20, Stanley (No. CV93-4708).
332. Id. at 14.
333. Appellee's Brief, Stanley v. University of S. Cal., No. 95-55466, Aug. 25, 1995, at 2
(on file with the Nova Law Review). The brief also summarizes that as to the retalia-
tion/public policy wrongful discharge claims that "[t]he court found it was undisputed that
USC had offered Stanley a multi-year contract with very substantial pay increases after she
had demanded the same pay as Raveling.... Furthermore, Stanley was not terminated, but her
written employment contract expired June 30, 1993, and she rejected all offers USC made for
a new contract." Id. at 7. Furthermore, defendants argued, "Under the law set by this Court in
Stanley I, USC was not required to pay Stanley according to a marketing professor's view of
the potential of women's basketball, as distinguished from the underlying actuality of
spectator interest, media interest, revenue generation, and the like." Id. at 19-20.
334. The Ninth Circuit posed no direct questions about any of the specific Title IX regu-
lations governing employment. The plaintiff has also filed two other appeals in this case, one
challenging the alleged bias of the district court judge, No. 95-56250 (9th Cir. 1996) (briefs
have been filed), and another challenging the imposition of costs as of result of the summary
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Katalin Deli, the former head coach of women's gymnastics team,
alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title IX, Title VII, and the Equal
Pay Act in not having received pay comparable to that of the men's football,
basketball, and ice hockey coaches (but not the men's gymnastics coach) in
Katalin Deli v. University of Minnesota.335 The federal district court granted
the University's motion for summary judgment on all three federal stat-
utes.336 The Title IX claim was dismissed for failure to comply with the
statute of limitations. No appeal was taken.337
Gabor Deli, the former assistant women's gymnastics coach, also
commenced a federal lawsuit in Gabor Deli v. University of Minnesota,33
alleging discrimination, including sex discrimination in violation of Title IX
in not receiving pay comparable to that paid to assistant coaches of some
men's teams (other than his own sport). On August 18, 1994, the federal
district court granted the University's motion for summary judgment. First,
as to the Title VII assertion, the court concluded that "[t]he clear terms of the
statute prohibit discrimination in compensation based on the sex of the
recipient. The statute does not proscribe salary discrimination based on the
sex of other persons over whom the employee has supervision or oversight
responsibilities. 339  Second, the court rejected plaintiff's Equal Pay Act
contention based on the failure to compensate him at the same level as male
assistant coaches of certain men's intercollegiate teams. The court stressed
that under this statute, the crux must be a difference in what is paid members
of one sex compared to the opposite sex. Since the plaintiff here is a man
and the comparators (assistant coaches of the selected men's teams) are also
all male, this claim cannot advance. Moreover, the court would not entertain
such a claim based on the sex of the students coached. 340 "Such compensa-
tion differentials are based on a 'factor other than sex' and thus are not
judgment awarded, No. 96-55004 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiff's
petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to have a district court judge disqualified, No. 95-
70704 (9th Cir. 1996).
335. 863 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn. 1994).
336. lL at 963.
337. See also Deli v. Hasselmo, 542 N.W.2d 649 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); Deli v. Univer-
sity of Minn., 511 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
338. No. 3-93-501 (D. Minn. Aug. 18, 1994) (Memorandum and Order) (on file with the
Nova Law Review) [hereinafter Mem. & Order].
339. Mem. & Order, at 11, Deli, (No. 3-93-501) (emphasis added) (citing Jackson v.
Armstrong Sch. Dist., 430 F. Supp. 1050, 1052 (W.D. Pa. 1977)).
340. Mem. & Order, at 12-13, Deli, (No. 3-93-501) (citing EEOC v. Madison Comm.
Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 581,584 (7th Cir. 1987)).
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proscribed by the EPA.,,341 Third, as to the Title IX violation raised, the
court ruled the plaintiff did not have standing to pursue a Title IX claim on
behalf of student athletes he had coached, and assuming arguendo that he
had, such standing evaporated when his coaching position was terminated,
thus rendering any such standing moot.342 Moreover, the court eviscerated
the Title IX claim by addressing merely the "equal opportunity" regulations
which require equivalency as to coaching. 343 The rationale was based, in
part, on the failure of the plaintiff to assert in his complaint that the athletes
he coached received lesser quality coaching as a result of the difference
between his salary and the salary paid to the men's assistant coaches. In
Deli v. University of Minnesota,34 the state Court of Appeals ruled that the
dismissals of the assistant coach, Gabor Deli, and the head women's gym-
nastics coach, Katalin Deli (Gabor Deli's wife), were predicated upon just
cause.
During December 1995, the jury issued a verdict in favor of the plain-
tiffs, former coaches, and athletic administrator employees in Meadows v.
State University of New York at Oswego.346 However, during February 1996,
the judge overturned it. Subsequently, motions were filed seeking restora-
tion of the verdict. The case was ultimately settled during 1996. 347
341. Mem. & Order, at 14, Deli, (No. 3-93-501).
342. Mem. & Order, at 14 n.4, Deli, (No. 3-93-501). The regulations allow anyone to file
an administrative complaint on behalf of aggrieved beneficiaries of Title IX protection, and
such an administrative complaint may even be filed confidentially. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7 (1996).
343. Mem. & Order, at 15, Deli, (No. 3-93-501) (referring to 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)).
Specifically subsections 5 ("Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring") and 6
("Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors") pertain to coaching.
344. 511 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
345. Il- at 54.
346. No. 92-CV-1492FJS (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1993) (denying plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction) (complaint filed during Nov. 1992).
347. For other cases commenced prior to 1994, see Huffman v. Gordon, No. 701610 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Orange County 1992) (parties settled suit brought by terminated women's
volleyball coach at California State University at Fullerton); Suwara v. Day, No. 659577 (Cal.
Super. Ct. San Diego 1992) (parties settled suit brought by former women's volleyball coach
at San Diego State University, who was terminated); California Nat'l Org. for Women v.
Evans, No. 728548 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara 1993) (parties settled suit brought by former
associate athletic director of San Jose State University); Dowell v. College of Mt. St. Joseph,
No. C-1-93-0826 (S.D. Ohio) (settled) (discussed in Heckman, supra note 15, at 1014, 1017).
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2. Cases Commenced During 1994-96
On January 20, 1994, Marty Hawkins, the former coach of the women's
basketball team filed suit in Hawkins v. University of Loyola at Chicago,348
seeking compensatory damages of $1 million and punitive damages of $3
million for his firing which he alleged was predicated on his speaking out for
gender equity at the school in violation of Title DC. The federal complaint
was voluntarily withdrawn. Thereafter, a lawsuit was commenced in state
court.
34 9
On April 6, 1994, a former women's basketball coach filed a complaint
in Bowers v. University of Baylor,350 alleging sex discrimination and retalia-
tion in violation of Title IX. The plaintiff sought $1 million compensatory
damages and $3 million punitive damages, and injunctive and declaratory
relief. Thereafter, on April 13, 1994, the district court denied plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction restoring her to the head coaching
position of women's basketball during the pendency of the lawsuit.3 1 On
August 11, 1994, the district court denied the defendant University's motion
to dismiss the plaintiff's Title IX claim, holding that an employee may assert
a private right of action under this statute.35 2 However, it granted the motion
as to the individually named defendants,35 3 relying principally on Doe v.
Petaluma City School District.
354
During April 1994, Mary Jane Telford, former women's basketball
coach for seventeen seasons brought suit in Telford v. St. Bonaventure
University alleging sex discrimination pursuant to Title IX, Title VII, and the
Equal Pay Act. On April 28, 1995, the case was settled, reportedly for at
least $100,000. 355
348. No. 94CV00245 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (On Mar. 22, 1994, the case was dismissed without
prejudice.).
349. Hawkins, No. 94L03300 (Cook County, Ill. Mar. 18, 1994) (The case was pending
as of January 24, 1997, and is subject to nonbinding mediation. The parties have selected a
mediator and are arranging a date for mediation.).
350. No. A94-CA-239JN (W.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 1994).
351. Id. (W.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 1994).
352. Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 145 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
353. Id at 146.
354. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993). In this case alleging sexual harassment of a
female student by her peers in creating a hostile environment, the district court determined
that "it is the educational institution that must be sued for violation of Title IX." Id. at 1577.
Accord R.L.R. v. Prague Pub. Sch. Dist. 1-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526, 1530 (W.D. Okla. 1993)
(dismissing the action against the alleged coach charged with the actual sexual abuse).
355. Arena, NEWSDAY, July 15, 1995, at A27.
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On May 11, 1994, Ellyn Bartges, a former part-time assistant women's
basketball coach and women's softball coach, who was terminated during
June 1993, filed an amended complaint seeking $5 million damages and
injunctive relief in Bartges v. University of North Carolina at Charlotte,356
pursuant to Title IX, Title VII, and Equal Pay Act, based on allegations of
sex discrimination, constructive discharge, and retaliation.357 Bartges had
resigned from her position as women's head softball coach. On November
6, 1995, the federal district court granted the University's motion for
summary judgment as to all causes of action alleged by the plaintiff.358 The
decision in Bartges focused on the Equal Pay Act considerations, as opposed
to Title IX, similar to the Ninth Circuit decision in the Stanley case.
Bartges had volunteered to be an assistant coach for the women's
basketball team during 1988-89."' She was then paid an hourly rate for the
following season, and hired by the female athletic director, Judith Rose, as
the part-time head women's softball coach during the summer of 1990-91.
Rose paid Bartges more than she had paid the former women's softball
coach, a man, despite her having less experience. Bartges has no prior head
coaching experience on the collegiate level, six months of experience as a
volunteer assistant basketball coach at another university, six months of
experience as head coach of a high school girl's team, and no prior experi-
ence as a softball coach. Bartges continued as part-time assistant women's
basketball coach and part-time head softball coach for the University for the
academic years 1990-91, 1991-92, and 1992-93. 36
"Later, Bartges lost her job as Assistant Women's Basketball Coach
when that position was converted to a full-time position and she was not
hired for the full-time slot. '361 She applied for the women's assistant
basketball coach's position "only after she was invited to do so" by the
athletic director and current coach.362 Although she was one of the three
finalists, she was not selected. Instead, the University chose another woman
who had three years head coaching collegiate experience elsewhere and was
a former basketball player at the University. In order to comply with NCAA
356. 908 F. Supp. 1312 (W.D.N.C. 1995), aff'd, 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996). On April
4, 1994, she had filed her original complaint. She did not resign from her position as part-
time head softball coach until July 26, 1994.
357. Id. at 1320.
358. Id. at 1334.
359. Id. at 1317.
360. Id. at 1318.
361. Bartges, 908 F. Supp. at 1319.
362. Id.
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regulations, the University created positions for two full-time assistant
coaches and one part-time "restricted earnings" coach,363 who was limited to
$12,000 a year in total compensation from the University.
364
Bartges agreed to change the term of her employment as softball coach
from a twelve-month to nine-month position to retain her health insurance
coverage. During her employment, she filed two administrative complaints
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Bartges
also filed an administrative claim with the OCR alleging sex discrimination
pursuant to Title IX. She submitted her letter of resignation on July 26,
1994.365
The court declined the Equal Pay Act claim that Bartges received lower
pay than other coaches. 366  The court observed that the full-time head
baseball coach "is responsible for a thirty-two member team as opposed to
the fifteen member softball team. Therefore, the Head Baseball Coach must
recruit, monitor, and coach more than twice as many student-
athletes... [and] is also responsible for supervising one full-time coach. 367
The court found the same situation existed with the head volleyball coach,
which was also a full-time position. 36 Moreover, Bartges was paid more
than the head golf coach. A comparison with the men's assistant coaches
illustrated the plaintiff's prior limited coaching experience in basketball and
non-existent prior experience with softball, compared to the corresponding
assistant coaches.369 Additionally, the men's assistant basketball coaches
were full-time positions, compared to position of the women's assistant
basketball coach, which was only a part-time position.
The court highlighted that
the uncontested evidence is that men's basketball is the most mar-
ketable and largest revenue producing sport at UNCC. This makes
the position considerably more important to the University, and
363. The court did not discuss the pending litigation concerning the permissibility of the
"restricted earnings" coaches. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 902 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Kan. 1995)
(men's "restricted earnings" basketball coaches instituted an antitrust action against the
NCAA); Schreiber v. NCAA, 167 F.R.D. 169 (D. Kan. 1996) (concerning whether class
action status would be conferred upon members of NCAA men's "restricted earnings"
baseball coaches, who instituted an antitrust action against the NCAA).
364. Bartges, 908 F. Supp. at 1319 n.1.
365. Id. at 1320.
366. Id. at 1326.
367. Il at 1323.
368. Id at 1325.
369. Bartges, 908 F. Supp. at 1325.
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also means the position entails greater public relations, recruiting
and other coaching responsibilities, and means the position carries
with it much more pressure to produce winning teams.
370
In addition, "[t]he University has given several reasons why Bartges
was paid less than the coaches of other programs: her limited experience,
the relative importance of the sport she coached in the University's sports
program, and the prevailing wage for coaches in her sport. 37' Thus, the
court concluded that "[b]ecause UNCC has established that its compensation
decisions were based on a factor other than sex ... , the University is
entitled to summary judgment on Bartges' claim under the Equal Pay
Act. , 372
In regard to Title IX, the University argued that the legislative history
was not intended to provide a private cause of action for individual educa-
tional employees, who were relegated to Title VII. This was based primarily
on the assertion that Congress has amended Title VII to include educational
employees, within the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, merely
three months prior to the enactment of Title IX and thus, the "legislative
history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which amended
Title VII," is part of the legislative history of Title IX.33 Thus, the defen-
dant argued that Congress omitted any intention of including a private rights
of action for educational employees because it had already been ad-
dressed.374 While that is accurate, can it be interpreted that any omission in
a new statute enacted three months later is the tabula rasa? Moreover, the
argument ignores the fact that in 1975 Congress enacted specific Title IX
regulations solely for educational employees. If Title VII was the exclusive
remedy then such regulations would have been superfluous, or Congress
could have instead merely incorporated by reference the actual Title VII
requirements, as it did for example when referring to retaliation, when it
adopted Title VI. However, this was not done. The defendant continued
that, assuming arguendo, Title IX did allow for such a private cause of
370. Id. at 1323 (citing Jacobs v. College of William and Mary, 517 F. Supp. 791, 795-
98 (E.D. Va. 1980), aft'd, 661 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1981); Stanley v. University of S. Cal., 13
F.3d 1313, 1321-24 (9th Cir. 1994); Deli v. University of Minn., 863 F. Supp. 958, 961 (D.
Minn. 1994)).
371. Bartges, 908 F. Supp. at 1324.
372. Id. at 1326.
373. Wilson v. University of Va., 663 F. Supp. 1089, 1091 (W.D. Va. 1987).
374. Defendant University's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
May 15, 1995, at 48, Wilson v. University of Va., 663 F. Supp. 1089 (W.D. Va. 1987).
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action,375 the Title VII standard of intentional discrimination must be
established. Since no evidence of intentional discrimination was found, no
Title IX cause of action could be maintained.
From a Title IX perspective, assuming arguendo a Title IX private right
of action for educational employees, the issue should have been framed as
whether the University discriminated on the basis of sex, when: a) compar-
ing the full-time head coaching position for men's baseball vis-a-vis the part-
time head coaching position for the women's softball team; b) comparing the
full-time men's assistant basketball coaches vis-a-vis the part time women's
assistant basketball coach; 376 and c) whether an examination of the entire
men's athletic program vis-a-vis the entire women's athletic program
revealed sex discrimination in the assignment, compensation, and opportu-
nity to receive coaching. 377  The court eschewed such an analysis. On
August 14, 1996, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision for
the reasons advanced therein. 378 No appeal was filed seeking certiorari with
the Supreme Court.
375. The Fourth Circuit sanctioned such a position in Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New
river Community College, 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994) (discussed infra p. 615).
376. The University asserted that "UNC Charlotte does not pay the coaches in the basket-
ball program more because they coach men." Appellees' Brief, 1996, at 22 n.3, Bartges v.
University of N.C. at Charlotte, No. 95-3157 (4th Cir. Dec. 18, 1995).
377. Subsequently, the OCR found no violation in the assignment or compensation of
coaches, but did find a violation in the availability of coaches for women's teams. Appellees'
Brief, at 48. Even in the appellees' brief, the University extolled that
[o]ne significant factor is the priority UNC Charlotte places on the sport in ques-
tion.... In prioritizing the sports in which it offers intercollegiate competition,
UNC Charlotte has simply decided which sports, and consequently which
coaches, are most important to the university. In light of those facts, UNC
Charlotte's decision to pay the more important coaches more money is a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the difference between their salaries and the
plaintiff's.
Appellees' Brief, at 17-18. High priority sports were men's basketball, men's baseball, men's
golf, and women's volleyball. Noticeably absent was women's basketball from the school's
internal assessment. See Heckman 1992 commentary, supra note 15, at 970, warning against
the practice of school's "emphasizing" certain sports for a Title IX analysis. The court made
no reference to the inequity in the number of participation opportunities (and teams)
emphasized for male student athletes at this University, compared to the female student
athletes.
378. 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996). The University's appellate brief stated that "[t]hough
Bartges may believe the she worked as hard as a full-time head coach, her belief is immaterial.
She has presented no evidence that the UNC Charlotte required the same effort from its part-
time head coaches that it did from its full-time head coaches. It is only when the employer
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In Plotzke v. Boston College,379 the former coach of the women's
basketball team at the college commenced a federal lawsuit alleging, inter
alia, Title IX sex discrimination and retaliation during November 1994. On
March 27, 1995, the court granted Boston College's motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's complaint in part, and denied it in part.380 The Title IX claim
remained, with the court relying on Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico.381
Likewise, the motion of the individually named University President and
athletic director was granted in part, and denied in part.382 The Title IX
claim was also allowed against the two aforementioned individual defen-
dants, again citing Lipsett.383 This stance of retaining the individually named
defendants is at odds with the decisions in other cases, which have dismissed
such claims. The parties entered into a confidential settlement during 1996.
In Harker v. Utica College of Syracuse University,384 the women's
basketball coach's contract was not renewed, and she brought suit pursuant
to Title VII, Title IX, and the Equal Pay Act. On April 24, 1995, the court
dismissed her complaint on all theories, finding, inter alia, that she failed to
create an inference of discrimination under Title IX.385
Only one case dealt with termination of a female athletic employee of a
men's team. On July 18, 1995, JoAnn Hauser, former men's basketball
teams' athletics trainer at the University of Kentucky, filed a state court
action in Hauser v. University of Kentucky,386 alleging sex discrimination
concerning her discharge. No Title IX claim was alleged. During Septem-
ber 1996, the judge dismissed the causes of action directed at the athletic
director and men's basketball coach, in their individual capacities, in this
lawsuit seeking $2 million.
D. Retaliation
Most of the termination cases also contained retaliation aspects.
Stephanie Schleuder, the women's volleyball coach at the University of
requires the same effort or responsibility for two positions that the jobs are substantially
equal." Appellees' Brief, at 12.
379. No. 94-12329-EH (D. Mass. Nov. 1994) (defendants' Motion for Dismissal was
granted in part and denied in part during 1995).
380. Plotzke, No. 94-12329-EH (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 1995).
381. 864 F.2d 881 (lst Cir. 1988).
382. Id at 884.
383. ItL
384. 885 F. Supp. 378 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
385. Id. at 392.
386. No. 95-2252 (Cir. Ct., Fayette Cty., Ky. July 18, 1995) (on file with clerk of court).
See Governmental Affairs Report, NCAA NEws, Aug. 30, 1995, at 5.
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Minnesota for thirteen seasons, had been without a contract since 1993. She
was fired during December 1994. "She alleges the firing was due to her
crusading for pay equity in the women's athletic department." 3s7  She
originally brought suit in a federal district court claiming violations of Title
IX and the Equal Pay Act. After her motion for temporary restraining order
restoring her as coach was denied, she voluntarily dismissed the suit3  and
filed a claim with the state agency responsible for sex discrimination. On
January 30, 1995, a state court judge in Minnesota v. Regents,38 9 issued an
injunction preventing the University of Minnesota from hiring a new
women's volleyball coach while the Minnesota Department of Human
Rights investigated a claim of retaliation pursuant to the Minnesota Human
Rights Act. The Commissioner of the agency asserted that the state predi-
cate was broader than the federal one.
The case of Clay v. Board of Trustees of Neosho Community College,390
concerned allegations of retaliation by the male coach of the women's
basketball team, whose contract of employment was not renewed.39' He had
spoken about the lack of Title IX compliance with the male athletic director.
The district court noted that "[t]he question of whether Title IX provides a
private cause of action for damages for retaliation against a whistle blower,
under circumstances similar to the instant case, has not been decided by the
Supreme Court or the Tenth Circuit.' 392 The court found that "[i]n short,
discrimination against women by a community college in its sports pro-
gramming is a matter of public interest. 3 93 The district court found that a
plaintiff may maintain a Title IX claim for retaliation. 394 Furthermore, the
common law wrongful discharge claim would be preempted by Title IX.395
387. Arena, NEWSDAY, Feb. 3, 1995, at A65.
388. Governmental Affairs Report, NCAA NEws, Apr. 26, 1995, at 1.
389. No. EM94-289 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 1995)
390. 905 F. Supp. 1488 (D. Kan. 1995).
391. Id. at 1491-93.
392. Id. at 1494.
393. l. at 1498.
394. Id. at 1495. The court also held that 'Title IX actions may only be brought against
an educational institution, not an individual acting as an administrator or employee for the
institution." Clay, 905 F. Supp. at 1495.
395. Id. at 1501.
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E. Reverse Discrimination Cases
The first reverse discrimination case was commenced during February
1995 in Reinhart v. Georgia State University.396  Bob Reinhart, former
men's basketball coach at the University commenced the suit, "claiming he
was fired because he refused a pay cut intended to bring his salary in line
with that of the women's basketball coach. 3 97
VI. EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION OR RETALIATION
GENERALLY
The predominant issue evidenced herein is a threshold issue of whether
Title IX provides a private cause of action for employees of educational
institutions, or are they limited to a Title VII action, with any prosecution of
violations of Title IX involving educational employees confined to the
federal government by the Department of Justice or the OCR. On June 13,
1994, an University of Toledo female employee brought an action against
the University for sex and age discrimination in Wedding v. University of
Toledo.3 98 The district court held that no private cause of action existed
under Title IX for sex discrimination in employment.399
396. Sidelines, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 10, 1995, at A35.
397. Id.
398. 862 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ohio 1994), overruled by Ivan v. Kent State Univ., 92 F.3d
1185 (6th Cir. 1996).
399. Id. at 203. Accord Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 1995) (Title IX did
not confer a private cause of action to a female medical professor denied tenure), cert. denied
sub nom. Lakoski v. University of Tex., Med. Branch at Galveston, 117 S. Ct. 357 (1996).
But see Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Comm. College, 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994);
Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (see discussion supra p. 607);
Ward v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 861 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1994); Henschke v. New York
Hospital-Comell Med. Ctr., 821 F. Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Paddio v. Board of Trustees
for State Colleges & Univs., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 86 (E.D. La. 1993) (wherein the
district court disregarded the argument of Southeastern Louisiana University that Title IX did
not provide relief for sex discrimination alleged by the former women's volleyball and softball
coach). Several cases have discussed Title IX causes of action in educational employment
cases involving athletic employment at educational institutions. See Stanley v. University of
S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussed supra p. 600); Deli v. University of Minn.,
863 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn. 1994) (discussed supra p. 605); Deli v. University of Minn., No.
3-93-501 (D. Minn. Aug. 18, 1994) (discussed supra p. 605). Based on the Supreme Court
decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979) (allowing a Title IX
private right of action implied for a student), North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,
521 (1982) (upholding the constitutionality of the Title IX educational regulations in a case
brought by the federal government against a school district, as opposed to a plaintiff who was
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The plaintiff, a community college student support services counselor,
alleged Title IX and Title VII retaliation in Preston v. Virginia ex rel New
River Community College4° when she was not elevated to the activities
counselor position. She had filed an employment discrimination claim when
she was the support services counselor.4°' On August 3, 1994, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of her claim.4°2 The appellate
court recognized that a Title IX implied private right of action extends to
employment discrimination at educational institutions receiving federal
funds.4°3 However, prior to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 0 the
prevailing case law involving Title VII retaliation was "that an employer is
not liable if it would have reached the same employment decision 'in the
absence of the protected conduct. ' ' '4°5 In 1994, the Supreme Court held the
Civil Rights Act should not be retroactively applied.4°6 Thus, the Fourth
Circuit determined that "Title VII principles should be applied to Title IX
actions, as least insofar as those actions raise employment discrimination
claims." 4 7 Therefore, since the actions complained of occurred prior to the
effective date of the Civil Rights Act, the Title VII standard would be
applied and retaliation would not be found where the protected activity
"played a part-even a substantial part-in the decision-making process."
4 8
In Fairbairn v. Board of Education of South Country Central School
District,4°9 the plaintiff, a female school administrator, was terminated.10
She brought a claim under a number of legal theories, including Title IX. On
January 13, 1995, the district court ruled:
an educational employee) (Title IX should be afforded "a sweep as broad as its language,"),
and explicit Title IX regulations dealing with employment, namely 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.51, .52,
.54, the decisions finding a Title IX right of action for educational employees would seem to
be the more supportable approach.
400. 31 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 1994).
401. Id at 204-05.
402. Id at 209.
403. Id at 206.
404. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994).
405. Preston, 31 F.3d at 206.
406. Id. at 207.
407. Id. at 206. See Roberts v. Colorado St. Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.
1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 902 (lst Cir. 1993); Lipsett v. University of
P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 869-97 (1st Cir. 1988); O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d 632,
642 n.8 (8th Cir. 1986).
408. Preston, 31 F.3d at 206.
409. 876 F. Supp. 432 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
410. Id. at 435.
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The burdens of proof and production which govern disparate
treatment claims under Title VII .... likewise are applicable
to... Title IX.... Accordingly, Fairbairn initially was required to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination that (1) she belonged
to a protected class, (2) she applied and was qualified for a job for
which her employer sought applicants, (3) that despite her qualifi-
cations, she was rejected, and (4) that after rejection, the post re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of plaintiff's qualifications.
411
A female plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the Board and some
individuals in Howard v. Board of Education of Sycamore Community Unit
School District No. 427412 on a number of legal theories premised on her
allegations of constructive discharge and being replaced with a man who was
not minimally qualified.413 The Title IX claim was directed only against the
Board concerning claims of sexual discrimination, harassment, and retalia-
tion.41 4 The district court cited the definition of "program or activity" and
determined that such definition does not include the agents of such an entity.
The court recognized:
Several other cases, on the other hand, have applied the agency
principles under Title VII cases to sexual harassment actions under
Title IX.... This court is persuaded by the reasoning in Floyd.
While it is not entirely clear what the precise parameters are on
employer liability, it is at least evident that agency principles pro-
vide guidance in Title VII cases.
415
"Absent the use of traditional agency principles, the court is left with
two alternatives: strict liability based on the conduct of school employees or
liability premised only upon the direct knowledge or involvement of the
school or educational institution. 4 16 The court opined:
Absent knowledge or direct involvement by the school or educa-
tional agency, it is difficult to characterize any form of sex dis-
crimination as an authorized program or activity of the school edu-
411. Id. at 437.
412. 876 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
413. Id. at 964-65.
414. Id. at 974.
415. Id. (citations omitted).
416. Id.
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cational agency.... Thus, this court finds that absent allegations
that the Board knew of, or was directly involved in, any of the al-
leged discriminatory conduct in Counts IV-VI, plaintiff can not
maintain a claim against the Board under Title JX1
7
Thereafter, on July 21, 1995, the district court issued another decision,41
stating:
[T]his court does not read the Cannon, Bell and Franklin decisions
as supporting the conclusion that the legislative history of Title IX
demonstrates Congress' intent to have Title IX serve as an addi-
tional protection against gender-based discrimination regardless of
the available remedies under Title VII. Accordingly, this court
dismisses plaintiffs Title IX claim as being precluded by Title
VII.
41 9
During May 1995, three female professors alleged sex discrimination
against the University of Iowa in Brine v. University of Iowa,420 concerning
the closing of the school's dental hygienist program, which was primarily
composed of females.421 The hygienist program was part of the dental
program, which was taught by and had a significant number of men. The
female professors were allegedly reassigned to lower paying positions.
While the jury rejected their sex discrimination allegations, the jury awarded
the women $210,000 in back pay and damages for retaliation in connection
with the situation.
On October 3, 1995, the Fifth Circuit, in Lakoski v. James,422ruled that
Title VII is the proper vehicle to bring an employment discrimination claim
417. Howard, 876 F. Supp. at 974.
418. Howard v. Board of Educ. of Sycamore Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 427, 893 F.
Supp. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1995). See also Howard, 876 F. Supp. at 959 (regarding defendant's
motion to dismiss the plaintiff's original complaint).
419. Howard, 893 F. Supp. at 815. The court agreed with several other decisions on this
point, including Wedding v. University of Toledo, 862 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ohio 1994) and
Storey v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 604 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (W.D. Wis, 1985)
(holding that an employee of an educational institution cannot bring a private cause of action
for gender discrimination under Title IX).
420. 90 F.3d 271 (8th Cir. 1996). See also Robin Wilson, Federal Jury Rejects Sex-Bias
Discharge at University of Iowa, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 12, 1995, at A20.
421. Brine, 90 F.3d at 272.
422. 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Lakoski v. University of Tex.,
Med. Branch at Galveston, 117 S. Ct. 357 (1996) (inviting the Solicitor General to file a brief
expressing the view of the United States). Accord Howard v. Board of Educ. of Sycamore
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and that "individuals seeking monetary damages for employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex in federally funded educational institutions may
not assert Title IX either directly or derivately through § 1983. "423 The case
concerned a female professor who sued a hospital at the University of Texas
for sex discrimination when she was denied tenure. Thus, the appellate court
concluded that Title IX did not provide a private cause of action.424 The
Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal in this case during the October
1996 term.
In Nelson v. University of Maine System,425 the district recognized that
"[w]hile the First Circuit has yet to address a Title IX retaliation claim, the
court's treatment of Title IX discrimination claims supports an extension of
this analysis to Title IX retaliation claims, 426 and the court utilized Title VII
standards.427 It stated that "[t]o satisfy the first prong of a prima facie case
for retaliation, the conduct opposed need not necessarily violate Title IX;
rather, the plaintiff need only have a good faith belief that a Title IX viola-
tion was occurring.
'428
VII. SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The area of sexual harassment in educational institutions is divided into
two main areas, harassment involving students and harassment involving
educational employees. Title VII, which concerns only employment sexual
harassment, is being heavily relied upon in Title IX situations. A consensus
is developing that the Title VII standards for sexual harassment, including
Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 427, 893 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Wedding v. University of
Toledo, 862 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
423. 66 F.3d at 758 (emphasis added). But see Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151 (5th
Cir. 1993) (applying Title VI standard); Nelson v. University of Me. Sys., 914 F. Supp. 643,
649 (D. Me. 1996) (stating that 'Title IX was specifically modeled after Title VI.") (citing
Grove City College v. Bell, 456 U.S. 555, 586. (1984)).
424. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754.
425. 923 F. Supp. 275 (D. Me. 1996).
426. kL at 279.
427. It noted further that
an adverse employment action need not rise to the level of discharge to be ac-
tionable.... It must, however, at a minimum, impair or potentially impair the
plaintiff's employment in some cognizable manner.... This Court is weary of
defining an adverse employment action in a manner which discourages open
communication, critical or otherwise, between employers or supervisors and their
employees as to the employee's employment performance.
Id. at 281.
428. Id. at 284.
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both quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile environment sexual harass-
ment, will be used for determining the Title IX causes of action.429 As to the
latter situation, the Supreme Court, during 1986, issued its landmark deci-
sion expounding upon Title VII hostile environment sexual harassment in
Meritor Savings Bank F.S.B. v. Vinson,430 wherein the Court rejected a strict
liability standard upon employers for sexual harassment involving their
employees.431 However, mere ignorance or lack of knowledge of the
officious actions would not insulate the employers from complicity. Instead,
as the court in Pinckney v. Robinson432 stated, relying on Vinson:
[Fior an employer to avoid [absolute] liability for its supervisor's
sexual harassment creating a hostile work environment, an em-
ployer must not only show that it lacked actual or constructive
knowledge of the harassment, but the employer must demonstrate
that it had an effective and responsive system ("energetic meas-
ures") in place at the time of the alleged harassment and that this
429. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896-97 (1st Cir. 1988)
(applying Title VII standard to a Title IX complaint by medical student-employee alleging
hostile environment discrimination created by supervisors and fellow medical students);
Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that
hostile environment sexual harassment may be asserted by students against teachers pursuant
to Title IX); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), affd,
800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that Title IX hostile environment sexual harassment
may be asserted by medical student concerning actions by her professor); Alexander v. Yale
Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Garza v.
Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 (S.D. Tex. 1994) ("Additionally, a
student can not bring a hostile environment claim under Title IX.") (citing Bougher v.
University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 882 F.2d
74 (3d Cir. 1989)). The only case cited which permits such an action is Doe v. Petaluma City
Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1583 (N.D. Cal. 1993), but even the Petaluma court requires
evidence of intentional gender-based discrimination allegations that the school district knew
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate corrective action are
insufficient. Even though Garza dealt with peer sexual harassment at an educational
institution, Patricia H. was not cited therein.
430. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)
(imposing a "reasonable person" standard in ascertaining whether a hostile or an abusive work
environment existed pursuant to a Title VII sexual harassment claim); Bradley Golden, Note,
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: The Supreme Court Takes One Step Forward and Two Steps
Back on the Issue of Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment, 1994 DEr. C.L. REV.
1151 (1994); Deborah Epstein, Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the Work-
place? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEo. L.J. 399
(1996).
431. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72.
432. 913 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1996).
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system was one of which the victim knew or should have known
and which he or she could have relied upon for a prompt and ef-
fective remedy.433
The EEOC issued regulations, defining sexual harassment as:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitutes sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either ex-
plicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's em-
ployment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an in-
dividual is used on the basis for employment decisions effecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.
434
Within those parameters, this issue will be categorized into six areas:
1) coaches/athletes; 2) teachers/students (including physical education
teachers); 3) supervisors/students; 4) others/students; 5) student/student
(peer sexual harassment) imputed to the educational institution or school
board; and 6) educational employment sexual harassment. Within this
paradigm, three levels of sexual harassment are developing, including: 1)
sexual abuse (including statutory rape); 2) quid pro quo harassment; and 3)
hostile environment harassment.
While there is also a consensus that the actions by the offending
individuals are intentional actions, the critical issue is what standard will be
applied to analyze whether the recipient of federal funding will be held
legally responsible for such conduct pursuant to Title IX. For example, two
federal courts within the same jurisdiction within a matter of days came to
opposite conclusions. The district court in Rosa H. v. San Elizario Inde-
pendent School District435 utilized a negligence standard to answer the
question of whether the school district would be responsible for allegations
of sexual abuse of a fifteen-year-old female student by a male after-school
karate instructor.4 36 Conversely, a few days prior to that decision, the district
court in Leija v. Canutilla Independent School District 437 applied a strict
433. Id. at 34.
434. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996).
435. 887 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, No. 95-50811, 1997 WL 66087 (5th Cir.
Feb. 17, 1997).
436. Id. at 143.
437. 887 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996).
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liability standard to the school district concerning allegations of sexual abuse
of a second grade female student by a male physical education teacher, who
was incidentally a coach. 438 The twist was that the district court would
severely restrict the amount of Title IX damages that could be awarded. Of
course, to complicate the matter even further, on June 26, 1996, the federal
district court in Nelson v. Almont Community Schools439 applied the Title VI
standard to a case involving allegations of Title IX sexual harassment of a
female student by a male teacher.440 This lack of uniformity poses real
problems to both the victims and the educational institution. There is also
lack of uniformity when a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is asserted by students,
based on sexual harassment, claiming liability by the educational institu-
tion.441 The crux of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is that the offending action is
"state" action or done by a state actor.442
438. Id. at 948-49.
439. 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
440. Id. at 1355.
441. See, e.g., Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 1395, 1406 (5th Cir. 1996)
(ruling that there was a basis for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the school district based on
allegations that a custodian had raped a female student at the school); Becerra v. Asher, 921 F.
Supp. 1538, 1548 (S.D. Tex. 1996), aff'd, No. 96-2041, 1997 WL 35402 (5th Cir. July 25,
1997) (concluding that there was no state action by the school district based on the allegation
of sexual abuse committed by a teacher, who was employed by the school district and was
providing instruction to a child, being schooled at home); Diverglio v. Skiba, 919 F. Supp.
265, 269 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Garza v. Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438
(S.D. Tex. 1994); Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1461 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (discussed supra p. 628); Doe v. Rains Indep. Sch. Dist., 865 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Tex.
1994), rev'd, 66 F.3d 1402 (5th Cir. 1995). In Doe, a female high school student alleged that
her male physical education teacher and coach had sexually abused her, thereby depriving her
of her Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in bodily integrity, pursuant to a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action. Id. at 377. On September 30, 1994, the district court found that "liability under
section 1983 cannot be based on a theory of respondeat superior." Id. at 379. The Fifth
Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that another teacher's alleged failure to report the
incidents of sexual abuse pursuant to a Texas statute which required teachers to report child
abuse in a timely manner, would not alone trigger the "state" action required for a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 violation. Id. at 1417. See also Doe v. Rains County Indep. Sch. Dist., 76 F.3d 666 (5th
Cir. 1996). For 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases discussing peer sexual harassment, see Nabozny v.
Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996) (male student sued his school based on allegations of
verbal and physical abuse by a fellow male student for an extended period of time, starting in
the eighth grade, due to the plaintiffs homosexual orientation); Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d
1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (male student with a hearing impairment brought suit against the
superintendent of his school pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the sexual assaults inflicted by a
fellow male student during on-campus living at the dormitory); and Garza v. Galena Park
Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1994). In Nabozny, the school district
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In the employment area, the individuals are generally adults and enter
into the employment relationship presumably on equal planes. However,
when the situation involves minor students, the scrutiny and protection
should be greater. Therefore, while dependence on Title VII may be
appropriate for the employment situation, should Title IX completely
duplicate such Title VII protection, or should Title IX provide greater
protection for its unique constituency?
In a record-breaking number, seventy-nine administrative complaints
were filed in 1995 claiming sexual harassment in an educational setting.
During February 1995, the OCR revised a pamphlet, "Sexual Harassment:
It's Not Academic," exploring sexual harassment involving students. It
states that "[s]exual harassment in educational institutions is not simply
inappropriate behavior, it is against the law." 443 It defines sexual harassment
as "consist[ing] of verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, imposed on
the basis of sex, by an employee or agent of a recipient that denies, limits,
provides different, or conditions the provision of aid, benefits, services or
treatment protected under Title IX."444 It advises that
[a]n institution can either utilize its general grievance procedure,
required by Section 106.8 of the Title IX regulation, or develop
and implement special procedures for handling sexual harassment
allegations. Given the especially sensitive nature of this form of
sex discrimination, some institutions have opted for the latter
course of action and/or have instituted specific training in handling
reportedly settled the case for $900,000. Associated Press, Gay Student Gets $900,000 for
Harassment, NEWSDAY, Nov. 21, 1996.
442. For pre-1994 decisions focusing on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions involving students and
educational employees, see D.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1183 (10th
Cir. 1990) (concerning allegations of molestation of boys participating in summer basketball
camp by a male teacher. The court placed emphasis on the fact that the boys were participat-
ing in a voluntary activity, which was not sponsored by the school). See also Jane Doe v.
Special Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 770 F.
Supp. 591 (D. Colo. 1991); Sowers v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 694 F. Supp. 125 (W.D. Pa.
1988), aff'd, 869 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1989).
443. Office for Civil Rights, "Sexual Harassment: It's Not Academic" (Feb. 1995), at 1
[hereinafter OCR Pamphlet].
444. Id. at 2. During August, 1996, the OCR issued guidelines on peer sexual harassment
which defined sexual harassment, stating "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when the conduct is sufficiently severe, persistent or pervasive to limit a student's ability to
participate in or benefit from the education program, or to create a hostile or abusive
educational environment." Tamar Levin, Kissing Cases Highlight Schools' Fear of Liability
forSexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at 22.
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these cases. Title IX requires that grievance procedures be prompt
and equitable.4
5
Another area under exploration is whether Title IX sexual harassment arises
in same-sex situations.
446
Nationally, the debate on proper sexual harassment policies at educa-
tional institutions arose out of a kindergarten boy who kissed a girl in his
class and was charged with violating the school sexual harassment policy.
The youngster when interviewed as to whether he knew what sexual harass-
ment was, responded in the negative. The court in Cohen v. San Bernardino
Valley College447 explored a University's sexual harassment policy, con-
cluding that it was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the First Amend-
ment concerning freedom of speech and, therefore, did not put the English
professor, charged with violating the policy, on proper notice.44  The
University's sexual harassment policy prohibited sexual harassment, which it
defined as
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal, written, or physical conduct of a sexual nature, it [sic] in-
cludes, but is not limited to, circumstances in which... [inter alia]
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an indi-
445. OCR Pamphlet, supra note 443.
446. See, e.g., Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996), (discussed
supra p. 636); Nelson v. Almont Community Schs., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996)
,(discussed supra p. 635). For 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases, see, e.g., Becerra v. Asher, 921 F.
Supp. 1538 (S.D. Tex. 1996), affd, No. 96-2041, 1997 WL 35402 (5th Cir. July 25, 1997);
Divergilio v. Skiba, 919 F. Supp 265 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
447. 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996). Judge Merhige issued the decision in Kadiki v. Vir-
ginia Commonwealth Univ., 892 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va. 1995) (discussed supra p. 628).
448. Cohen, 92 F.3d at 972.
The court stated that:
Neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has determined what scope of First
Amendment protection is to be given a public college professor's classroom
speech... There are three objections to vague policies in the First Amendment
context. First, they trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second,
they impermissibly delegate basic policy matters to low level officials for resolu-
tion on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary
and discretionary application. Third, a vague policy discourages the exercise of
first amendment freedoms.
Id. at 971-72.
1997]
79
Heckman: On the Eve of Title IX's 25th Anniversary: Sex Discrimination in
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
vidual's academic performance or creating an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive learning environment.
449
In that case, a female student charged a male professor with sexual harass-
ment in violation of the school's policy. The male professor taught a
remedial English class in which the female student was enrolled. It was
reported that during a class on pornography the professor "stated in class that
he wrote for Hustler and Playboy magazines and he read some articles out
loud in class. [The professor] concluded the class discussion by requiring
his students to write essays defining pornography. 450
A. Coach/Student Athlete
Since Title IX's inception, there has been only one substantive Title IX
decision examining sexual harassment between a coach and a student
athlete.45' However, during the 1990s the headlines have been replete with
incidences of allegations of sexual harassment, uniformly concerning the
improper activities of male coach's with their female student athletes,
452
449. Id. at 971.
450. Id. at 970. In addition, other "students came forward to testify about the sexual
nature of Cohen's teaching material and his frequent use of derogatory language, sexual
innuendo, and profanity." Cohen, 92 F.3d at 971.
451. See R.L.R. v. Prague Sch. Dist. 1-103, 838 F. Supp. 1526 (W.D. Okla. 1993). See
Heckman, supra note 15, at 1018-21 (discussing cases involving allegations of sexual
harassment by coaches against student athletes). In the following cases, the offending male
teachers, accused of sexual harassment involving a female student, were also, incidentally,
coaches: Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Bolon v. Rolla Pub.
Schs., 917 F. Supp. 1423 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th
Cir. 1994) (discussed infra 627). In the following cases, the offending male teacher, accused
of sexual harassment involving a female student, were physical education teachers: Rosa H. v.
San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, No. 95-50811,
1997 WL 66087 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 1997) (discussed supra p. 620 and infra p. 632); Divergilio
v. Skiba, 919 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Doe v. Rains Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402
(5th Cir. 1995) (discussed supra p. 621).
452. See also John T. Wolohan, Title IX and Sexual Harassment of Student Athletes, J.
PHYSICAL EDUC. RECREATION & DANCE, Mar. 1995, at 52; Filip Bondy, When Coaches Cross
the Line, N.Y. TiMES, May 2, 1993, § 8, at 1, 3. The University of Florida fired its swimming
coach, Mitch Ivey, a former Olympian, reportedly for using offensive language; however,
there was reported concern regarding his relationship with his female swimmers. See Linda
Robertson, Motivation and Manipulation: Athlete-Coach Bond Occasionally Leads to
Temptation, Sexual Harassment, MIAMI HERALD (1994) (discussing reported incidents
involving other individuals and indicating that the American Swimming Coaches Association
was the only coaches' association to adopt guidelines on ethical behavior in this area) (on file
with the Nova Law Review); Don Sabo, Ph.D. & Carole Ogelsby, Ph.D., Ending Sexual
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although female coaches are not exempt from such unsavory actions4 53 As a
result, certain governing bodies, such as the American Volleyball Coaches
Association, are issuing ethical guidelines. 454 Parenthetically, the cases
involving the relationship between teachers and students are also instructive.
On February 21, 1996, the Sixth Circuit, in Lillard v. Shelby County
Board of Education,455 examined a number of allegations of sexual harass-
ment based on Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by three high school females
against a male high school coach, who was also a physical science teacher.
The teacher held a doctorate and coached the girls' soccer team, on which
one of the plaintiffs participated. The coach allegedly slapped one of his
athletes, a fourteen-year-old female plaintiff, across the face. The child's
father informed the school principal of the incident. An FBI agent who
learned about this incident informed the school principal that he had ob-
served the coach "cursing and verbally abusing the girls at practices and
games, and had 'observed [the coach] hitting the girls on their buttocks.'
456
It was further alleged that he intentionally rubbed one of the other female
plaintiff's stomach, while passing her in the hall, with a "remark that could
be reasonably be interpreted as ... inappropriate. 457
The Sixth Circuit addressed a number of issues. First, it concluded that
Title IX does not override a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action.458 Second, it
held that the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions would be
Harassment in Sports, 4 WoMEN IN SPORT & PHYSIcAL Acrrvrry J., Fall 1995, at 84-104. "It
is also helpful to see sexual harassment in athletics as a form of child abuse." Id. at 95. This
subsequent article also indicated that the United States Olympic Committee Coaching Ethics
Code now includes a statement on sexual harassment. Id. at 98.
453. See, e.g., Landreneau v. Fruge, 676 So. 2d 701 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
684 So.2d 930 (La. 1996) (concerning allegations of sexual misconduct against the school
district and a female physical education teacher/coach of a female high school student; no
Title IX claim was presented).
454. The American Volleyball Coaches Association's "Coaches Code of Ethics and
Conduct" requires that the member coach abide by the following:
Principle II - Coach/Athlete Relationship. G. Recognize that all forms of sexual
abuse, assault or harassment with athletes are illegal and unethical, even when an
athlete invites or consents to such behavior or involvement. Sexual abuse and
harassment is defined as, but not limited to, repeated comments, gestures or
physical contacts of a sexual nature. I will report all suspected cases of sexual
assault or abuse to law enforcement as required by law.
American Volleyball Coaches Ass'n., Coaches Code of Ethics and Conduct (adopted
December 1996).
455. 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996).
456. Id. at 719.
457. Id at 726.
458. Id. at 723.
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applied.4 5 9 As to the first incident, it found that "it is simply inconceivable
that a single slap could shock the conscience" so as to be actionable.46 In
addressing the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, it found that as to the hallway
incident, which the court described as "wholly inappropriate, and, if proved,
should have serious disciplinary consequences.... But without more, it is
not conduct that creates a constitutional claim. It is highly questionable
whether a single, isolated incident of this magnitude could even rise to the
level of sexual harassment under Title VII. '46' The obtuse decision, while
noting the FBI's unsolicited testimony, appeared to totally discount it in
reaching its conclusion. The court emphasized that it was not reaching the
merits of the Title IX claims alleged. Thus, it remains to be seen how the
finder of fact will classify the incidents within the penumbra of Title IX.
During May 1996, members of the women's crew team filed a lawsuit
against Temple University alleging sexual harassment based on a hostile
environment created by coaches and members of the men's crew team. The
lawsuit informs "that the room where the crew teams train was decorated
with pornographic pictures and that male athletes made lewd gestures and
comments to the women. ' 462 It was also reported that this was not the first
lawsuit instituted against Temple University concerning the crew program.
During 1994, a female student athlete charged that a male assistant part-time
coach of the men's team made lewd gestures at the woman. The University
fired this coach in 1993, when another athlete informed the school about
another incident concerning this coach. The case was settled with the
University agreeing to pay that plaintiff $5,000 and her dropping the charges
and supposedly apologizing for the suit.463
It is difficult to ascertain how many lawsuits may have been com-
menced by female or male student athletes for sexual harassment actions by
their coaches, especially when no publicity surrounds the filing of the
lawsuit, and many settlement agreements routinely contain confidentiality
clauses.
459. Id. at 729.
460. Lillard, 76 F.3d at 726.
461. Id. (emphasis added).
462. Sidelines, CHRON. HIGHER EDuC., June 7, 1996, at A33.
463. Id.
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B. Teacher/Student
The lead case in this area is the 1992 Supreme Court decision in
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,464 which focused on the
remedies that Title IX provides, based on allegations of sexual harassment of
a female student by a male teacher. The first decision to substantively deal
with the issue of whether Title IX confers protection for students for hostile
environment sex discrimination was Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified School
District, 46 involving allegations of sexual molestation of female students by
a male band teacher. The plaintiffs asserted that the teacher's continued
presence at the school alone established a hostile environment.
In Doe v. Taylor Independent School District,466 a fifteen-year-old
female student alleged sexual abuse by a male teacher (a biology teacher and
coach) and abridgment of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
protecting liberty interests by the school district. On March 3, 1994, the
Fifth Circuit held the plaintiff was deprived of her substantive due process
protections. 467 No Title IX claim was alleged. The plaintiff's "due process
claim is grounded upon the premise that schoolchildren have a liberty
interest in their bodily integrity that is protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and upon the premise that physical sexual
abuse by a school employee violates that right."M68 However, the federal
appellate court noted that a "school official's liability arises only at the point
when the student shows that the official, by action or inaction, demonstrates
a deliberate indifference to his or her constitutional rights."469 The court
elaborated:
It is incontrovertible that bodily integrity is necessarily violated
when a state actor sexually abuses a schoolchild and that such mis-
conduct deprives the child of rights vouchsafed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Obviously, there is never any justification for sexu-
ally molesting a schoolchild, and thus, no state interest, analogous
464. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
465. 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
466. 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994).
467. kiL at 451.
468. Id. at 450.
469. Taylor, 15 F.3d at 454. See Armstrong v. Lamy, 938 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Mass.
1996). In Lamy, there was no 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action to impute liability to the school board
for an inadequate hiring policy based on allegations of sexual abuse by a teacher of a student.
The court noted that "[a] supervisory official may, however, be held liable under § 1983 on
the basis of his or her own acts or omissions." Id. at 1033.
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to the punitive and disciplinary objective attendant to corporal
punishment, which might support it.
4 70
Allegations of sexual harassment of a female sixth grade student by a
student-teacher and fellow male students were presented in Oona R.-S. v.
Santa Rosa City Schools.47' The court declined to grant the individual
student-teacher's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 motion to dismiss, as well as to certain
classroom teachers and some other named school officials. The district court
underscored that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim does not foreclose a Title IX
private cause of action.472 Additionally, the court found that the conduct of
an educational employee who engages in sexually harassing activities toward
a student may be held culpable, provided that intentional discrimination is
established, stating that "the Court finds that intentional discrimination is an
element of a claim that an individual official has violated a plaintiff student's
rights under Title IX by engaging in or allowing sexual harassment of that
student." 473 However, the "plaintiff student must show that each defendant
official either intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of sex or is
liable under standard section 1983 supervisory liability principles for his
own wrongful conduct in supervising a subordinate who intentionally
discriminated. 474  The same standard would be applied to each school
official concerning allegations by a student's peers or non-officials.475
On June 23, 1995, the district court in Kadiki v. Virginia Common-
wealth University47 6 held that a university could be held strictly liable under
Title IX if a student successfully provided that her biology professor's
470. Id. at 451-52. See also Wilson v. Webb, 869 F. Supp. 496 (W.D. Ky. 1994). In
Wilson, two female students asserted a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause concerning their liberty interests based on allegations of sexual
molestation by one of their male teachers on school grounds. The teacher argued that the
liberty interests protected were limited to those involving undue restraint. However, the court
noted that "[s]choolchildren have a liberty interest in their bodily integrity that is protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and physical sexual abuse by a school
employee violates that right." Id. at 497.
471. 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
472. Id. at 1461. But see Mann v. University of Cincinnati, 864 F. Supp. 44 (S.D. Ohio
1994) (discussed supra p. 551).
473. Id. at 1464 (emphasis added).
474. Id. at 1465.
475. Id. at 1466. See also Bosley v. Keamey R-I Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D.
Mo. 1995) (involving peer sexual harassment).
476. 892 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Va. 1995). See also Slater v. Marshall, 906 F. Supp. 256
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (discussed infra p. 633).
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conduct constituted quid pro quo sexual harassment.47 The court stated that
"knowledge of the quid pro quo harassment may be imputed to a univer-
sity/employer need ... ",,478 Furthermore, "[g]iven the purpose of Title IX
and Congress' mandate that Title IX be broadly interpreted, it is essentially
inconsequential that Title IX does not expressly adopt agency principles. 479
Allegations of sexual abuse by a male physical education teacher of a
female second grade student pursuant to Title IX were the focus in Leija v.
Canutilla Independent School District.480 While the child's primary teacher
was told of some of the incidents, none of the members of the school board
were notified. First, the district court found that only the educational
institution, not the individual teacher, could be liable for Title IX viola-
tions. 481 The court dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action because the board
had "no knowledge of the abuse she suffered and therefore could not have
been deliberately indifferent to her rights. 482  Query: Why should the
student's informing the primary teacher not have constituted constructive
knowledge by the school board? Assuming that the primary teacher was not
required to inform the school principal and that the school principal was not
required to bring this to the attention of the board, then should the lack of a
proper policy not have been a question of fact for the jury as to the school
board's failure to have a proper policy in place, in the first instance?
However, on the issue of whether the school district would be liable for
the intentional actions of sexual abuse of this young girl, the court eschewed
agency principles and instead applied strict liability standard. Thus, while
"the court believes that the actions of a teacher should be strictly imputed to
an educational institution. Concurrently, the court believes that limitations
should be placed on damages." 43 In defending his position, the court stated
that "[t]he young student, vulnerable in every way, should not be the only
477. Kadiki, 892 F. Supp. at 755.
478. IM. at 754.
479. Ma
480. 887 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996). The Fifth
Circuit reversed, finding that the school district was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
because the school district "had neither actual nor constructive notice of the sexual abuse."
Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 402-03 (5th Cir. 1996). See also John
Does 1, 2, 3, and 4 v. Covington County Sch. Bd., 884 F. Supp. 462, 464-65 (M.D. Ala.
1995) (holding that a Title IX cause of action exists against the school board, principal, and
superintendent for allegations of sexual abuse committed by a teacher against elementary
school students).
481. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 957.
482. Id. at 950.
483. Id. at 948.
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effective line of defense or the policing authority. The job of the student,
especially the elementary student, is to learn in a trusting environment.
' 484
This is the first court to so adopt a restricted position as to compensa-
tory damages. The jury had awarded the plaintiff $1.4 million.481 Interest-
ingly, the district court indicated that the Fifth Circuit has clearly utilized
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act486 in determining Title IX cases. 48 7 How-
ever, the court distinguished that the Fifth Circuit did not address the issue
of imputed liability under Title IX.
The court enunciated that "[t]here can be several types of school
discrimination: (1) denial of access to the school or school's programs,
normally but not always at the higher education level, (2) physical sexual
abuse, or (3) non-physical but sexist harassment., 488  The court further
elaborated that
[t]he problem in teacher-student sexual abuse cases is therefore as
follows: (1) only the school district can be liable under Title IX;
(2) only intentional acts of discrimination are reached by Title IX;
(3) the intentional acts can be committed by the district's employ-
ees who will never have authorization to act; so (4) unless the acts
of the employees of the district are fully and strictly imputed to the
district, Title IX becomes potentially inoperative.
489
In balancing this strict liability, the court in the cases only of teacher-
student sexual abuse would limit the damages to compensatory damages for
merely expenses for medical treatment, expenses for mental health treat-
ment, and expenses for special education, specifically omitting any monetary
damages for pain and suffering. Identifying that unlimited damages, such as
the million dollar verdict in this case, can bankrupt school districts, the court
stated that "[p]ublic education is of critical importance to our Nation.
Limited damages under Title X protect the schools and simultaneously
provide relief to sexually abused students .... In cases where rights are
implied, 'appropriate' remedies will also be implied." 49° The Title IX statute
484. Id. at 955.
485. Id
486. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (1994).
487. Leija, 887 F. Supp. at 950 (citing Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151 (5th Cir.
1993)).
488. Id. at951.
489. M at 953.
490. ld. at 956.
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contains no restriction on the amount of compensatory damages. Moreover,
the court did not discuss at all the Title VII maximum cap of $300,000
damages as another possible option in this situation. Expect an appeal, as
the court ordered a new trial on the issue of damages. Thus, while the
analysis of the strict liability standard in this case is defensible, the limited
damages, as promoted herein, stand on shaky grounds.
On October 17, 1995, the district court, in Canutillo Independent
School District v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.,491 ruled that an
insurance contract did not specifically exclude Title IX claims against a
school district.492 Another judge issued this decision based on the underly-
ing facts in Leija. The court exemplified that holding a school district in
violation of Title IX for sexual harassment of a student by an employee
required satisfaction of two elements. It requires
that there be two distinct actions or inaction, at least one of which
is intentional in nature, on the part of an employee and on the part
of the school district .... Title IX does require proof of negligent,
reckless or intentional acts by the school district, independent of
the intentional conduct of the employee. This Court believes that
to hold otherwise is to place the school district in the untenable po-
sition of being liable for conduct which it was, or is unable to rem-
edy or rectify. Simply put, case law does not allow the school dis-
trict (the insured) to be liable for the wrongful act of an employee
under either Title IX or § 1983. There must be further wrongful
conduct by a school district to prove a Title IX case.493
Note, the court did not require an intentional act by both the offending
employee and the school district. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and
rendered judgment in favor of the insurance company, relying principally on
the fact that the underlying actions which prompted the lawsuit by the
students against the school district were the actions of the physical education
teacher, and noted that "the sexual assaults constitute criminal acts under
Texas law. 494 It required some discriminatory act on the part of the school
491. 900 F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 99 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 1996). See also
Board of Educ. of E. Syracuse-Minoa Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Continental Ins. Co., 604 N.Y.S.2d
399 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding a teacher's allegations of sexual harassment against the
school district, for actions of the principal, not to constitute an "occurrence" within the
meaning of the district's general liability policy).
492. Canutillo, 900 F. Supp. at 847.
493. Ma (emphasis added).
494. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1996).
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district or its agents. Moreover, "we note that while injunctive relief may be
available for failure to adopt Title IX's grievance policies and procedures,
such a failure is not itself an act of discrimination that may be the basis of an
award of damages. 495
Three days after the Leija decision, another judge in the Western
District of Texas issued his decision in Rosa H. v. San Elizario Independent
School District496 concerning allegations of sexual abuse of a fifteen-year-
old female student by a twenty-nine-year-old male after school karate
instructor, where karate was being offered by the school district. The jury
awarded the plaintiff damages. First, the district court, as in Leija,497
dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the school district and the
Title IX action against the offending school instructor. Second, there was no
doubt that "any school district employee molesting students is acting outside
the course and scope of his or her employment." 498 However, this court
would also require a negligence standard to find the educational institution
liable under Title IX. Thus, while "sexual abuse of a student is always an
intentional act. However, to impute liability to the school district there must
be some further action or inaction on the part of the school district which
would give rise to liability." 499 The court stated that
[t]o prevail on a claim of intentional discrimination under Title IX,
the plaintiff must show that: 1) the school district is subject to Ti-
tle IX; 2) plaintiff was sexually harassed or abused (the intentional
conduct); 3) by an employee of the school district; 4) the school
district had notice, either actual or constructive, of the sexual har-
assment or abuse; 5) the school district failed to take prompt, ef-
fective, remedial measure; and 6) the conduct of the school district
was negligent.
5W
This court also did not require an intentional act by both the offending
employee and the school district itself. In this construct, the notice provision
allows the school district an opportunity to do something about the situation.
In addition, the fifth element entails "that the school district be given
495. Id. at 706.
496. 887 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
497. Leija, 887 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996)
(discussed supra p. 629).
498. Id. at 142.
499. lM. at 143.
500. Id. (emphasis added).
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opportunity to act on behalf of the student, that is, terminate the discrimina-
tory conduct, before being subject to liability. 501
In Slater v. Marshall,50 2 a female student's complaint against the
Montgomery County Community College created a claim under Title IX for
quid pro quo sexual harassment by a male professor, based on her being
foreclosed from meaningful course work on the basis of gender. However,
the complaint failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
American with Disabilities Act,503 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.5
4
The January 5, 1996, district court decision in Bolon v. Rolla Public
Schools05 carved out the four standards that the courts are using to deter-
mine a school district's liability for sexual harassment by teachers of their
students. The courts stated that
[c]ourts have adopted several different approaches, including the
following: (1) the agency principle ... (essentially a 'negligent or
reckless' standard)...; (2) knowledge or direct involvement by
the school district .... ; (3) the Title VII standards of employer li-
ability in sexual harassment cases (i.e., 'knew or should have
known' for hostile environment and strict liability for quid pro quo
harassment)... ; and (4) strict liability.5°
After reviewing the aforementioned, the court concluded:
This Court, guided by the Supreme Court's Franklin decision in-
terpreting Title IX, holds that intentional discrimination by teachers
is imputed to the school district under the principles of respondeat
superior, regardless of whether the intentional discrimination is the
creation of a hostile environment, the demand for sexual favors, the
501. Id.
502. 906 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
503. IL (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1995)).
504. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1985 & Supp. 1995)).
505. 917 F. Supp. 1423 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
506. Id. at 1427. In Nelson v. Almont Community Schs., 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich.
1996), the district court applied the Title VI intentional discrimination standard to a Title IX
case involving allegations of sexual harassment of a male student by a female English teacher.
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removal of females from the classroom, or any other intentional
action based on sex in violation of Title IX. 0 7
The court explained:
If Title IX is to have any effect, school districts must be held
strictly liable for the actions of a teacher who engaged in blatant
sex discrimination, for example, requiring all females to sit in the
hall during class. Otherwise, the school would be effectively insu-
lated from all Title IX liability.
508
Furthermore,
[i]n light of the Supreme Court's holding in Franklin that sexual
harassment constitutes intentional sex discrimination in violation of
Title IX, there is simply no reason to apply a different standard of
liability when a teacher discriminates by engaging in a sexual rela-
tionship with a student rather than by denying him or her an educa-
tion.
509
Thus, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The district court in Pallett v. Palma1 0 elaborated on institutional
responsibility when allegations of sexual harassment are raised involving
actions by a professor at a university, stating that "[t]he institution of higher
learning satisfies its legal obligation under facts similar to these cases unless
it provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment
but did nothing about it."511  The court seemed satisfied that a sexual
harassment prohibition notice was provided to the students and employees,
as well as a grievance procedure, commenting that
the College upon learning of the plaintiffs sexual harassment alle-
gations took appropriate remedial action and to the extent that it
was unable to or failed to take appropriate remedial action the
College was prevented from doing so by the failure and active re-
fusal of the plaintiffs to cooperate with the College administration
in pressing formal charges and testifying at the necessary faculty
507. Id. at 1427-28 (emphasis added). The court noted, however, that it was not required
to address the standard concerning peer sexual harassment. Id. at 1428 n.2.
508. Id at 1429.
509. Id.
510. 914 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
511. Id. at 1024.
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hearing to terminate [the professor's] tenure upon the required
finding of gross misconduct.
512
In this case, upon learning of allegations of separate incidents of sexual
harassment involving a female undergraduate student and a female graduate
student (who was also a University employee), the school suspended the
offending tenured professor.
The plaintiffs elected to forego the University's own process, which
could have resulted in the professor's termination, and commenced a lawsuit
instead. The court noted:
That a faculty member on occasion will violate the published poli-
cies of an institution and do so clandestinely, as here, is not a basis
for students or employees who have eschewed the established pro-
cedures for rectifying the wrong done to them, to run instead to the
courts, to mulct the charitable funds of a non-profit teaching insti-
tution. These funds could be used better for the instruction of other
students.
513
In situations of sexual harassment and abuse, the offending individuals often
rely on the silence of their victims; however, Title IX does not require that
an individual first exhaust a school's internal grievance process or even
exhaust an administrative process before instituting a lawsuit. Therefore, it
would appear that the ad hominem criticism of the plaintiffs' elected course
of action seems gratuitous and unnecessary, as according to the court the
issue was simply whether the educational institution had a policy in place.
Furthermore, it is not the nonprofit status of the educational institution that
is the main concern herein, as almost exclusively, educational institutions are
nonprofit institutions. Rather, the focus of Title IX is that federal funds
should not be used to promote or condone sexual harassment and sex
discrimination by these educational institutions, who voluntarily elect to
receive such federal funding or allow their students to do so regardless of
whether the institution is non-profit or for-profit.
In Nelson v. Almont Community Schools, 514 a male high school student,
who attempted suicide allegedly because his female English teacher would
not allow him to end their relationship, claimed Title IX sexual harassment
against the school board. On June 26, 1996, the district court, recognizing
512. Id. (emphasis added).
513. Id.
514. 931 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
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the conflict in the standard being applied to analyze Title IX sexual harass-
ment, summarized the standards being applied as follows:
Some courts follow the agency principles continued in the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(6) (essentially a "two-
tort" negligent or reckless conduct standard showing the intentional
tort of the employee and the negligence of the school dis-
trict) .... Others, persuaded by the Franklin Court's reference to
Meritor... which was a Title VII employment discrimination case,
have applied the Title VII standard of employer liability (i.e.,
"knew or should have known" for hostile environment claims, and
strict liability for quid pro quo harassment) .... A number of
courts, because of the above-quoted discussion in Franklin of
"intentional" discrimination, have adopted the Title VI intentional
discrimination standard, and require a showing of knowledge stan-
dard, and require a showing of knowledge or direct involvement by
the school district in the discrimination or failure of the school to
take appropriate remedial action .... A few courts have applied a
"strict liability" standard. 5
This court ultimately determined:
This Court agrees with those courts which apply the Title VI inten-
tional discrimination standard. Intentional discrimination requires
either (A) a showing of direct involvement of the school district in
the discrimination, or (B) a showing of (1) actual or constructive
knowledge on the part of the district of the sexual harassment of a
student and (2) that the school failed to take immediate appropriate
action reasonably calculated to prevent or stop the harassment.
516
The August 26, 1996, Eighth Circuit decision in Kinman v. Omaha
Public School District5 17 is notable because the court found that a Title IX
sexual harassment hostile environment action can be brought when it
involves the same sex. Kinman involved allegations of a homosexual
relationship between a female English teacher and a female high school
student.518 The appellate court found "no reason to apply a different stan-
dard under Title IX. The uncontroverted evidence shows that McDougall
515. Id. at 1355.
516. Id.
517. 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996).
518. Id. at 465.
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targeted Kinman because she was a woman.' 519 As to what standard should
be applied in this Title IX case, the court instructed that:
We recently held that Title VII standards for proving discrimina-
tory treatment should be applied to employment discrimination
cases brought under Title IX. We now extend that holding to apply
Title VII standards of institutional liability to hostile environment
sexual harassment cases involving a teacher's harassment of a stu-
dent.... In such cases, the employer should not be held liable un-
less the employer itself has engaged in some degree of culpable be-
havior. For example, the employer could be held liable if it knew
or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appro-
priate remedial action. 52
0
Thus, the "'knew or should have known' standard is the appropriate standard
to apply .... v7521
C. Supervisor/Student
In Randi W. v. Livingston Union School District,522 a thirteen-year-old
female commenced a lawsuit in a California state court, alleging sex dis-
crimination as the result of molestation by a male vice principal of the
school.523 This court found that Title IX did not extend statutory liability on
the school district for the Vice Principal's actions. 524  Aside from the
Karibian v. Columbia University525 case, there were no other decisions
rendered concerning allegations of sexual harassment by a supervisor during
the three-year time period.526
519. Id. at 468.
520. Id. at 469 (citations omitted).
521. Id.
522. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471 (1996).
523. Id. at 473.
524. Id at 488.
525. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussed infra p. 649).
526. See Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Kan. 1993). The case featured
allegations of Title IX sexual harassment of a female student by a male director of a vocational
educational school. The court recognized "that in many cases decided under Title VII, courts
have held that an act of a supervisor with direct authority over the harassee makes an employer
directly liable for any violations of Title VII." Id at 1320 (citations omitted).
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D. Other/Student
In Murray v. New York University College of Dentistry,527 a male
patient at the dental clinic where the plaintiff, a female dental student, was
required to provide services as part of her clinical curriculum was badgering
and stalking the plaintiff, according to the allegations. Another dental
student informed the chief of the dental clinic that the patient was "unstable"
and was sexually harassing the plaintiff.5 28 The chief informed the patient to
desist with his activities. The plaintiff never advised her professors or the
clinic chief that the actions were continuing until after she received a notice
from the College informing her that, due to her failure to successfully
complete ten out of twenty-eight courses, she would be required to redo her
second year. Subsequently, in a letter to the review board, she explained that
the subpar performance was due to the illness of a family member, having to
work another job to finance her tuition, and the actions of the clinic patient.
After receiving the letter, the board did not rescind its determination. The
plaintiff contended that the college violated Title IX by "(1) allowing the
discriminatory abusive environment created by [the patient] to persist after
the College had notice of it, and (2) retaliating against her for asserting her
right under Title IX to be free from discrimination on the basis of gender." 529
The Second Circuit reviewed the conclusions of the district court and
held that
the facts alleged in the complaint would not support a finding either
(1) that NYU had notice of ongoing harassment sufficiently severe
and pervasive to give rise to a "hostile environment" under Title
VII standards or (2) that after receiving notice that harassment had
occurred, the College took any action disadvantageous to Murray
527. 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995). See Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867 (M.D. Ga.
1993) (holding that no Title IX claim was established against the school district for sexual
assaults committed by a male security guard against female students). The court in Floyd did
not address whether the educational institution had a responsibility to properly investigate the
background of this individual employee and whether any complaints had been filed against
him during his employment. See also Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446 (8th Cir. 1996). In
Larson, the district court set aside a jury verdict of $475,000 in favor of a handicapped female
student who was sexually abused by a male driver who drove the van which brought the
plaintiff to her school. The driver was imprisoned as a result of his actions. However, the
appellate court found that the school district was not civilly liable for failing to thoroughly
investigate the plaintiffs first complaint of sexual abuse. Id, at 1457.
528. Murray, 57 F.3d at 275.
529. Id. at 247.
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from which an inference of discriminatory retaliation could be
drawn.5 3
0
First, the Second Circuit indicated that "Title IX has been construed to
prohibit gender discrimination against both students enrolled in federally
supported educational programs and employees involved in such pro-
grams."53' Second, the court noted that "[i]n reviewing claims of discrimi-
nation brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment
or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are
applied to such claims under Title VII.'' 532 In analyzing Title VII sexual
harassment claims, the Second Circuit noted that "[w]hether the harassing
conduct of a supervisor or coworker should be imputed to the employer is
determined in accordance with common law principles of agency."
5 33
However,
[i]n contrast, employer liability for a hostile environment created
by coworkers, or by a low-level supervisor who does not rely on
his supervisory authority in carrying out the harassment, attaches
only when the employer has 'either provided no reasonable avenue
for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.
534
Since the plaintiff "fail[ed] to allege that even NYU's agents knew or should
have known of the continued harassment in the present case,"535 the Second
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.
In an unusual case, Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Productions, Inc,536
students contended that compulsory attendance and some of the conduct at
an AIDS awareness program put on by an outside company at the school
constituted a Title IX violation due to the establishment of a hostile envi-
530. Id.
531. Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
532. Id. The court did make reference to the fact that it "looked primarily to Title VII, as
well as to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (1988)
(prohibiting racial discrimination in federally supported educational programs), in defining the
contours of a student's private right of action under Title IX for gender discrimination
occurring in college discriminatory proceedings." Murray, 57 F.3d at 248. (citing Yusuf v.
Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994)).
533. d at 249 (citations omitted).
534. Id (citations omitted).
535. Id at 250.
536. 68 F.3d 525 (lst Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996).
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ronment based on sexual harassment.537 On October 23, 1995, the First
Circuit noted that, because the Title IX case law was sparse, it would apply
the Title VII standards. 538 As such, "the court must consider not only the
actual effect of the harassment on the plaintiff, but also the effect such
conduct would have on a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position. 539
The court concluded, based on facts involved herein, "[i]f anything then,
they allege discrimination based upon the basis of viewpoint, rather than on
the basis of gender, as required by Title IX".,4 Thus, the appellate court
affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint.
On April 23, 1996, the Fifth Circuit, in Doe v. Hillsboro Independent
School District,54' a case involving allegations of the rape of a female
student by a male custodian, determined that it did not have appellate
jurisdiction to review whether Title IX causes of action were valid in this
interlocutory appeal.542 The school district was not a party to this appeal,
which was brought by individually named defendants. The court, in dicta,
noted that there is no Title IX claim against individuals.543 However, the
court held that the plaintiffs could go forward with their 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims against individual officials based on allegations of inadequate hiring
policies and inadequate supervision stemming from the officials' deliberate
indifference to the custodian's criminal record. 5
E. Student/Student (Peer Sexual Harassment)
1. Interscholastic Students
In Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Board of Education,545 an action for
Title IX peer sexual harassment brought by a female fifth grade student
537. Id. at 529.
538. Id. at 540 (citations omitted).
539. Id.
540. Id. at 541.
541. 81 F.3d 1395 (5th Cir. 1996).
542. Id. at 1407.
543. Id. at 1400 n.9.
544. Id. at 1403. See also Armstrong v. Lamy, 938 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Mass. 1996). In
Lamy, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the district court stated that "[t]o prove that a hiring policy
violated her rights, [the plaintiff] must show that (1) the hiring procedures were inadequate;
(2) the school officials were deliberately indifferent in adopting the hiring policy; and (3) the
inadequate hiring policy was a cause of his injury." Id. at 1036. See also supra note 469.
545. 862 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub. nom. Davis
v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.), vacated, 91 F.3d 1418 (1lth Cir.
1996). See also Houston v. Mile High Adventist Academy, 872 F. Supp. 829 (D. Colo.
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against the school board for the alleged actions of a fellow male fifth grade
student, included the touching of her breasts and vaginal area, and using
vulgar language toward the plaintiff. The plaintiff reported these incidents
to her teacher, who only verbally admonished the offending student. The
alleged sexual harassing activities continued. The principal had also been
notified. On August 29, 1994, the district court determined that
the sexually harassing behavior of a fellow fifth grader is not part
of a school program or activity. Plaintiff does not allege that the
Board or an employee of the Board had any role in the harassment.
Thus, any harm to [the plaintiff] was not proximately caused by a
federally-funded educational provider.
5 46
The court, disregarding the decision in Doe v. Petaluma School District,
547
thus found "no basis for such a cause of action in Title IX or case law
interpreting it'548 for the imposition of Title IX liability on the Board for
peer sexual harassment of which the school becomes aware.
During 1996, the Eleventh Circuit explored the issue of whether a
violation of Title IX occurs when allegations of sexually hostile environ-
ments are created due to the actions of a fellow student, and thus impute
liability to the school board. On February 14, 1996, the circuit court in
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,549 ruled it would apply Title
1994). In Houston, a female plaintiff alleged that a teacher allowed students to use his home
for sexual relations. The plaintiff was sexually assaulted by a male student at the teacher's
residence. No Title IX claim was raised. The district court held that under Colorado law there
was no fiduciary duty between the private school and student. Id. at 835. Cf Bruneau v.
South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 169 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). In Bruneau, the district
court applied a modified Title VII standard for peer sexual harassment to a Title IX claim. Id.
at 169. This court rejected utilization of constructive notice and instead required that "[t]he
plaintiff must show that the school and/or school board received actual notice of the sexual
harassing conduct and failed to take action to remedy it." Id. at 173. The trial occurred
during November 1996. The attorney for the school district argued in closing summations that
"[nlame-calling and inappropriate touching among sixth-graders amounts to misbehavior, not
sexual harassment ...." Associated Press, Gay Student Gets $900,000 for Harassment,
NEWSDAY, Nov. 21, 1996, at A18. See also Levin, supra note 444, at 22.
546. Aurelia D., 862 F. Supp. at 367.
547. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir.
1995). See also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (1lth Cir.), vacated and
reh'g en banc granted, 91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
548. Aurelia D., 862 F. Supp. at 367.
549. 74 F.3d 1186 (1 lth Cir. 1996).
1997]
97
Heckman: On the Eve of Title IX's 25th Anniversary: Sex Discrimination in
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
VII standards to determine this type of Title IX sex discrimination case.5 It
stated:
Thus, we conclude that as Title VII encompasses a claim for dam-
ages due to a sexually hostile working environment created by co-
workers and tolerated by the employer, Title IX encompasses a
claim for damages due to a sexually hostile educational environ-
ment created by a fellow student or students when the supervising
authorities knowingly fail to act to eliminate the harassment.
551
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that
[t]he elements a plaintiff must prove to succeed in this type of sex-
ual harassment case are: (1) that she is a member of a protected
group; (2) that she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment;
(3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
her education and create an abusive educational environment; and
(5) that some basis for institutional liability has been established. 52
Moreover, the Title VII use of the common law principles of agency
will be applied to determine the fifth element.5 53 Finally, the court informed
that
[i]n determining whether a plaintiff has established that an envi-
ronment is hostile or abusive, a court must be particularly con-
cerned with (1) the frequency of the abusive conduct; (2) the con-
duct's severity; (3) whether it is physically threatening or humili-
550. Id. at 1191 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75-76
(1992)).
551. Id. at 1193 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Burrow v. Postville
Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996). In Burrow, the female plaintiff
had a party at her parents' farmhouse, without their presence, which resulted in property
damage approximating $1,500. The plaintiff apprised the school of the names of the
individuals responsible. Subsequently, according to her allegations, she and her family
informed the school of a slew of verbal and physical assaults and alleged that the defendants
"failed to take any meaningful action to end the harassment and protect" the plaintiff. Id. at
1196. The plaintiff further alleged that she graduated a semester early to escape the ongoing
hostile school environment. "[P]rior to October of 1992, the School District had no official
policy to deal with cases of sexual harassment.., and that prior to June of 1993, the School
District had no grievance procedure for claims of sexual harassment." Id. at 1198.
552. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194 (citations omitted).
553. Id. at 1195.
642 [Vol. 21:545
98
Nova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 3
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol21/iss2/3
Heckman
ating rather than merely offensive; and (4) whether it unreasonably
interferes with the plaintiff's performance. The Court has ex-
plained that these factors must be viewed objectively and subjec-
tively.554
Doe v. Petaluma School District 55 concerned allegations of verbal
sexual harassment of a female student by a male junior high school student,
as well as from female students, where the school counselor did nothing after
being informed. The allegations included sexual comments, references to
her breasts, and lewd writings about the plaintiff on the bathroom walls.
First, the district court held that student-to-student harassment is actionable
under Title IX.556 Second, in elaborating on what standard should be
applied, it noted that
[t]he 'knew or should have known' standard is in essence a negli-
gence standard.... Discriminatory intent (or discriminatory ani-
mus) means that one actually meant to discriminate.... Thus, a
plaintiff student could proceed against a school district on the the-
ory that its inaction (or insufficient action) in the face of complaints
of student-to-student sexual harassment was a result of an actual
intent to discriminate against the student on the basis of sex.
557
Third, "individuals may not be held personally liable under Title IX.... [I]t
is the educational institution that must be sued for violations of Title IX. 5
On May 12, 1995, the Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, encapsulated the
issue to whether the high school counselor had a legal duty at the time of the
1990-92 incidents which would have required him in his official capacity to
do something about it. The court stated that "[wle must examine the state of
Title IX law as it existed between the rulings of Cannon and Franklin. In
doing so, we conclude that it was not clearly established, at the time of [the
counselor's] alleged inaction, that he had a duty to prevent peer sexual
harassment."559 The court also concluded that an opinion letter (letter of
findings) issued by the OCR was insufficient enough to establish such a
duty. The appellate court, however, cautioned that if the counselor "engaged
554. Id. at 1194.
555. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
556. Id. at 1563.
557. Id. at 1576.
558. Id at 1576-77.
559. Doe, 54 F.3d at 1451.
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in the same conduct today, he might not be entitled to qualified immu-
nity."560
The dissent noted that while there was no Title IX case explicating that
a school official would be liable for failing to stop peer sexual harassment,
the court should not have provided the counselor with immunity. 561 "Just as
an employer must take remedial action 'reasonably calculated to end' co-
worker harassment ... so too must school officials take remedial action
reasonably calculated to end peer harassment."
5 62
In another case, Seamons v. Snow,563 after the plaintiff, the backup
quarterback, had exited the shower area, members of the high school football
team used athletic tape to bind him to a towel rack in the boys' locker room.
While the plaintiff was restrained, another male student brought a female
student, whom the plaintiff had taken to a homecoming dance, into the
locker room where she observed the undressed plaintiff. The football coach
then suspended and dismissed the plaintiff from the team. Thereafter, the
superintendent canceled the remaining football season. The plaintiff alleged
a hostile educational environment in violation of Title IX. On October 4,
1994, the federal district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the
action, including the Title IX claim. 4
The court came to a number of conclusions. First, as a general obser-
vation, the court stated that "Title IX's protections arise when sex is the
motive behind a harmful discriminatory act. Title IX was not intended to
create a genderless society in which every act gives rise to a cause of action
simply because it affects a male or female." 565 Second, the court emphasized
the three elements necessary to establish a Title IX claim: "(1) that he or she
was excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to
discrimination in an educational program; (2) that the program receives
560. Id. at 1452.
561. Id. at 1453-54 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). The dissent cited the following Title IX
cases: Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Lipsett v. University of P.R.,
864 F.2d 881 (Ist Cir. 1988); Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges and Occupational
Educ., 813 F.2d 311 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987); Moire v. Temple Univ.
Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986); and
Alexanderv. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id
562. Id at 1455.
563. 864 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Utah 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 84 F.3d 1226
(10th Cir. 1996).
564. Id. at 1123.
565. Id. at 1116.
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federal assistance; and (3) that his or her exclusion from the program was on
the basis of sex. 566
Third, the court found the parents of the plaintiff did not have standing
as beneficiaries of Title IX protection, which is in accord with R.L.R. v.
Prague Public School District 1-103.567 Fourth, the court also concluded that
the plaintiffs in a Title IX action must establish discriminatory intent.568
Fifth, the court concluded that the defendants' failure to either adopt a
sexual harassment policy or to designate a Title IX coordinator and griev-
ance policy affects both the females and males equally. Therefore, as a
matter of law, the plaintiffs did not demonstrate an intent to discriminate.
5 69
Finally, the district court went further and determined that Title IX does
not create a cause of action based on negligence for a hostile environment.570
Furthermore, since the defendants' conduct was not sexual in any way, the
plaintiffs allegations were not sufficient to constitute a claim of sexual
harassment. 571 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision as it concerned the
Title IX determination on May 8, 1996, but reversed as to the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiff's claim regarding freedom of speech. 2
In Mennone v. Gordon,573 the female plaintiff, a high school senior,
alleged sexual harassment by a male high school student. He repeatedly
insulted and assaulted her, "making remarks about her breasts, grabbing her
hair, legs, breasts and buttocks, and threatening to rape her. [The teacher]
did nothing to stop [the student's] actions.... [and t]he school administra-
tion took no action against [the male student]. 5 74 The district court stated
that
566. Id. (citing Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139, 143-44 (W.D. Pa.
1989), affd on other grounds, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989)).
567. 838 F. Supp. 1526 (W.D. Okla. 1993).
568. Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1117 (D. Utah 1994) (citing Guardians Ass'n
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 603; Doe v. Petaluma Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560,
1563 (N.D. Cal. 1993)). But see Heckman, supra note 15, discussing sexual harassment under
Title IX, and specifically the text accompanying notes 354-56 discussing Guardians. The
position articulated in Seamons is apposite the stance in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Pfeiffer
v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 788 (3d Cir. 1990); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678
F. Supp. 517, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1987). Haffer is discussed in Heckman, supra note 92, at 22-23.
569. Seamons, 864 F. Supp. at 1122.
570. Id. at 1118.
571. Id. at 1119.
572. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1239 (10th Cir. 1996).
573. 889 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1995).
574. Id, at 54-55.
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[l]ogically, the language of Title IX demands that a defendant must
exercise some level of control over the program or activity that the
discrimination occurs under. Thus, the plain language of the stat-
ute sets forth a functional restriction that does not preclude indi-
vidual defendants, as long as they exercise a sufficient level of
control.575
Furthermore, the court concluded that "Title IX has a sufficiently compre-
hensive enforcement scheme to demonstrate that Congress intended to
foreclose enforcement through § 1983 .' ' 76 Allegations of peer sexual
harassment of a female student by fellow male students were also addressed
in the May 2, 1995, decision in Oona R.-S. v. Sant Rosa City Schools.
577
In another case, Bosley v. Kearney R-I School District,578 a female
student complained that other students were sexually harassing her. She
brought suit against the school district on a number of grounds, including
violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title X. 579 The district court ruled on
October 19, 1995, that the plaintiffs parent was not a proper party plain-
tiff.580 The court determined there was no Fourteenth Amendment viola-
tion58' and enunciated that "compulsory school attendance does not create
the custodial relationship necessary to impose constitutional liability on the
defendant school district for failing to protect [the plaintiff] against alleged
sexual harassment by her fellow students." 582 It also found that Title VII law
provided the standards for enforcing the anti-discrimination provisions of
Title IX. 583 The court stated that "[d]iscriminatory intent is a fluid concept
that is sometimes subtle and difficult to apply. 584  Additionally, there
575. Id. at 56.
576. Id. at 59-60.
577. 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussed supra p. 628).
578. 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
579. Id. at 1013.
580. Id. at 1020.
581. Id. at 1019.
582. Id. at 1018.
583. Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1022. "Franklin supports the conclusion that Title VII law
provides standards for enforcing the anti-discrimination provisions of Title IX." Id. 'The
Office for Civil Rights also uses Title VII's hostile environment standard in determining that
an educational institution's failure to take appropriate remedial action regarding known
student-to-student sexual harassment is a violation of Title IX." Id.
584. Id. at 1020 (citations omitted). "It implies that the decision maker... selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at 1021.
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existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the school district
intentionally discriminated against the female student based on her sex. It
cautioned that, "[o]nce a school district becomes aware of sexual harass-
ment, it must promptly take remedial action which is reasonably calculated
to end the harassment.,, 585 "[There is no notice problem where a school
intentionally discriminates."
586
The district court stated that "[d]iscriminatory intent is not synonymous
with discriminatory motive. Neither does it require proof that unlawful
discrimination is the sole purpose behind each act of the defendant being
scrutinized." 58 7  The court elaborated that discriminatory intent may be
demonstrated by "direct" evidence, or by inference as "an invidious dis-
criminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts."5
88
The court set forth the elements required to establish a claim of sex
discrimination for student-on-student (peer) sexual harassment in any
educational program or activity receiving federal funds as follows:
1) the plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; 2)
the harassment was based on sex; 3) the harassment occurred dur-
ing the plaintiff's participation in an educational program or activ-
ity receiving federal financial assistance; and 4) the school district
knew of the harassment and intentionally failed to take proper re-
medial action. If the finder of fact makes these findings, the finder
of fact may infer that defendant intentionally failed to take appro-
priate remedial action because of plaintiff's gender.
589
585. Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1023.
586. Ia at 1025.
587. Il at 1020.
588. Id. at 1021 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). See also Wright v.
Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996). In Wright, the court
stated:
In light of the preceding analysis, this court agrees with the majority view that
Title IX encompasses a claim for peer-to-peer sexual harassment. However, the
court does not believe that a school district can be held liable under Title IX for
its negligent failure to remedy the sexually harassing behavior by a student's
peers despite its knowledge of such behavior. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Franklin explicitly demands more than mere negligence to create liability for
monetary damages for a violation of Title IX-it requires plaintiffs to show in-
tent to discriminate.
liL at 1419.
589. Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1023 (emphasis added).
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2. Intercollegiate Athletes
In addition to Title IX, female co-eds are beginning to assert violations
of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act. 59  Examples of such assertions
by female co-eds can be found in two 1996 cases in which the females
alleged that they had been raped by male football athletes at their respective
schools.591
F. Employment Sexual Harassment
In Ward v. Johns Hopkins University,592 two female employees at Johns
Hopkins University instituted suit claiming sexual harassment by a fellow
male employee in violation of Title IX.593 One of the plaintiffs also alleged
sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title Vii.594 The University
moved for summary judgment. On April 22, 1994, the district court noted
that "[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that the sexual harassment of an
employee may give rise to a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII.
595
The court discussed the two theories utilized to predicate such a claim: quid
590. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13981-14040 (1994), Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902-55 (1994). This Act provides for compensatory damages and
was promulgated under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
591. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D.
Va. 1996) (dismissing the plaintiff's Title IX claim against the University). The female co-ed
at the University claimed she was raped by two male football players (who were not indicted
by the grand jury) who she claimed received preferential treatment by the University. In
Brzonkala, the court stated that "[i]n the final analysis, Brzonkala has alleged a flawed
judiciary proceeding, the outcome of which disappointed her, but she has failed to allege facts
that would support the necessary gender bias to state a claim under Title IX." Id. at 778-79.
The case presented a cause of action alleging violation of the 1994 Violence Against Women
Act. During July 1996, in the first case to assert a violation of the new law, the district court
judge ruled that the Act was unconstitutional. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State
Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779, 801 (W.D. Va. 1996). The United States Justice Department had
filed a brief in support of the law. Id at 781.
The second case was commenced during 1996 by a female student, who sued the Univer-
sity of Nebraska and Christian Peter, a former defensive tackle for the school and fifth-round
draft choice in the 1996 National Football League draft. The woman alleges that she was
raped by Peter in 1991, and that she has asserted a violation of the Act. Arena, supra note
298, at A63.
592. 861 F. Supp. 367 (D. Md. 1994).
593. Id. at 369.
594. Itd (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (1995)).
595. Ward, 861 F. Supp. at 372.
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pro quo or hostile environment. The Supreme Court recently elaborated on
the hostile environment basis as a "middle path":
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objec-
tively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title
ViI's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively per-
ceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually
altered the conditions of the victim's employment and there is no
Title VII violation. 96
The court further determined that the substantive law involved with Title VII
sexual harassment would apply to a Title IX claim. 7
On June 13, 1994, the Supreme Court, in Karibian v. Columbia Univer-
sity,598 denied the University's petition for writ of certiorari regarding a
collegiate female student-employee's Title VII claim against the University
based on allegations of sexual harassment by her supervisor, pursuant to the
theories of quid pro quo and hostile environment.5 99 The Second Circuit
held actual economic loss was not required to establish quid quo pro sexual
harassment. °° During June 1996, based on the University's failure to
reasonably investigate the employee's sexual harassment claim, the district
court judge vacated the jury's award of $450,000 in favor of the plaintiff
against Columbia University? °1 However, the jury found no sexual harass-
ment by the supervisor? °2 An appeal can be expected?' 3
596. Id. at 373.
597. Id at 375.
598. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693 (1994). See Cohen v. Litt, 906
F. Supp. 957, 962-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (ruling that the probationary elementary teacher's
claim of hostile environment sexual harassment was not sustained pursuant to Title VII, where
there was only a single unwelcomed sexual advance without any physical contact).
599. Karibian, 114 S. Ct. at 2693.
600. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 779.
601. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 930 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
602. Id at 150.
603. See also Redman v. Lima City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 889 F. Supp. 288 (N.D. Ohio
1995) (discussing the suit instituted by a custodian against a school district for actions by the
principal predicated upon Title VII sexual harassment). Another case, Pinkney v. Robinson,
913 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1996), involved allegations of sexual harassment, based on hostile
environment pursuant to Title IX and Title VII, which the female plaintiff, the confidential
executive secretary of the dean of the University of the District of Columbia, claimed the dean
of the law school committed. The woman had been terminated for allegedly poor performance
on the job. The district court ruled that the Title VII standards would be applied to the Title
IX claim. Id. at 32, The district court rejected a strict liability application. Id. at 33.
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G. Cases Commenced by Individuals Charged with Sexual
Harassment
In Coplin v. Conejo Valley Unified School District,604 an unusual case,
the accused predator in a sexual harassment action, a male high school band
member who had been charged with twenty incidents concerning female
students and who further admitted to certain actions in a written document,
subsequently sued various school administrators and the school district
claiming a violation of due process. 6°5 The district court issued a judgment
in favor of the defendants finding no violation, which the court based on its
finding that the plaintiff and his parents knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to a hearing.6°6 The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the
school had to identify the plaintiffs accusers.
60 7
VIII. LEGISLATIVE AND ExEcUTIVE ACTION
A. Congressional Action
On May 9, 1995, the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education,
Training & Life-Long Learning, chaired by Representative Howard "Buck"
McKeehon (R-CA), held oversight hearings on Title IX and intercollegiate
However, the court found that a material issue of fact existed as to the law school's proce-
dures, which prevented the granting of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id. at
34.
604. 903 F. Supp. 1377 (C.D. Cal. 1995). See also Motzkin v. Trustees of Boston Univ.,
938 F. Supp. 983 (D. Mass. 1996) (rejecting the theory set forth by an assistant professor, who
had been terminated due to sexual harassment charges alleging violation of the American with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994), claiming a psychological disorder, called
disinhibition, for which he was being treated); Silva v. University of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293
(D.N.H. 1994) (regarding a male professor who commenced a lawsuit challenging the
University's determination of his alleged sexual harassment remarks, pursuant to the issue of
academic freedom and violation of the First Amendment freedom of speech and abrogation of
due process rights afforded pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment); Yusuf v. Vassar College,
827 F. Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (concerning a male student who questioned the school's
internal sexual harassment policy which had charged him with sexual harassment of a female
co-ed), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994). See also Title IX Tickler,
NCAA NEws, Apr. 29, 1996, at 17 ("Former San Diego State University's women's volleyball
coach, Myles Gabel filed suit April 2 against the institution and individuals involved in the
termination of his employment last year... [based on] alleged unprofessional conduct and a
violation of the school's sexual harassment policy."). See also Cohen v. San Bernardino
Valley College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussed supra p. 623).
605. Coplin, 903 F. Supp. at 1379.
606. Id. at 1387.
607. Id.
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athletics at the urging of the College Football Coaches Association and
members on men's nonrevenue intercollegiate teams, especially wrestling
teams.608
On August 3, 1995, Representatives Hastert and Johnson introduced a
Title IX amendment. The bill would require that congressional funds could
not be used by the OCR, unless it issued a new policy guidance to post-
secondary institutions, which includes objective criteria clarifying how such
institutions can demonstrate a history and continuing practice of program
expansion for members of the underrepresented sex. No action has been
taken on the bill, beyond being assigned to the appropriate committee. The
issue should be moot with the issuance of the new OCR "Clarification of
Intercollegiate Policy Guidance: The Three Part Test."
The General Accounting Office issued a report during October 1996
investigating Title IX compliance by schools nationally.0 9 It was reported
that the House of Representatives Committee on the Budget issued a report,
608. See Report, Hearing on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 Before the
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ., Training and Life-Long Learning, 104th Cong. (1995).
Witnesses included: Norma Cantu, Assistant Secretary of the OCR; Representative Cardiss
Collins; Representative Dennis Hastert; Rick Dickson, Director of Athletics of Washington
State University; Dr. Christine H.B. Grant, Director of Women's Athletics at the University of
Iowa; Dr. Vartan Gregorian, President of Brown University; Wendy Hilliard, President of the
Women's Sports Foundation; Dr. David L. Joins, President of Eastern Illinois University; T.J.
Kerr, wrestling coach at California State University of Bakersfield; and Charles M. Neinas,
Executive Director of the College Football Association. Providing a national forum to
presidents of two institutions, who were involved in ongoing Title IX actions (litigation at
Brown University, and a compliance review initiated by the OCR examining Eastern Illinois
University), should not have been permitted. There were no witnesses representing the female
student athletes involved in those cases.
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation held hearings on Octo-
ber 18, 1995 on the Amateur Sports Act and the development of United States Olympic
athletes. The representative of the National Association of Collegiate Women Athletic
Administrators commented:
[I]t is important to bear in mind the critical role that Title IX has played and must
continue to play in order to ensure young women the opportunity to participate
in competitive athletics.... [B]ut after Title IX was passed and opportunities be-
came available, women's participation skyrocketed. If we have learned anything
from this experience, it is that women are interested in playing sports and that
interest expands as opportunities expand,
Amateur Sports Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign
Commerce, and Tourism of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United
States Senate, 104th Cong. 200-03 (1995) (emphasis added) (testimony of Peggy Bradley-
Dopps, Univ. of Mich.).
609. GAO Report Cites Gender-Equity Advance, NCAA NEws, Nov. 4, 1996, at 5.
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dated May 14, 1996, containing a proposal which "would essentially prohibit
dollars being taken from an existing program and reallocate the money to
efforts for gender equity. 610 Such a directive would be gilding the lily, as
Title IX does not presently require that equivalent funding be afforded
separate men's and women's athletic programs, but merely "necessary"
funds.61'
B. Executive Action
On November 29, 1995, the Department of Education issued its regula-
tion, 34 C.F.R. § 668, entitled "Student Assistance General Provisions"
(Final Rule)612 implementing the 1994 "Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act,"
which became effective on July 1, 1996. The information that colleges and
universities are required to provide must have been available by October 1,
1996, and must be available by October 15th of each of the following
years.61
3
The school's report must contain the following information: 1) the
number of male and female full-time undergraduate students that attended
the institution; 2) a listing of the varsity teams that competed in intercolle-
giate athletic competition, and for each team the following data: i) the total
number of participants, by team; as of the day of the first scheduled contest
of the reporting year for the team, and ii) the total operating expenses
attributable to those teams.614 "Operating expenses" is defined as expendi-
tures on lodging and meals, transportation, officials, uniforms, and equip-
ment.
615
It also directs information as to "[w]hether the head coach was male or
female and whether the head coach was assigned to that team on a full-time
or part-time basis." 616 It requires the average annual institutional salary of
the head coaches and assistant coaches of the men's and women's teams.
617
610. Andrew Pittman, Ph.D., ed., Dicta, SSLASPA NEWSLETTER, Sept. 1996, at 5.
611. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).
612. 60 Fed. Reg. 61,424 (1996).
613. 34 C.F.R. § 668.41(e)(2) (1996) (originally published at 60 Fed. Reg. 61,424,
61,433 (1995)).
614. Id. § 668.41(c)(1)-(2) (originally published at 60 Fed. Reg. 61,434 (1995)).
615. Id. See also Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, effective July 1,
1994, which also requires that post-secondary institutions provide revenue and expense
statistics within their athletic departments. New Federal Regulations Require Schools to
Compile Equity Reports, SPORTS LAW., Vol. XIV, Spring 1996, at 3.
616. 34 C.F.R. § 668.48(c)(iii)(A).
617. Id. § 668.48(c)(7)-(8) (originally published at 60 Fed. Reg. 61,424, 61,434 (1995)).
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Additionally, it mandates the total amount of money spent on athletically-
related student aid, the total amount of expenditures on recruiting aggrega-
tely for all men's and women's teams, and the total annual revenues gener-
ated by the men's and women's teams.
618
During January 1996, the OCR issued the official "Clarification of
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three Part Test." 619 The
January 16, 1996 letter from Assistant Secretary Cantu accompanying the
final Clarification informs that:
[T]he Clarification now has additional examples to illustrate how
to meet part one of the three-part test and makes clear that the term
'developing interests' under part two of the test includes interests
that already exist at the institution. The document also clarifies
that an institution can choose which part of the test it plans to meet.
In addition, it further clarifies how Title IX requires OCR to count
participation opportunities .... 620
Secretary Cantu summarized the three-part test by explaining that
[t]he first part of the test--substantial proportionality--focuses on
the participation rates of men and women at an institution and af-
fords an institution a 'safe harbor' for establishing that it provides
nondiscriminatory participation opportunities.... The second
part--history and continuing practice-is an examination of an in-
stitution's good faith expansion of athletic opportunities through its
response to developing interests of the underrepresented sex at that
institution. The third part-fully and effectively accommodating
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex-centers on the
inquiry of whether there are concrete and viable interests among
the underrepresented sex that should be accommodated by an in-
stitution.
621
618. Id. § 668.48 (c)(3), (5), (6). The district court judge ordered the NCAA to submit,
by July 5, 1996, detailed information concerning the salaries of coaches and budgets of the
athletic programs of member institutions in association with the case of Law v. NCAA, 902 F.
Supp. 1394 (D. Kan. 1995). The case challenged the Association's ruling restricting the
amount of compensation certain part-time coaches of Division I schools can receive.
619. Letter from Norma Cantu, Assistant Secretary, Office for Civil Rights, Clarification
of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three Part Test (Jan. 16, 1996) [hereinafter
Clarification].
620. 1& at 2.
621. Id.
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For satisfaction of prong one, substantial proportionality between the
percentage of student athletes and full-time undergraduate enrollments, the
Clarification states that, in determining participation opportunities, OCR
counts the number of actual athletes participating in the athletic program.
622
The final Clarification provides a working definition. 623 It notes that, "[a]s a
general rule, all athletes who are listed on a team's squad or eligibility list
and are on the team as of the team's first competitive event are counted as
participants by OCR., 624 Additionally, "an athlete who participates in more
than one sport will be counted as a participant in each sport in which he or
she participates.,, 625 The OCR stated that the requirement of "substantially"
proportionate would be made "on a case-by-case basis.
626
As to the second prong of a history and continuing practice of program
expansion for the underrepresented sex, the OCR
looks at the institution's past and continuing remedial efforts to
provide nondiscriminatory participation opportunities through pro-
gram expansion .... [T]he focus is on whether the program expan-
sion was responsive to developing interests and abilities of the un-
derrepresented sex. In addition, the institution must demonstrate a
continuing (i.e., present) practice of program expansion as war-
ranted by developing interests and abilities.
6 27
However, the OCR will accept as evidence of the second prong "an
institution's current implementation of a nondiscriminatory policy or
procedure for requesting the addition of sports (including the elevation of
club or intramural teams) and the effective communication of the policy or
procedure to students ..... 628 While it will not be acceptable to merely
622. Id. at 2-3.
623. Id. at 3.
624. Clarification, supra note 619, at 3.
625. IL
626. Id at 4. However, the OCR notes that it
would also consider opportunities to be substantially proportionate when the
number of opportunities that would be required to achieve proportionality would
not be sufficient to sustain a viable team, i.e., a team for which there is a suffi-
cient number of interested and able students and enough available competition to
sustain an intercollegiate team.
Md at 4-5.
627. Id. at 5-6.
628. Clarification, supra note 619, at 6. "[Plart two considers an institution's good faith
remedial efforts through actual program expansion.... Cuts in the program for the underrep-
resented sex, even when coupled with cuts in the program for the overrepresented sex, cannot
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promise to expand the program for the underrepresented sex at some time in
629the future, merely having a policy in place should not be permitted to
satisfy prong two.
630
Finally, as to the third prong, "the Policy Interpretation does not require
an institution to accommodate the interests and abilities of potential stu-
dents. 631 The Clarification also states that
[i]n making this determination, OCR will consider whether there is
(a) unmet interest in a particular sport; (b) sufficient ability to sus-
tain a team in the sport; and (c) a reasonable expectation of com-
petition for the team. If all three conditions are present OCR will
find that an institution has not fully and effectively accommodated
the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex.
632
Furthermore, "[a]n institution may evaluate its athletic program to assess the
athletic interest of its students of the underrepresented sex using nondis-
criminatory methods of its choosing.... These assessments may use
straightforward and inexpensive techniques, such as a student questionnaire
or an open forum, to identify students' interests and abilities."
633
Proposed revisions to the OCR Title IX Athletics Investigator's Manual
are still under review. Additional comments were solicited during the
beginning of 1995. Moreover, there has been no updated Policy Clarifica-
tion concerning coaches compensation.
During the period from March 22, 1988 (when the 1988 Amendments to
the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 was adopted) to September 30,
1995, the OCR conducted only 50 Title IX compliance reviews of intercolle-
giate athletics programs among it's ten regional offices. 6 34 Also, individuals
be considered remedial because they burden members of the sex already disadvantaged by the
present program." Id. at 7.
629. Ma
630. See, e.g., Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (concerning
repeated attempts by female students over a period of about eight years, to establish a
women's varsity ice hockey team at the University through the administrative process;
however, they were consistently rebuffed), vacated, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993). See also
Bryant v. Colgate Univ., No. 93-CV-1029, 1996 WL 328446 (N.D.N.Y. June 11, 1996)
(discussed supra p. 579).
631. Clarification, supra note 619, at 9.
632. Id.
633. Id. at 10-11.
634. Based on information supplied by the OCR on November 8, 1995, pursuant to a
Freedom of Information Act request of the Women's Sports Foundation (on file with the Nova
Law Review).
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filed ninety administrative complaints against post-secondary institutions. 635
For example, during May 1995, the OCR allowed Eastern Illinois University
another opportunity to fashion a compliance action plan. This plan will
permit the University to retain two men's teams and establish a women's
golf team during the 1996-97 academic year.636 On August 30, 1995, the
administrative complaint filed by female athletes against the University of
Pennsylvania was settled. It was reported that the University agreed, among
other things, "to enhance its facilities and to bolster coaching staffs for
women's sports. 637
An administrative complaint was filed against Dearborn High School
protesting the closing of a significant number of bathrooms in order to
diminish student smoking.638 It was alleged that this subjected the female
students to urinary tract infections, thus discriminating against the female
students in violation of Title JX.639 The school reopened the bathrooms.
Subsequently, based on the school district's actions, the OCR closed the
case.
640
635. The OCR indicated it was concluding its monitoring activities overseeing the com-
pliance action plan agreed to by the University of Toledo. The administrative complaint was
filed on May 8, 1990. It took almost four years for the OCR to agree to a plan dated
December 8, 1993. The University added two new varsity teams for women, golf and soccer,
and also expanded the size of some of the existing women's intercollegiate teams. OCR File
No. 5-90-2070 (Region V) (Final Monitoring Letter, Apr. 17, 1996) (on file with the Nova
Law Review). The University of Minnesota indicated that during October 1995, the women's
club ice hockey team would be elevated to a varsity team effective during the 1996-97
academic year. Jody Smith, University of Minnesota Adds Women's Ice Hockey, WOMEN'S
SPORTS EXPERIENCE, Feb. 1996, at 13. During May 1996, Johns Hopkins University
announced it was elevating its women's lacrosse program from Division III to Division I
beginning during the 1998-99 academic year. The University of Pittsburgh "announced it
was eliminating its men's tennis and gymnastics programs in a move motivated by Title IX."
Title IX and the Elimination of Men's Athletic Programs, SPORTS LAW., Vol. XIV, Spring
1996, at 5.
636. Sidelines, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 5, 1995, at A43.
637. Douglas Lederman, Athletic Notes: U. of Pennsylvania Settles Sex-Bias Dispute,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 8, 1995, at A61.
638. Maryanne George, Dearborn Schools Sued for Locking Bathrooms, DETRorr FREE
PRESS, May 11, 1995, at lB, 2B.
639. "Because women contract urinary tract infections at 30 times the rate of men and
need more time for personal hygiene, [attorney, Jean Ledwith] King charges the locked
restrooms subject the 600 female students to a much higher risk of health problems than male
students." Id. King has been an advocate for gender equity on the state and national level for
25 years. She represented the students in the administrative complaints filed against
University of Toledo and Eastern Kentucky University.
640. OCR File No. 15-95-1139 (closing letter from the OCR Region V, June 7, 1995).
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IX. CONCLUSION
The Title IX decisions rendered since 1994 illustrate, in some instances,
polar or contradictory results on the same issues. This is in part fostered by
the cursory language of the Title IX statute and the absence of legislative
history, or even of regulatory guidance concerning the myriad conditions
that may give rise to a claim of sex discrimination involving educational
institutions which are recipients of federal funds. The 1992 Supreme Court
decision in Franklin continues to have a significant fallout. In allowing
monetary damages, the number and breadth of Title IX issues has increased
dramatically, as evidenced by the decisions reviewed herein, compared to the
total case law issued prior thereto. The cases clearly exemplify that female
students and educational employees are still subject to second class status on
a nationally. The unveiling of the odious examples of sexual abuse of
female students predicated by male educational employees is a disturbing
aspect. The "glass sneaker ' 64, still exists in the area of interscholastic and
intercollegiate athletics for female students and prospective female coaches
and athletic directors.
First, while the decisions uniformly demonstrate a greater reliance on
Title VII to fill in the gaps or to borrow the standards and relevant case law
in the sexual harassment area, there is also prior case law instructing that
Title VI should be the focal point for reliance in explicating Title IX claims.
Second, since the Title IX statute contains no express statute of limitations,
the courts have been forced to borrow state statutes of limitations based on
differing related causes of actions (predominantly personal injury actions, as
was adopted by the Eighth Circuit in the EgerdahI ruling and the Sixth
Circuit in Lillard, versus civil rights actions), which may give potential
plaintiffs dramatically different time frames within which to initiate their
lawsuits. Third, the courts are ready to recognize a claim of retaliation
pursuant to Title IX, as was implicitly done by the Second Circuit in Murray
and explicitly done by the district courts in Clemes and Clay. Fourth,
interestingly Title IX exempts same sex public military schools from its
ambit. However, the "separate but equal" argument utilized by these schools
was deployed by the 1996 Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Virginia,642 thus rendering moot any argument as to whether the statute
should be amended to eliminate the exception.
641. The author coined this term in her first law review article. See Heckman supra note
92, at 63.
642. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
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Fifth, while the Ninth Circuit in Jeldness recognized a Title IX cause of
action for female prisoners at state prisons, the district court in Archer found
no Title IX cause of action for female prisoners at federal prisons, which are
clearly recipients of federal funds and belies the whole notion of prohibiting
sex discrimination in education. This also raises the question as to whether
some provision should be made to bring educational programs at federal
prisons within the ambit of sexual discrimination protection, whether
pursuant to Title IX or independently.
Sixth, in the area of athletic programs and activities, the cross-over
cases which had been so instrumental, especially on the interscholastic level
during the first twenty years of Title IX's existence has dwindled signifi-
cantly to a handful of cases during the 1990s, with minimal case law during
this three-year period. Rather, the "equal opportunity" cases, especially on
the intercollegiate level, have since come to the forefront in a dramatic way
during the 1990s. During 1996, the First Circuit in Cohen again favorably
resolved an appeal in favor of the female student athletes. 43  The First
Circuit recognized the impact of Title IX stating:
There can be no doubt that Title IX has changed the face of
women's sports as well as our society's interest in and attitude to-
ward women athletes and women's sports. In addition, there is
ample evidence that increased athletics participation opportunities
for women and young girls, available as a result of Title IX en-
forcement, have had salutary effects in other areas of societal con-
cern....
One need look no further than the impressive performances of
our country's women athletes in the 1996 Olympic Summer Games
to see that Title IX has had a dramatic and positive impact on the
capabilities of our women athletes, particularly in team sports.
These Olympians represent the first full generation of women to
grow up under the aegis of Title IX. The unprecedented success of
these athletes is due, in no small measure, to Title IX's beneficent
effects on women's sports, as the athletes themselves have ac-
knowledged time and again. What stimulated this remarkable
change in the quality of women's athletic competition was not a
643. 101 F.3d 155, 188 (1st Cir. 1996). The University filed a petition for writ of certio-
rari during February 1997. The Supreme Court denied review in two prior "equal opportu-
nity" cases on behalf of collegiate athletes-Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 998 F.2d 824
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993) and Kelley v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill.,
35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995).
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sudden, anomalous upsurge in women's interest in sports, but the
enforcement of Title IX's mandate of gender equity in sports.6"
The uniformity of the circuit courts in adopting or condoning the three-
part "effective accommodation" test, as was done by the First, Third, Sixth,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, was disregarded in January 1996 by a federal
district court in Pederson, yielding for a possible appellate determination by
the Fifth Circuit. However, even in Pederson, the female student athletes
were successful in proving that the University had violated Title IX, which
continues the results of all the "equal opportunity" cases brought on behalf
of collegiate female students who have been successful in persuading the
courts of their gender equity plights. Conversely, the male collegiate
athletes, who have sought restoration of their varsity teams, have all struck
out in the judicial arena. Interestingly, no cases were instituted during the
applicable time frame seeking reinstitution of women's varsity intercolle-
giate teams. Perhaps the post-secondary institutions are examining the issue
of Title IX compliance and the NCAA gender equity certification require-
ments before embarking on the elimination of established women's inter-
collegiate teams, especially when the percentages of female students and
female student athletes as compared to the male student athletes is so
skewed.
Seventh, while females continue to be shortchanged in gaining em-
ployment as coaches of men's teams, or as athletic directors running men's
or women's athletic programs, or as head sports information directors, no
litigation has been brought to spotlight this anomaly. Instead, the battlefront
concerns the equal pay and termination and/or retaliation claims brought by
coaches of women's teams (male and female) or female athletic administra-
tion employees. The three federal predicates are Title IX, Title VII, and the
Equal Pay Act. The 1993 Ninth Circuit decision in Stanley, which focused
solely on the Equal Pay Act, continues to garner stature as a basis for finding
that the duties and responsibilities of the coach of men's intercollegiate
(basketball) team were different than the duties and responsibilities of the
coach of women's intercollegiate (basketball) team. The decision was relied
upon by the federal district courts in the Deli and Bartges decisions and the
District of Columbia Superior Court in the Tyler decision. To date, no
courts have examined the Title IX regulations operative in this area and the
exact import that they possess. The Ninth Circuit heard another appeal in
Stanley during 1996. During 1996, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower
644. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 188 (lst Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
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court's decision in Bartges without commenting on the Title IX regulations,
and the parties settled the Tyler case. The two Deli decisions addressed
comparisons of the women's gymnastics and assistant gymnastics coaches
with non-gymnastics coaches. The Bartges case was a hybrid seeking
comparison of the women's softball coach with the men's baseball coach, as
well as other coaches. The first reverse discrimination suit was brought by a
former men's basketball coach, dissatisfied about receiving the salary that
the women's basketball coach was getting. The OCR should issue a revised
policy clarification concerning the compensation area, especially when
differences hinge on the sex of the athletes coached, rather the sex of the
coaches.
Eighth, none of these decisions held that an athletic employee of a
University or college that received federal funds was precluded from setting
forth a Title IX cause of action. However, this is at variance with a number
of other decisions involving educational employees generally.
Ninth, there is a lack of consensus on whether an individually named
defendant, who is an employee or a representative of the governing authority
such as a school board member, may be named as a party in a Title IX
action. Tenth, a number of courts would apply the Title VII standards to
Title IX cases of sexual harassment and even retaliation claims.
Finally, when sexual abuse or molestation of a student occurs, as
opposed to when nonphysical sexual harassment, should the educational
institution be held to a negligence standard of failing to properly act after
notice (whether actual or constructive) based on the clearly intentional and
egregious actions by their employees or agents; or should strict liability be
imposed? Presently, the majority posture as represented in Canutillo
Independent School District calls for "two distinct actions or inaction, at
least one of which is intentional in nature, on the part of an employee and on
the part of the school district ... Title IX does require proof of negligent,
reckless or intentional acts by the school district, independent of the inten-
tional conduct of the employee." 645 While arguably the minority position,
the logic for assigning strict liability in Title IX sexual abuse cases, as in
Leija, has merit. Clearly, as the judge issued in Leija, the educational
institution should be sacrosanct from any and all sexual abuse of students.
However, a restriction on the amount of compensatory damages, as the judge
urged in exchange for imputing the strict liability standard, remains open to
attack for the reasons advanced herein. On whom should the burden lie to
645. Md at 847.
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obviate the liability of the educational institution in the employment and
monitoring of its employees: the second grade student or the educational
institution? As the Eleventh Circuit in Davis cogently stated, "a female
student should not be required to run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for
the privilege of being allowed to obtain an education."
In the hostile environment cases, the Title VII standard appears to
continue in the Title IX cases, including the peer sexual harassment cases.
However, the courts should carefully scrutinize whether the actions by the
educational institutions are protective, timely, and comprehensive enough
after being informed of possible unwanted sexual harassment. Assuming the
reliance on Title VII, it will be interesting to watch for the first judge to
modify a Title IX award to the $300,000 maximum that an individual may
collect in a Title VII case. Title IX presently contains no restriction on the
amount of monetary damages that may be awarded. The OCR should also
issue an updated policy clarification on sexual harassment in education,
analyzing the myriad types of harassment that may occur.
Thus, the 1990s will continue to unfold the parameters of Title IX
protection, through the judicial process and possibly through the legislative
process, especially in light of some of the erratic decisions rendered during
the applicable time frame. The gender line in athletics continues to be the
kryptonite vault line. The Title IX paradigm remains a work-in-progress.
646. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194.
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